The upheavals of 1989 caused the coining of the term ‘year of miracles’. In 1990 a euphoric George Bush described the new configuration of international relations arising in the aftermath of 1989 as ‘a new world order’. Events after 1989 have shown that the world order, whether new or otherwise, is still in a state of flux. Far from being the ‘end of history’ as Francis Fukuyama has claimed, new actors have appeared on the scene together with the old, replacing ideological differences with new geo-political permutations.

Rather than becoming simpler, the situation has become more complicated with the proliferation of states, new interests, new conflicts, and the renewal of antagonisms long suppressed by the exigencies of a bipolar world. This same bipolarity had, before 1989, given rise to fears of a nuclear third World War, yet at the same time it had also presented a reliable paradigm to political scientists and theorists of international relations. New paradigms are still emerging as time unfolds and theorists today are still undecided about what form the overall security map will eventually take.

The year 1991 was a continuance of what 1989 had started. It was the year that saw the complete collapse of what was referred to as the Soviet Union. This event resulted in Gorbachev’s downfall, together with his position as president of a defunct USSR, thus making way for an increasingly forceful Boris Yeltsin whose first actions at the helm were to increase the Russian presidential powers. Although to all intents and purposes the era of a bipolar world had already passed, the removal of one of the major blocs was a significant event for global security. New sovereign states came to the fore with the Russian Federation inheriting the bulk of the former Soviet Union’s powers and burdens. However the re-creation of states like Georgia, the Baltic states, the nuclear capable Ukraine and so on, have complicated the issue.

This essay shall examine the international situation following the demise of the Soviet Union and the various implications as regards security. But why security? The 1990s have shown that the ending of the cold war has not meant an end to conflict. Thus the security map (or architecture, as some prefer to call it) resulting from the break-up of the Soviet Union, is a highly relevant issue in geo-politics today. It is also pertinent to identify what is meant by security in the emerging world order as perceived today. As will be shown, security is a term that is also, in many ways, still evolving. This essay will argue that Russia, although weakened following the Break-up of the Soviet Union, is still a key player.

The changes within the Soviet Union during 1991 were perhaps more remarkable than those of 1989 because they took place in a country in which communist rule had not originally been an external imposition. The short-lived coup which attempted to oust Gorbachev brought things to a head in August and the different republics one by one declared themselves independent.

Ukraine was the first, after the Baltic states, declaring independence on 24 August; Moldavia was next on 27 August followed by Azerbaijan on 30 August. These three were soon followed by Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Turkmenia and Kazakhstan. The three Baltic states had in the meantime secured acceptance of their independence from the state council. By the end of the year Russia was the only republic that had not adopted a declaration of this kind. On 8 December in Minsk, the capital of Belorussia, the three Slav republics (Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine) concluded an agreement establishing an entirely new entity; the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with its headquarters in Minsk. The CIS would provide for unitary control of nuclear arms and a ‘single economic space’. Importantly, the USSR was declared as no longer in existence. On 21 December a further agreement was signed by the three original members and by eight of the other nine republics (all except Georgia which joined later), committing the members of the new commonwealth to recognition of the independence and sovereignty of other members, respect for human rights including those of national minorities, and observance of existing boundaries. In a separate agreement, the heads of member states agreed that Russia should take the seat at the UN formerly occupied by the USSR. Following these developments Gorbachev resigned as President making way at the Kremlin for the new Russian government.

The result of these changes was clear; the shutting down of a centralised system based in Moscow and its replacement by a diversity of independent states. All these "new" states quickly began to assert their distinctive identities. It soon became clear that there were strong pressures forcing them apart and giving rise to disputes between them. No longer could the west deal with one entity in its desire for a security framework; arrangements would have to now take into account the different needs and problems of new actors

Security is considered to be the freedom from threats, dangers and risks. It can also be likewise defined as a condition in which states consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure and economic coercion so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress.

THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF SECURITY

During the era of the Cold War the perception of the possibility of a military and nuclear holocaust were so great that other aspects of security were neglected or ignored. The threat based on ‘mutually assured destruction’ capable of annihilating all of mankind prevented not only nuclear but also conventional war in Europe. The need to keep up with one’s adversary resulted in an exhaustive arms race which some theorists (but by no means all) consider as having led to the Soviet Union’s change of attitude in the late 1980s. The arms race had been escalated during President Reagan’s tenure, in what has been termed as the Second Cold War, resulting in the sapping of the USSR’s already shaky economic strength. The change in the Soviet security approach did enable the achievement of progress in the fields of arms limitations and controls through Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and so forth.

With the disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the demise of communism and its totalitarian regimes and the advent of fledgling democracies in the former Soviet Union and its Central and Eastern European allies, the perception of a large scale military threat has diminished enough to be almost negligible. However vast arsenals of weapons still remain on European soil and even after the implementation of the CFE Treaty, European armies have not been disbanded. The problem with having a large stockpile of weapons is that they can be used, as they have been in ethnic and border disputes or for territorial gain especially in Nagorno-Karabach and ex-Yugoslavia.

Borders are still problematic despite the treaties that have been signed. The collapse of the Soviet Union actually triggered off a series of minor wars such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan for the control of the aforementioned Nagorno-Karabach. Russian troops soon invaded Vilnius and Riga in early 1991, taking over the broadcasting facilities of Lithuania and Latvia just a few weeks after their declaration of seeking independence. Only public and diplomatic outrage especially during a CSCE senior officials meeting forced the Russians to recapitulate. Thus, although one can say that the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc has minimised the risk of a large scale war in Europe, the danger of limited localised military conflict has been increased.

It is important also to keep in mind that the Soviet Union, and now Russia, is not simply just a European power; Russia is in fact best described as Eurasian. In central Asia and the Caucasus there has arisen the risk of a power vacuum, which as the saying goes, attracts power. There is, now more than ever, the danger that neighbouring states such as Turkey will flex their muscles and attempt to challenge (through the new states’ Muslim populations) for a bigger share of spoils in the region. Also territorial claims by China and Japan over present Russian possessions such as the Sakhalin islands have still not been satisfactorily resolved.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF SECURITY

With the demise of totalitarian communism Europe is no longer split on ideological grounds. The adage that ‘democracies do not fight each other’ is no longer, however, accepted as a hard and fast rule. Countries can have apparent democracy whilst still not have effective decision making leadership with the resultant power vacuums that have often led to strife. There is the danger, especially in Eastern Europe, of a disillusioned electorate, reacting with a surge of crime and violence, risking in its turn a spill-over (another Domino Effect?) to other countries. It would appear that where the authority of the state is weak there is a corresponding degradation of international security.

An important aspect of the political dimension of security are human rights and humanitarian issues which are no longer exclusively the internal affairs of states concerned. The European convention of Human rights as adhered to by members of the Council of Europe together with the Helsinki Final Act (HFA) and other CSCE documents emphasise the importance that a state carries out its duties in safeguarding human rights. The HFA gave rise to various non-governmental watchdogs in the totalitarian states of Eastern Europe, such as Charter 77. These and other examples of ‘civil society’ together with increased scrutiny by the international community have been cited as helping in the downfall of communism. Russia, in 1996, became a member of the Council of Europe as did many of the other states of Central-Eastern Europe. In this scenario, national sovereignty is at stake if interference by the international community in the case of gross and massive violations of human rights is allowed by international law. Although international response had been generally muted in regard of the Chechnya conflict, more is expected to be heard in the future, (particularly in regards to Kosovo-type flare-ups), making it an international security issue rather than an internal one as Russia insists it is.

The internal political situation of Russia itself is far from a clear one. The economic hardships suffered by the people due to the economic reforms have resulted in a resurgence of communist popularity. The communist party, albeit in a more democratic form, has become, after the November ‘95 elections, the biggest party in the Russian Duma. Although not a problem in itself, this resurgence has given rise to fears, however founded or unfounded, within the neighbouring states of a new form of Brezhnev Doctrine. These fears have been fuelled by the Yeltsin camp who continually remind the international community that although Russia is committed to live in peace with its neighbours, a communist government might in future seek former expansionism. The biggest danger to Yeltsin’s popularity, apart from the economic problems, is the huge increase in ordinary and organised crime. Unless this is tackled appropriately Russia risks becoming stigmatised as unreliable and unruly, where graft is the common business tool, scaring off outside investment and becoming a country controlled at the domestic level by a new class of power broker.

ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF SECURITY

The economic dimension is inextricably linked with the political and human dimensions as the failure of economic reforms will give rise to social unrest. It can cause mass emigration and give rise to reactionary and nationalistic trends which in turn encourage the advent of demagogues -such as Russia’s very own Zhirinovsky - and dictators.

An economically superior state can use coercion to intimidate another sovereign state into doing what it wants. Russia, although having its own economic problems, has been using its energy supplies of oil, gas and coal to threaten its former partners of the USSR. The government of Belorussia re-established a reunion in April 1996 with Russia because of what it has called "common interests". The major factor contributing to this unexpected decision is of course that Belorussia is totally dependant upon Russia for its energy and economic needs, despite the fact that a substantial portion of the population appeared to be set against any return to being a Russian ‘satellite’.

The international community on the large part has shown itself to be behind Yeltsin and economic reforms. It has even managed to prop up his ailing government with a huge amount of financial aid although not enough to enable Russia to shrug off its many problems. Germany has contributed Billions of Deutsch marks in cash and trade (in part as payment for ‘expenses’ incurred in the removal of soviet troops from East Germany). The IMF provided an aid package of 10 Billion Dollars in loans (March 1996) when Yeltsin appeared to be losing ground in the opinion polls to Zhuganov, the Communist Party leader. This was mainly in response to accusations from Russia that the West was not fulfilling its promises to aid reform. Russia itself strove hard to keep its end of the deal by becoming a member of the IMF and attempting to make the Rouble convertible whilst opening up its market to encourage foreign investors. However the troubles which the Rouble has faced in the second half of 1998 do not inspire confidence.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

Affecting public health and liveable space, environmental degradation can endanger the lives of millions of people. Environmental threats are of a global nature and not a specifically European problem. With the opening up of the former communist countries some horrifying truths were made public. The industrialised regions in East Germany and the Soviet Union had become environmental graveyards. The reality of radioactive waste also came to the fore, whilst the memory of Chernobyl is still a vivid memory reminding everyone of the danger of a nuclear accident due to the deterioration of equipment. In November 1995, Norway was complaining that the Russian Navy was dumping nuclear waste in fields close to the border. All this shows that perhaps the environment might be the most immediate security concern of the new era.

Georgi Arbatov, the Russian Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, warned in 1988 that, "We are going to do something terrible to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy".

THE USA AND NATO

With the change of the political situation many of the actors in the international arena found that they had to change their perspectives. The USA which together with NATO formed the bulwark of defence against an attempt at Soviet hegemony found itself at a loss. NATO as a primarily military alliance had lost its traditional foe, a circumstance which gave rise to doubts about its whole raison d’être. The USA from being one of two super powers became the only entity capable of global military intervention. However the USA had in a way lost its prerogative of taking unilateral action and now needs a mandate from the UN or the CSCE for its involvement to be acceptable by the international community. This was amply exemplified by the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the following Gulf War as well as in ex-Yugoslavia.

NATO enlargement was for a time seen as the only means to incorporate the former iron-curtain countries into a new security architecture. The problem is that while NATO insists that enlargement is the next natural step, Russia has been blowing hot and cold against it. On various occasions Russia has made it clear it will not broach any expansionism which could threaten its direct interests especially in the areas which it considers as its "near abroad". However the countries of Central-Eastern Europe and former USSR republics such as Ukraine, were asking to join. NATO today sees its new role as a security enhancing organisation rather than a defensive one which signifies increased participation from new members

A solution seems to have been found by the formation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) followed by NATO’s proposition of a Partnership for Peace (PfP). This is open to all CSCE states willing and able to participate without, however, implying that joining the PfP signifies eventually joining NATO. This seems to have put Russia’s mind at rest and is itself now a partner after having received the concession of being recognised in writing as the military and nuclear power it still perceives itself to be.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The demise of the USSR aided the integration of Sweden, Finland and Austria into the EU, which because of their constitutions and geography, especially in the case of the latter two, could not join whilst the cold war bloc situation still existed. These three countries’ joining did not present any problem to the EU as their populace was willing while their economies where strong enough for a smooth transition as witnessed by the rapid negotiations and accessions.

However the EU/EC which had been also a bulwark of economic security for Western Europe, found itself in a quandary when faced with the clamours of former iron curtain states newly liberated from the Soviet yoke to join in the exclusive "rich man’s" club. The problem is that while the west had been urging the kind of changes and reforms which actually took place, it is ill prepared to embrace unconditionally these countries with their present struggling economies. These new circumstances have put further enlargement in doubt. Although Agenda 2000 has, in principle, shown the way forward, progress is not expected to be swift, and major changes in the EU institutions are deemed by many to be absolutely necessary if enlargement is to take place at all. On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 had confirmed the EU role in bringing the people of Europe into an ever closer Union; an ideal which should also include the former iron curtain countries.

The problem of both NATO and EU enlargement is that they threaten to increase Russia’s isolation from European affairs. This should be unacceptable for both sides as an isolated Russia would have to go on the defensive with the ensuing international repercussions. Either Russia has to be incorporated with the West (which is not really feasible) or else it has to become strong enough to be able withstand the internal pressures of its own electorate and avoid fear of outside encroachment. As Serge Sur, deputy director of UNIDIR writes: "The USSR used to frighten people because of its strength, now Russia arouses fears because of its weakness". So the only solution in the long run may be to strengthen Russia and help it achieve economic, and not just military, power status.

THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES

Perhaps the biggest change was experienced in the status and role of the states of the so called ‘Neutral and Non-Aligned group’ (N+NA). The countries of this rather loose group which at one point reached a membership of almost a 100 nations spanning all the continents, had its heyday in the 1970’s and 1980’s when they were to be seen to participate in many fora. Their function was then obvious; they were mediators between the super powers whilst at the same time distancing themselves from the ongoing conflict (imaginary or otherwise) between the two blocs as well as being wooed by them. The CSCE process itself was a triumph for the N+NA where they could be seen at one point chairing nearly all the work shops at the various summits.

However with the demise of the USSR the whole concept of being Non-Aligned seems to have lost its meaning. One is tempted to beg the question; aligned and non-aligned against what? While countries like Switzerland still insist that there is a role to play, the increasingly multilateral forms that organisations and institutions are taking seem to preclude the need of such positions. In the ideal scenario everyone would be aligned towards a common aim. However, the ideal is not always achievable, and blocs still exist albeit being economic rather than military. Even the latter can once again become a possibility which in its turn would show that shedding the mantle of neutrality and non-alignment could be an overly hasty decision. This debate although not drawing the attention of International Relations theorists as much as one would expect (possibly because the major actor states were not N+NA) is a keenly contested one. As with other debates, only time can really give an empirical and pragmatic answer to the dilemma of what is best, or at least feasible, in the long run. In itself non-alignment is a non sequitur in a world where the UN is increasingly made out to be the future global government, and neutrality loses its meaning when everyone is an equal sovereign partner. At the end of it all, however, states will still try to act in their own best interests and will attempt, if allowed, to adapt to the new scenarios the future may offer in the most advantageous way possible.

The security order is still emerging as new actors evolve and new roles are comprehended. The Soviet Union has disappeared (for the time being at least) and in its place one finds a number of sovereign states amongst which Russia stands out as the largest and most powerful yet at the same time perhaps the most vulnerable.

As has been seen, security today has many facets which interact together to form a universal challenge to the stability of nations and states. It is accepted that political security is intrinsically dependent on economic well being and both aspects can effect military security. Environmental security in its turn knows no boundaries and demarcation lines. It effects everyone and actions of states have repercussions even on future generations.

The world has been left with only one real super power with global interests. The USA has had to shoulder this burden, much to its chagrin, as the only alternative would have to be an isolationist position similar to that of the inter-war period. This is of course unacceptable in today’s scenario but Washington has for some time now increasingly demanded that it wants others to help carry the cost of peace making and keeping. Nonetheless it is still, by far, the only power capable of global intervention; a position which earned it the name of ‘global policeman’.

The EU immediately reacted to the collapse of communism by absorbing East Germany whilst the demise of the USSR allowed the accession of Finland, Sweden, and Austria. Now the EU has to face the problem of economically weak states wanting to join it. The ideological and political division in Europe is, hopefully, a thing of the past. However, if the EU does not integrate the countries of the East, albeit slowly and gradually, a new division will arise; an economic one between the haves and the have-nots. This, in a way, can actually be worse than the previous division as the people of Eastern European countries, including those of the former Soviet Union, now have expectations which would be hard to suppress. They know what they want and they know where and how they can get it. If they don’t achieve prosperity they will inevitably blame the West for what is perceived as broken promises.

The way forward in solving many of the above problems, some contend, lie in multilateralism. The CSCE process has now become the OSCE and will inevitably be a principle building block for future enhancement of relations. It is especially well qualified as it now encompasses the whole of Europe down to Vladivostok whilst still retaining that all important Trans-Atlantic link. The UN has already accepted actions taken within the OSCE as being compatible with its charter’s provisions for regional arrangements.

Russia, which still remains an enigma to many, has an important role to play in any international arrangement. The new scenario has made it possible for the Western world to try and enlist this giant as an ally rather than a foe. Although this might mean huge amounts of aid in both finance and technological expertise, it is surely a worthwhile endeavour. A strong and stable Russia within the international community and part of the global market is a guarantee for future co-operation and coexistence. On the other hand a Russia in chaos and ungovernable may give rise to nationalistic forces which would seek to take by force what they perceive as being denied to them by the West. Bolstering Russia is perhaps the only way that the problems arising out of the demise and break-up of the Soviet Union, including those related to security in Europe, can be offset.

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