THE BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND EUROPE SINCE THE 1992 ELECTIONS.
Soon after the 1992 elections any semblance of unity over Europe, within the Conservative Party, disappeared. The question of British sovereignty within an ever closer European Union became, to the Conservatives, a huge divisive issue. In many ways the problems the Conservatives faced, (and are still facing), were similar to those that threatened to blow the Labour party apart in 1975. Dissent towards John Major's handling of affairs at Maastricht, and of his dealings with Europe in general, had been muted during the 1992 election campaign in order to secure victory. Up to May 1992, a few days after the new Parliament opened, support was still forthcoming. The Maastricht Bill passed its second reading with a comfortable 244 vote majority with only twenty-two Conservative MPs voting against. However, with the election safely out of the way, there was nothing to stop the Eurosceptics from attempting to steer Britain away from what they considered to be a "European Federal System" especially after the result of the first Danish referendum on Maastricht and the forcing of Sterling out of the ERM.
Post-Election Blues
The result of the first Danish referendum on Maastricht provoked a strengthening of Euroscepticism and Anti-Maastricht sentiment in Britain. Sixty-eight Conservative back-bench MPs signed a Commons motion calling on the government to use its presidency of the Council of Ministers to make a new start on the development of the EC. Major however responded that renegotiation of Maastricht was not a practical proposition. The pressure on Major increased when Margaret Thatcher (by now Baroness Thatcher) attacked the Prime Minister during a television interview on 28 June saying that Major was wrong to agree to a 'treaty too far' and called for a referendum. In her maiden speech to the House of Lords, Lady Thatcher reiterated her demands for a referendum and made it clear that she would vote against ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
In September 1992, John Major had to face another huge problem. Major had been an ardent advocate of Britain's joining of the ERM and had been the Chancellor of the Exchequer when a reluctant Thatcher placed Sterling within the ERM in October 1990. On 16 September 1992, heavy currency speculation (which had been partly prompted by the possibility of a negative vote in the French referendum on Maastricht due to be held four days later) forced the floating of the Sterling. The result was that Sterling and the Italian Lira could not maintain their level (within their respective fluctuation bands) and had to leave the ERM. The shock felt in Britain was enormous. John Major's and the Conservative's policies were immediately put into question. Less than two years after joining the ERM, Britain was forced out; it was a blow to national pride and opinion polls immediately demonstrated a loss of support for the Conservatives.
Major's problems were further exacerbated by Britain's continuing economic recession. Unemployment in January 1993 reached three million and the rate of business failures remained high. While inflation came down to levels comparable with other EU countries, the recession greatly harmed public sector finance. These problems, together with the loss of a by-election at Newbury Berkshire, caused the dismissal of Norman Lamont from his post of Chancellor of the Exchequer. In July 1994, Major reshuffled his Cabinet replacing four senior ministers. In November 1994, Major decided to tackle the Eurosceptics head-on. A European Community (Finance) Bill was declared by Major as a vote of confidence. The Bill was passed comfortably but the Tory whip was withdrawn from eight Eurosceptic backbenchers who had abstained, while a ninth voluntarily relinquished the whip. The Tory Eurosceptics were becoming stronger all the time and in a Commons vote on 6 December 1994, about the imposition of the full rate of VAT on household fuel and heating, the Government was defeated by 319 votes against 311. In July 1995, Major once again confronted his critics by resigning the party leadership and standing for re-election. Major won the 4 July 1995 leadership election against John Redwood, the Secretary of State for Wales, easily and in the process Major strengthened his position within the Conservative Party. It was now certain that he would lead the Conservative Party in the 1997 elections. Nonetheless the Conservatives kept losing seats through by-elections and defections. By the beginning of March 1997, Major's administration had become a minority government propped up during crucial votes in the Commons by the Ulster Unionists.
The New Labour Party
The fourth consecutive electoral defeat in 1992 was a terrible blow for Labour and Neil Kinnock resigned soon afterwards. However Labour started to recover morale when John Smith was elected as leader after a landslide victory over Bryan Gould. Smith continued reforms started by Kinnock, and in 1993 he pushed through rules for Parliamentary candidates to be selected solely by members of the party. In this way the power of the Unions over the Labour Party was reduced. John Smith was slowly making the Labour Party more trustworthy in the eyes of a growing sector of the electorate.
Unfortunately, on 12 May 1994, John Smith died following a heart attack, and Tony Blair succeeded him after achieving a convincing victory over John Prescott. Blair continued to speed up the pace of Labour's internal reforms and enhancing the Labour Party's popularity. In the summer of 1994, Blair decided to scrap Clause four, thus, moving the Labour Party further away from its Socialist past. Blair's shock tactics appeared to be immediately popular with the public. By July 1995, the Labour Party, by now dubbed 'New Labour', had built a 30-point lead over the Conservatives in the opinion polls.
As the 1980s ended and the 1990s began, Labour had on the whole become increasingly pro-EC. By late 1988 Labour had come out in favour of the ERM, while in September 1991 its economic sub-committee recommended acceptance of EMU. By 1995 the conversion seemed complete. Tony Blair, speaking in April 1995 at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, confirmed the Labour Party's support for participation in a single currency and the extension of Qualified Majority Voting. However, by the end of 1996, Blair too began to take a more cautious line. While Labour committed itself to signing the Social Chapter, it nonetheless promised a referendum on the issue of the Single Currency and EMU. In this way, Blair attempted to play down the European issue, using it only to highlight Tory divisions and Major's lack of leadership in keeping the Tory Eurosceptics in line. Blair's preference was to concentrate on domestic issues on which he hoped to win the approaching election.
The 1997 Election: Europe as a Political Issue.
Europe slowly, but inexorably, became a contentious issue for the Tories in the run up to the 1997 general elections. The focus was primarily upon the Single Currency and EMU . The issue, however, soon centred around choosing the right people to defend Britain's interests in the forthcoming Amsterdam Inter-Governmental Conference in June 1997. Moreover early in 1998 the European Union is expected to decide which countries qualify for the Single Currency while Britain is itself due to take over the Presidency of the Council from 1 January 1998. The Conservatives, heavily split down the middle, officially came out with a 'wait and see' policy vis-�-vis the Single Currency. Meanwhile, millionaire James Goldsmith, founder of the Referendum Party, threatened to contest each marginal Conservative seat with his own candidates, unless the Tory candidates concerned declared themselves in favour of a referendum.
By February 1997 the Conservative ' wait and see' policy was starting to show cracks. Malcolm Rifkind, the Foreign Secretary, declared in a radio interview that the government was hostile towards plans for a single currency. On 4 March, Stephen Dorrell categorically stated that a Tory government would not be joining the Single Currency on 1 January 1999. Although John Major emphatically denied that the government had declared itself against joining the Single Currency, the Eurosceptics were increasing in number and becoming more vociferous. In fact, by the 17 April, 177 Tory candidates had declared themselves against the Single Currency.
The Labour Party leadership had also started to waver. On 20 February 1997, Gordon Brown, the Shadow Chancellor, said during a BBC interview, that both he and Blair judged that there were
real obstacles facing Britain and other countries that are increasingly difficult to overcome by 1999......We are keeping our options open to protect the nation's economic interest.
The official Labour and Conservative stands on the single currency were now beginning to resemble each other. However speaking in Brussels, in early March, Robin Cook, the Labour Party Shadow Foreign Secretary, used a more pro-Europe tone, claiming that the "Labour government in waiting" was prepared to lift several veto threats to a revamped Maastricht Treaty. Cook said that Labour was ready to remove obstacles laid by Tory Ministers at the IGC although Britain would insist on maintaining British control over passports.
Nonetheless, the Eurosceptics could no longer be held back especially on the Tory side. The announcement of the election date started, what can only be called, a scramble of candidates breaking ranks and coming out against the single currency. The Conservative leadership had no alternative but to allow (and in some cases adopt) the Eurosceptic line. The Conservatives accused the Labour Party, that by signing the Social Chapter and accepting the introduction of the minimum wage, they would be selling out Britain. John Major and Kenneth Clarke (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) speaking at a press conference, said that a new strategy, based on "Europe isn't working" which would highlight unemployment problems in the other European countries, would be a key element in their campaign.
Faced with its own Eurosceptics, the Labour Party in its election manifesto, published on 3 April 1997, adopted the 'wait and see' policy stating that
there are formidable obstacles in the way of Britain being in the first wave of membership, if EMU takes place on 1 January 1999..........there are three pre-conditions which would have to be satisfied before Britain could join during the next Parliament: first, the Cabinet would have to agree; then Parliament; and finally the people would have to say 'yes' in a referendum.
On April 13, Robin Cook declared that individual Labour candidates who came out against a European single currency (although, according to Cook these were small in number) would not be punished. The same declaration had been made by the Conservatives two days earlier on 11 April 1997, when William Hague, the Welsh Secretary, (a Eurosceptic) supported by Conservative Central Office, stated that Candidates were free to say what they liked about the Single Currency. Both the major parties had decided that they would not allow the Single Currency issue to split them. For the Tories, however, this was easier said than done. Being in government meant that any policy statements made would have immediate international repercussions. John Major's hands were being increasingly tied.
What has been described as a "pro-European Majority" did make an effort to fight back. An advertisement signed by 97 pro-European MPs was published in The Times on the 12 March 1997. The advertisement emphasised the importance of Britain remaining a full and committed member of the EU, and maintained that to withdraw would be disastrous. The advertisement was signed by 39 Tories, 40 Labour MPs, 17 Liberal Democrats and one Scottish Nationalist. A European Commission poll the day before had shown that 80 per cent of the British people were in favour of staying in the EU.
The "City" also came out in favour of Europe and the Single Currency. In early March 1997, Adair Turner, Director-General of the Confederation of British Industry warned that if Britain stayed out of EMU
"amidst triumphalist assertions of our superiority and against a background of wider Europhobia, rubbing our hands with glee at Europe's problems, we could risk isolation".
Other big industries which favoured the single currency included inter alia British Aerospace, Unilever, and Toyota.
An interesting "contribution" to the debate during the election campaign in Britain was made by Jacques Santer, the President of the European Commission. During a speech in Amsterdam on 21 April 1997, Santer attacked British Eurosceptics saying
"Those who criticise, do they know what they are talking about?...Do these doom merchants want us to step backwards towards a Europe only composed of simple trading arrangements?...No one can seriously suggest that we turn back the clock and deprive ourselves of the strength and advantages of belonging to the world's first economic power".
John Major, beleaguered by the split within his party seized on this statement as proof that Brussels was intent upon federalism, saying that
"unlike the Labour leader I will retain our vetoes. If it is right for Britain, I will keep my feet on the brakes. Mr. Blair would....put his foot on the accelerator to a federal Europe. This is the clear choice on May 1. I repeat: if Europe goes federal, a Conservative British government would not follow".
For the first and last time during the election campaign the Tories were momentarily united. Santer's statement managed to provide the Conservatives with a cause in the form of a common "enemy". The unity did not last long however as Eurosceptic Tories kept insisting upon a definite "no" to the single currency. A commitment that Major would not accept.
Public Opinion on Europe
Public opinion seemed to change drastically in the last month of the election campaign. A MORI opinion poll, published in The Times on 17 April 1997, showed that Eurosceptic ideas had gained a lot of ground. For the first time since 1975, an opinion poll showed that the majority of the British public was not in favour of remaining in the European Union. To the question put to them, 40 percent said they would vote to stay in and 40 per cent said they would vote to get out, with 20 per cent having no opinion. In the case of a single currency referendum, 22 per cent said that they would vote in favour and 58 per cent would vote against. However 57 per cent said that Britain should keep its options open and 33 per cent said that Britain should rule out immediately being in the first group of countries to join the single currency. Once again British public opinion on Europe appeared indecisive. While a majority said that they would vote against a single currency, a majority also said that the option should be kept open. Two views which are not compatible.
Nonetheless, for the two larger political parties, Europe had become a liability, if only because of the confusion associated with it. One might argue that the public's thinking on Europe should have helped the Tories rather than hindered them. The Conservative Party was becoming more and more anti-Europe, while Labour was perceived to be more in favour of the EU (due to the Social Chapter) and therefore the European issue should, at least on paper, have lost the latter support. An NOP poll published on 13 April indicated that 32 per cent of the British public believed that the Conservatives had the better policies for looking after British interests in Europe while only 29 per cent held the same opinion regarding Labour and seven per cent regarding the Liberals. So the question to be asked is why did the Labour Party maintain a healthy lead over the Conservatives in the opinion polls throughout the campaign and achieve a landslide victory of historical proportions? The probable reason is that when it comes to voting for a government the people do not vote for just a party's European policies, or for that matter any one single policy. In A Mori Poll published on 10 April, Europe was considered to be the most important single issue by only 22 per cent of those polled. Twenty-two per cent is a significant number, but does not compare with the 68 per cent who said that health care was the most important issue that would influence the way they voted. However, neither party wished to risk alienating that 22 per cent of the electorate for whom Europe was the most important issue. And it is probably for this reason that both big parties, in the end, shied from taking an official stand either pro- or anti-Europe. Once again neither the Conservatives nor the Labour Party would risk an election over Europe. The best policy appeared to be to retain possible future options.
The British electorate, on 1 May 1997, overwhelmingly returned the first Labour government after 18 years of Conservative rule. Tony Blair entered 10 Downing Street as Prime Minister on the 2 May, backed by the largest ever labour majority (179 seats), achieved through a nation-wide swing of over ten per cent. The Conservatives in turn suffered their worst defeat for over a century. But how much of this result is attributable to the European issue is still not clear. Increasing Eurosceptic opinion in Britain should have pointed to, if not a Conservative victory, at least to a lesser majority for Labour. What is certain is that the European issue divided the Conservatives, making them less able to withstand the Labour tide that swept them away. With no seats won either in Scotland or Wales, the Conservative Party is now in the very weak position of being only an 'English' Party. For Labour, Europe seems to have been no more and no less than just another issue which helped them by splitting their opponents and weakening Major's leadership. In fact, when John Prescott, Deputy Leader of the Labour Party was asked whether Europe was an important issue in the election, he answered that only "the Tories have tried to make it so".
Tory Eurosceptics, by and large, fared badly during the 1997 elections. But so did the many of the Europhiles. On the other hand, the Liberal Democrats, who of all parties in Britain can be said to have been the most favourably inclined towards Europe, more than doubled their seats compared to the 1992 elections. However, the Liberal Democrat influence in the new Parliament has been reduced by the huge Labour win. The Labour Majority ensures that, barring dissent that might lead to a party split, Blair can push through any legislation and policies the new government wants. Electoral obscurity on Europe however means that the immediate policy (with the exception of the Social Chapter which Labour promised to sign) seems to be to wait and see. Nonetheless, it will be Tony Blair who represents Britain in the next Head of Government Summit in Amsterdam, while the European Union has a full and important agenda for the coming years, which includes the implementation of a Single Currency, Monetary Union, a search for a true Common Foreign and Security policy and also, possibly, enlargement. The political debate in Britain about Europe is not over yet.