Dialectic, Cosmos, and Society
Issue Number Two
Introduction
Maggie Vosburg Mansueto: "Ross for Boos": A preliminary consideration of the Perot campaign
Boris L. Gubman: Philosophy and Religion in the Postmodern Epoch
Anthony E. Mansueto: Synergism: The Transition to a Postindustrial, Postmarket Society
Introduction
The penetration of market relations into every sphere of life has gradually eroded nonmarket social
relationships and broken down the mediating institutions which are the foundation for a vibrant public
life. As people become less and less connected with each other --or rather as they relate to each other
only through the marketplace-- it becomes increasingly difficult to build effective political organizations.
This has been felt most acutely by the international workers movement, which is everywhere in a state
of crisis. And without support (and pressure) from an organized and powerful working class movement,
the more progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie have been unable to carry out the kind of structural
reforms which are necessary for continued social progress under capitalism. The result has been
political stalemate and social disintegration.
As the marketplace transforms all relationships into simply a means of realizing individual consumer
interest, it becomes increasingly difficult for people to find meaning in human history or in the larger
cosmos of which it is a part. Thus the rise of nihilistic "postmodern" ideologies. We are increasingly
aware of the fact that our scientific concepts are themselves social products --that the human mind is
less a mirror of reality than an organizer of information. Our location within a social matrix wholly
determined by market relations, however, makes it impossible for us to see these scientific concepts as
among the highest expressions of the self-organizing activity of the cosmos, and thus true precisely
because they are social products and not merely the result of the persistent and patterned bombardment
of our sense organs by physical stimuli. Social products in a market society are, after all produced to
meet individual consumer interests. No one product is "correct." Thus the hyper-relativism of the so
called "post-modernist" epistemologies.
Maggie Vosburg Mansueto's article draws attention to the danger associated with periods of social
disintegration and political stalemate: the danger of authoritarian populism. Specifically, she situates
the Presidential candidacy of right-wing tycoon Ross Perot in the context of the current situation, and
makes some tentative evaluations of the political valence of his appeal. Boris Gubman's article
explores some of the dangers of postmodernism and suggests that religious traditions can provide an
important safeguard for universal values, but can also fuel bigotry and reaction. Such traditions must
always be assimilated through the perspectives of a critical rationality.
My own article summarizes a longer work in progress which attempts a comprehensive solution to the
current crisis. I begin by reviewing current scientific developments which provide a rational basis for
belief that the cosmos generally, and human history in particular, are characterized by the development
of increasingly complex forms of organization. I characterize the goal towards which nature and society
are developing as synergism: a form of social organization in which the resources of society are
deployed in such a manner as to best promote the all-sided development of human social capacities and
of the self-organizing activity of the cosmos as a whole. I argue that neither the marketplace nor
centralized redistributional systems are adequate to the tasks of organizing synergism. Finally, I
develop a detailed analysis of the current situation, assessing the current alignment of social forces,
defining the principal constituency for the transition to a synergistic form of social organization,
identifying strategic and tactical reserves, adversaries, etc., and outlining a strategy for the transition.
I argue that our principal task in the present period is the development of an organization which can
create the technological, economic, political, scientific, and spiritual conditions for the transition to
synergism.
A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THE PEROT CAMPAIGN
Maggie Vosburg Mansueto
As the primary season draws to a close, the traditional two-party electoral system of the United States
is in disarray. Both major parties have had a clear frontrunner for months, yet polls show an
independent with no political experience leading in several areas of the country. Ross Perot's candidacy
can no longer be dismissed as the eccentricity of a bored billionaire. The current situation leaves open
the very real possibility that Ross Perot will become the next president of the United States. I believe
that this candidacy and the social conditions which make it possible represent a serious threat to the
progress of the civilizational project in the United States and around the world.
In order to understand Perot, we must situate him within the context of the current situation. The public
arena in the United States today is profoundly pluralistic. Civil society exists as a complex network of
overlapping and interactive institutions, each of which leverages its own influence through the power
of its analysis and/or the attractiveness of its values and traditions to various sectors of society. There
are institutional leaders in a number of sectors: labor leaders, heads of foundations, members of
community organizations, leaders of the various religious groups, a multiplicity of politicians of
different levels of government and the associated bureaucracy. This is the meaning of pluralism, that
every decision must be brokered through the competing interests of organized (i.e., powerful),
interdependent institutions. Under the current system, flawed as it is, I exist not solely as one isolated
voter, but as one piece of several different organizations, each of which promotes some aspect of my
total, complex self-interest. I may belong to a number of limited issue organizations (environmental,
feminist, anti-racist, pro-labor, international solidarity, etc.). I may work with a local tenants'
organization, or the local school or social service agency. I may support a number of political
organizations that are something less than full-scale parties. I may belong to a religious congregation.
I work, so I have an interest in the business of my employer and my clients. Each of these institutional
affiliations magnifies my impact on society as a whole, as I both affect and am affected by my struggles
with them. And all of them help me to hold the various levels of government accountable to my needs
and the needs of society as I see them.
So why is the country in such a mess? The sad fact is that these mediating institutions are being
undermined by the very nature of a market economy. My connections to society are relentlessly
narrowed by the dictates of the marketplace. When I have to work 40, 50, 60, 80 hours a week simply
to feed and house my family, it becomes increasingly difficult to get involved in a meaningful way with
other institutions. Many people find it nearly impossible simply to keep up with the news, much less
take an active role in the restructuring of our society. Our economic system is ripping people apart.
The range of institutions which serve to bind people together into a productive and mutually developing
whole is being destroyed, leaving people isolated, disorganized, and confused. What is needed, clearly,
is to rebuild the democratic infrastructure of genuine pluralism by organizing people into complex,
vibrant institutions which authentically develop people's capacities to engage with the world while
tapping into their true self-interest.
Instead, the political process itself, even the bourgeoisie's ability to govern, is unraveling. As people
become increasingly isolated and unconnected institutionally, the formal electoral channels are called
upon to fill the gap. Congress gets bogged down in debates about values that used to be dealt with
substantively through the complex matrix of mediating institutions. Since all citizens take less and less
responsibility for the common good, elected officials are expected to govern a pluralistic society from
above. There is less and less organized support for politicians to do anything substantive about social
problems. And since many of the changes that need to be made threaten vested and powerful interests,
government has ground down to a political stalemate, with no sector able to do anything more than
block the advance of other sectors.
This is the type of situation that has historically led to Bonapartism or to fascism. Bonapartism can be
defined as the emergence of a charismatic leader who enters the political arena from some other field
(usually the military) and rules by mediating on behalf of a stalemated ruling class. He is able to
accomplish societal changes because he can inspire in the masses confidence in his person, rather than
in a set program of values or identities. Ultimately, he becomes disposable as the ruling class reasserts
its ability to rule through more traditional governing structures. Fascism, on the other hand, is the
attempt by the most reactionary elements of the ruling class to restore social discipline (and thereby
labor discipline) through appeals to religion or national identity. Although it is usually dominated by
a charismatic leader, he demands submission on the basis of his embodiment of the national identity.
In this way, fascism is often capable of surviving the death of its founder.
Ross Perot can be seen as exhibiting elements of both tendencies. He clearly fits the image of the
Bonapartist outsider, come to save the system that made him wealthy. One example of his desire to
bypass the role of mediating institutions that give some influence to the working class can be seen in
his support for the innovation of the electronic town meeting. Through audio and video hook-ups
scattered around the country, Perot would take his message to the people and receive their feedback
directly, unencumbered by political representatives, lobbyists, or political action committees. He
envisions a structured "debate" between experts on a given issue, with each side having the opportunity
to present its view, followed by an electronic vote/opinion poll of "the people." This procedure is seen
as a way to return power to the people and thereby revitalize democracy. It is the late twentieth century
idea of participatory government.
The dangers of this approach are legion. To begin with, who are these "experts" who would have such
power to shape public policy? Who chooses them? It goes without saying that even moderate leftists
would have a hard time getting on to such a list, much less those whose analysis threatens the status
quo. And even if they could get a hearing, would they have the resources to present their views
effectively? The possibilities for autocratic control by the executive exist on several fronts. What does
this do to the role of Congress? Imagine the impact of an electronic town meeting on welfare the night
before the Congress votes on the budget, or on capital punishment right before a confirmation hearing
for a Supreme Court justice. Is there any effective way for Congress to serve as a check on the power
of the executive when Ross is boss and "the people" (as an undifferentiated mass) have spoken?
Consider the implications of having the debate occur between "experts". This represents a big step
toward the clericalization of American politics. Instead of the overlapping, interdependent dynamic of
mediating institutions, we have a simple dichotomy between the governing (including the experts who
form the ideological shock troops for the executive) and the governed. Anyone who is not either a part
of the executive or one of the appointed (anointed) experts is reduced to the "equality" of anonymity
and relative powerlessness.
Perot's town meeting approach eliminates these mediating institutions altogether. My blip on the
computer is one single blip. The rich complexity of the network of my relationships and alliances has
been flattened into a binary response to the computer king. In the name of empowering the people, he
will have inaugurated the populism of uniform alienation and powerlessness.
An analysis of Perot's fascist tendencies is rather more complex. To begin with there is the question
of how a fascist could rule in the United States. Granted the number of voters who are willing to
identify themselves with the far-right wing is large enough to be of some concern: witness the
campaigns of David Duke and Pat Buchanan. But appeals to the old bases of group identity (race,
religion, nationalism, sexism) seem to lack the kind of universality that is necessary for the old-style
fascist hegemony. Neither Duke nor Buchanan really hit on the fundamental basis of the American
Ideology. For all the claims to the contrary on both the right and the left, Americans do not for the
most part identify themselves by race or religion or even patriotism. Those sorts of appeals do not
generate enough energy for people to be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to bring a fascist to
power.
Perot is not an old-style fascist, because the people of the United States are not a nation in the
traditional sense, nor are they unified either religiously or ethnically. Rather, as the imperatives of the
market have eroded the basis for non-market relations and values, those relations and values have been
replaced by the insatiable quest for instant consumer gratification. Most Americans would at least pay
lip service to a kind of American Ideology of rugged individualism and economic achievement. Perot
certainly plays to that ideology by portraying himself as the self-made man, and placing economic
competitiveness on the top of his agenda. Many of his supporters justify his right to govern by alluding
to the image of the federal government as the country's largest corporation. Citizens become either
stockholders, clients, or employees, depending on the context within which the image is being used.
This represents a more adequate attempt to hegemonize an American Ideology as the basis for
authoritarian power.
Yet, somehow even the American Ideology seems to have little power to energize people today.
Certainly the level of self-discipline required to reach the kind of society Perot talks about would seem
to be beyond most people in the United States. Americans want to be seen as hard-working, and many
are working longer and longer hours, yet they are only willing to work hard for an immediate reward.
The same person who might put in 60 hours to get a bigger paycheck on Friday is unwilling to put in
half that time to work on any of the larger issues facing our society. People are discouraged because
they "don't feel like they're having any impact" on a situation that they know intellectually will take
years to begin to effect.
Ross Perot offers instant voter gratification. No need to spend time educating yourself on the issues
or getting involved in organizing a constituency for some policy or candidate or party. Just call our
toll-free number, 1-800-I-GOVERN, and you've taken care of all your responsibilities as a citizen.
Never mind that the un-politician is running his own political system called authoritarian populism.
Never mind that the system is even less responsive to the complexities of your life than the current
silliness in Congress. Just close your eyes and push the button, and Ross the Boss will take care of
everything.
This aspect of Perot may well represent a new third way to authoritarianism. He has been described
in the mainstream press as practicing corporate feudalism at EDS. Perhaps that is a more adequate
approach to understanding him? We simply do not know enough about him yet to be able to make that
judgement.
There are, of course, a wide range of questions still to be answered. What is the social basis for the
Perot campaign? What is its relationship to various factions within capital? We need a clearer view
of the political valence of the phenomenon--how deep does the authoritarianism go? How is it likely
to be manifested? What is Ross Perot's strategy? What should be our response?
It is imperative that all progressives understand the nature of Perot's appeal and its danger for any
pluralistic society, because even if Perot does not become president, those tendencies within U.S.
society which make him attractive will still be with us. Any effective strategy for change must take all
of these conditions into account--political, economic, cultural, social, and psychological. They are
arrayed today in a configuration that is vulnerable to a demagogue like Ross Perot. To what--or whom-
-will they be vulnerable tomorrow?
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN THE POSTMODERN EPOCH
Boris L. Gubman
The relation between philosophy and religion has always been a problematic area of considerable
importance. The power of philosophical reflection consists in questioning any kind of vision of man,
universe and God, and rejecting or justifying this or that global world outlook. Philosophy and rational
theology were united in Antiquity, clarifying mythological thought. The harmonization of philosophy,
rational and mystical theology was the focus of different thinkers of the Middle Ages. The
Enlightenment emancipated philosophy from theology and religion. Nevertheless, philosophy retains
its ties with eternal theological issues, as shown by German classical philosophy, for example.
Friedrich Nietzsche was the prophet of the total deconstruction not only of the legacy of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, but also of the roots of classical philosophy, which were nourished in the final
instance by religion. He laid the foundation for the postmodern pattern of thought, which is so
important for understanding the current spiritual situation. But even after the total deconstruction efforts
of the prominent thinkers of our century, the religious impulse is still alive, motivating efforts of
philosophers of different orientations. Religious philosophy has undergone serious changes, facing the
attack of its adversaries. At the same time some prominent secular philosophers of the late twentieth
century are quite close to religious values in their conclusions concerning the destiny of man in the
present day world. Let us consider the specific traits of relations between philosophy and religion in
the epoch of postmodernity.
Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-
Francois Lyotard and others have done a lot to create the postmodern situation and style of doing
philosophy. Their ideas form an opposition to the classical pattern of philosophical thought of the
Enlightenment: rationalist belief in the power of reason to comprehend the universe in its essential
dimension and to lead man to the final victory over irrational forces; humanistic orientation and global
historicism; accompanied by utopian ideals of the future. The philosophy of postmodernism questions
and refutes this set of ideas. It denies both a rationalist understanding of the power of reason and
substantialist ontological constructions that are born within this approach to the universe. Western
reason is criticized in the light of the existence of different systems of categories in other cultures,
uncovered by ethnological investigations. Classical philosophy is reproached for the "humanistic self-
mystification of man." Substantialist global views on history are rejected, and the antiutopian climate
prevails. Lyotard claims that all traditional values are overthrown and the new world outlook may be
characterized as pagan. This conclusion is based on the understanding of man's cultural creativity as
gaming activity directed against universal human values. It is interesting to note that the real "new
paganism" of Alain de Benoist and other representatives of the "new right philosophy" in France
appeared in exactly this spiritual atmosphere. Even secular and religious thinkers who are somehow
opposed to the radical deconstruction of the classical tradition, must understand the demands of the
postmodern situation, its spiritual character and modify their style of doing philosophy. It is impossible
to consider the philosophical problems in the old-fashioned manner after postmodernism.
Religious philosophy of the second part of the twentieth century has become anthropologically oriented.
The image of man as creator of the universe of culture and history is produced by the representatives
of different schools of religious thought. In some respects this is the continuation of the efforts of such
thinkers as M. Scheler, Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier, Gabriel Marcel, Paul Tillich, Reinhold
Niebuhr, Nikolai Berdyev, D. Merezcovsky, Martin Buber and others. In response to the challenge
of postmodernism Karl Rahner, E. Coreth, W. Luijpen, Paul Ricoeur, W. Pannenberg and other
anthropologically oriented religious philosophers claim that man is still alive in spite of the constant
threat of the dehumanization of culture. Clarifying the mystery of human existence, they are using
methods developed by German philosophical anthropology, existential phenomenology, and
hermeneutics.
The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur seems to be one of the most representative examples of the attitude of
contemporary religious thought to the problem of method. The crisis of rationalism creates the situation
that might be called "hermeneutical." Revealing different dimensions of human existence in the world
means, according to Ricoeur, the use of different hermeneutical strategies. He claims that Martin
Heidegger, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Claude Levi-Strauss, G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx
and the hermeneutics of sacred symbols are offering mutually complementary interpretations of human
existence. Thus, this hermeneutical field is open to a variety of interpretations which help to understand
the richness of the multidimensional existence of man, which is open to the realm of absolute values.
The universe of nature and history appears through the horizon of different symbolic systems, invented
and transformed by man. This is the response of the leading religious thinkers to contemporary changes
in the philosophical climate.
Religious anthropological philosophy of the late twentieth century, opposed to antihumanism, defends
universal human values as necessary for the solution of global social and political problems. Karl
Rahner, for example, was a thinker who spoke in favor of absolute Christian humanism as a basis for
assessment of different types of humanism. "Christianity renders every concrete humanism contingent,
i.e., dispensable, in favor of another future humanism, by situating every one within God's open
future." In the light of the events of the twentieth century, two world wars, the Gulag, and
Auschwitz, religious philosophy and philosophical theology according to Rahner necessarily become
politically engaged. "The theologian is aware that, since the necessary setting for the individual's
salvation is the Church as the unity of mankind and its history, theology must always be 'political
theology'". In putting this critical task for religious philosophical reflection, Rahner was evidently
influenced by the neo-marxism of the school of Frankfurt. His view is shared by K.-H. Weger, Johann
Baptist Metz, Gustavo Gutierrez, Hugo Assmann, Juan Luis Segundo, Jose Miranda, Jurgen Moltmann
and others. Critical reflection serves as an instrument directed against ideological illusions and social
evil. Its positive aim consists in supporting universal human values within the context of culture.
History is the focus of contemporary religious thought: it understands the ultimate reality of God as
revealing itself through the cultural activity of people within history. Sacred and profane histories are
interpreted not as two separate realities, but as a certain unity. J. Ladriere describes their relations in
the following way: "Horizontal relation, connecting me with history, is always bound together with the
vertical, leading to the transcendental, so to say, to the realm above this world." History has its
intrinsic value, constantly enriched by the efforts of man creating cultural reality.
The "City of God" and the "Secular City", according to contemporary religious philosophy, are not
divorced, not opposed to each other. On the contrary, they are closely united. Thinkers doing
philosophy in the Thomistic tradition speak nevertheless about the difference between the two cities.
Other Catholic philosophers, sharing principles of theological modernism, do not stress this difference.
Their arguments would seem to be in accord with their Protestant colleagues, who are inclined to follow
Paul Tillich in this respect.
Interpreting history in the eschatological perspective, contemporary religious thinkers claim that it has
its own intrinsic finality. Ladriere agrees with Maritain's description of this finality, giving meaning
to history:
"We can propose with Maritain the following characteristic of this finality: the growing
conquest of nature (by means of technology and organization), the self-perfection of the
human being (through the development of the life of spirit: art, science, philosophy), the
actualization of the possibilities belonging to human nature. Without any doubt, we must
add to these three elements: the establishment of the just society and true peace (this
means universal social order). In a simpler way it is possible to characterize the essential
historical finality as the progressive establishment of the of the kingdom of truth and
justice, i.e. as the perfection of the demands of reason in the double form--theoretical and
practical, on the level of individual existence, as well as from the point of view of the
collective life."
So, history is viewed in its inner dimension as having humanistic finality: the eschatological perspective
does not exclude the self-development of man and the evolution of the society in the direction of justice
and peace. Eternal values are embodied in different cultural worlds, actualizing the opportunities of
mankind.
The belief in the humanistic dimension of history and its intrinsic finality does not prevent religious
philosophers from uncovering the actually existing symptoms of the contemporary situation of crisis.
Using the power of critical reflection, they are in search of the roots of the tragic events of our century.
Nietzsche was the father of the genealogical analysis of the cultural tradition. Genealogical
deconstruction is very much in fashion among the representatives of different schools of postmodernism.
It is natural that religious philosophers are also trying to explore the field of cultural tradition by means
of the genealogical analysis. They differ from their secular colleagues by declaring that they accept a
certain set of values before the process of genealogical deconstruction.
The decline of religious influences is described in various ways. Harvey Cox and G. Vahanian speak
about the "death of God" as a necessary consequence of the "biblical faith", desacralizing nature and
history. The "biblical ferment" stimulates an active attitude of man towards the universe. It nourishes
the contemporary scientific-technological thought, which is permeated by the spirit of the Renaissance
and totally alien to religion. The revival of religion is inevitable in this world, deprived of its sacred
dimension, because longing for God is the strongest impulse of man's life. Deconstructing the roots
of the contemporary religious crisis, J. Ladriere shares the assumption of later Husserl, Max Weber,
and the Frankfurt school. M. Muller accepts the ideas of later Heidegger. They both look toward
the future religious renaissance in the context of the desacralized world. It is evident that religious
philosophers are appealing to the set of ideas born within the pattern of postmodern thought, but are
reaching quite different conclusions, proving by anthropological arguments the necessity of the revival
of religion and its values.
Laying stress on the eschatological hope, religious thinkers are criticizing utopias as playing a sinister
role in this century. They are right in seeing absolute finite ideals as a very dangerous tendency.
Totalitarian regimes of different kinds promised "Eden on Earth", but failed to satisfy even the most
basic needs of the individual. The direction of religious thought coincides with the antiutopian climate
of our age.
Intolerance often accompanies utopian aspirations: to pursue the only one just utopian ideal means at
the same time to reject all other possible perspectives. Understanding the collapse of fanatical
intolerance, its inability to solve the problems of our age, religious philosophers of the late twentieth
century are developing ecumenical ideas. The treatment of this issue, proposed by Karl Jaspers, A. J.
Toynbee, and Paul Tillich, has become widely accepted among prominent religious philosophers. Karl
Rahner understands God as "the invisible gardener" whose image is differently conceived in various
cultures. He proposed his doctrine of the "anonymous Christian," claiming that it is possible not to be
a member of the Christian church and to follow its values in the practical life. The ecumenical dialogue
becomes an urgent necessity in the Nuclear Age.
The aim of the religious philosophy of postmodernity is to restore the belief in the universal values,
needed for the development of man and culture. Some leading secular philosophers trained in the idea
of the total deconstruction of the cultural tradition and reevaluation of all values, are coming now to
the same conclusions. The theory of the functions of practical reason, proposed by Jurgen Habermas,
is based on the assumption of the existence of universal human values. The instrumental use of
practical reason must be complemented by the search for the meaning of life. But that is not the end:
the demand of Kant's categorical imperative still stands and is needed to guarantee the survival of
people in the global community. Its violation is leading in politics to the neglect of human rights and
democratic principles. Another example of this tendency to restore the prestige of the universal human
values may be seen in the philosophy of B.-H. Levy. This representative of the "new philosophy" in
France sees his own goal as the resistance to all forms of evil and oppression. He calls his doctrine
the "philosophy of resistance", aimed at uncovering the complex reality of evil and the struggle against
it. Levy declares that he is not a believer, but considers the Judeo-Christian tradition to be the most
precious foundation for the struggle with contemporary forms of evil. Positively assessing Christianity
and stressing its links with Judaism, he gives his preference to the latter as stimulating devotion to the
Law and battling with everything deviating from truly human standards--be it the example of Cain or
a Nazi criminal. Critical reflection understood in this way needs a foundation in universal human
values.
The postmodern style of philosophizing helped to disclose the narrowness of the classical thought of the
Enlightenment, but at the same time it revealed its own limits. Man is not to be wiped off the field of
philosophical reflection. His being in the world can be clarified through the horizon of hermeneutical
reason, which is capable of a search for universal human values. The rejection of humanism is
dangerous, but we need today the renewal of the whole set of man's values. The importance of man
must be acknowledged in a way which reaffirms the values of life, humanity, peace, liberty, democracy,
culture and its eternal goals--Truth, Good, and Beauty. In the light of these values, hermeneutical
reason will be able to view the panorama of history, assessing our past and interpreting coming social
and cultural alternatives.
Religious and secular philosophers can combine their efforts working together in this direction.
Philosophy of the postmodern period must take into account the positive resources of religion in giving
cultures sound value standards, unifying the people of the world. At the same time, it is obliged to use
its critical faculty to combat all forms of fanatical consciousness and oppression which exploit religious
traditions for the sake of state power or nationalism. Using its critical ability, philosophy is always to
coin positive values for mankind.
SYNERGISM: THE TRANSITION TO A POSTINDUSTRIAL, POSTMARKET SOCIETY
Anthony Mansueto
Introduction
Humanity stands on the threshold of a new era. We have reached, or are very close to reaching, the
level of development necessary for deployment of fully renewable energy sources and production
processes which use almost exclusively renewable natural resources. We are capable of producing
goods and services sufficient to lift the vast majority of the population out of poverty and of automating
many of the less creative forms of labor. New technologies, the formation of an integrated world
market, the growing importance of international organizations, and new means of transportation and
media of social communication have drawn peoples and nations together into a tightly knit global
civilization. New forms of institutional organizing make it possible for broad sectors of the population
to participate in organizing and directing even the most complex institutions, thus realizing the historic
promise of the democratic revolutions. New sciences such as cosmology, chaos theory, general systems
theory, cybernetics, and dialectical sociology seek to understand reality from the standpoint of totality,
and promise to provide the scientific basis for an understanding of and commitment to promoting the
self-organizing activity of the cosmos.
And yet we seem unable to actually cross this threshold. Sometime during the past quarter century, the
development of our society seems to have suddenly ground to a halt. The ecological crisis grows more
serious each day, yet, despite widespread awareness of the problem we see no serious new policy
initiatives. We seem unable to mobilize the capital necessary to develop new, clean, renewable sources
of energy or to carry out the systematic automation of industry. Despite widespread recognition of the
importance of education in the transition to a postindustrial society, real investment in this sector has
failed to grow significantly, and there has been no effort to unleash the talent and energy of the
country's vast underemployed intelligentsia. Political participation continues to decline. The people
seem increasingly isolated from each other, and increasingly disconnected from the powerful institutions
through which their social capacities are organized. They are very far from assimilating the results of
the new sciences of organization. On the contrary, the influence of religious fundamentalism on the
one hand, and nihilistic postmodern ideologies on the other hand, continues to grow.
Behind this stagnation lies an outmoded market economy which makes every form of activity into
simply a means of realizing individual consumer interests. Markets obstruct investment in research and
in human development, undermine the formation of effective public relationships, and mystify social
relations.
For the past 150 years the great masses of humanity have looked to socialism for a strategy to transcend
the contradictions of industrial capitalist society and to build a social order which would make possible
the full development of human social capacities. But the past several years have witnessed an all-sided
crisis of socialism which has left the working class everywhere in retreat. The centralized
redistributional systems of the Soviet bloc, despite their extraordinary ability to centralize resources for
investment in research and education, could neither meet nor contain rising consumer expectations
generated by the persistence of commodity relations. The Communist led national liberation
movements, which only a decade ago seemed to be on the verge of a global victory, are rapidly losing
influence to reactionary tendencies such as fundamentalist Islam. The Communist Parties of the
advanced industrialized countries, which relinquished their revolutionary perspectives long ago, are
rapidly losing influence even in their historic stronghold in southern Europe. The result has been a
profound theoretical and spiritual crisis not only among communists, but among progressive forces
generally, who are rapidly losing their faith not only the our capacity to transcend capitalism, but in the
progressive character of human history and in the meaningfulness of the universe in general.
Clearly it is necessary, at the present conjuncture, to rethink fundamentally the next step in the human
civilizational project. This essay summarizes the argument of a longer work in progress which attempts
just such a retheorization. In this context we hope, first of all, to demonstrate that there is in fact a
rational, scientific basis for our belief in the meaningfulness of the universe and the progressive
character of human history. We consider this an important foundation for any effort to retheorize the
next step in the human civilizational project --and an important antidote to the rapid spread of nihilism
among the progressive forces. The current direction of scientific research increasingly suggests that the
cosmos is essentially relational and self-organizing in character, and that human labor, understood to
include not simply the reorganization of biological, physical and chemical matter, but also the
reorganization of human social relations, and the analysis and interpretation of experience, is the highest
expression of this self-organizing process. We redefine the goal towards which humanity is developing
as a synergistic form of social organization in which the resources of society are deployed in such a
manner as to best promote the all-sided development of human social capacities and of the self-
organizing activity of the cosmos as a whole. Second, we argue that neither the marketplace nor
centralized redistributional systems are adequate to the tasks of organizing synergism. Finally, we
develop a detailed analysis of the current situation, assessing the current alignment of social forces,
defining the principal constituency for the transition to a synergistic form of social organization,
identifying strategic and tactical reserves, adversaries, etc., and outlining a strategy for the transition.
We argue that our principal task in the present period is the development of an organization which can
create the technological, economic, political, scientific, and spiritual conditions for the transition to
synergism.
Presented in abbreviated form, our argument necessarily appears rather schematic. We have decided,
however, that it is more useful to outline our vision in full, with perhaps less development and
documentation than might be desired, in order to provide a basis for debate and discussion, rather than
to present a more limited, but more tightly argued thesis.
I. The Social Form of Matter
The past two decades have witnessed an extraordinary revolution in scientific thinking, the significance
of which is best understood by comparison with the scientific thinking of earlier periods. Aristotelian
science regarded matter as an indefinite substance, which was given "form" or organization by essences
which existed separately from it, and which determined the path of its development. The entire cosmos
appeared to be governed by such forms, the highest material manifestation of which were the heavenly
bodies moving in their perfectly harmonious spheres about the earth. Aristotelian science provided a
basis for grasping the underlying unity and purpose of the cosmos, and for the construction of a natural
law ethics which could order human conduct in accord with that purpose. At the same time, as
material beings, humans participated only in a very limited way in this cosmos. They contributed
nothing fundamentally new to its organization, structure or development.
The Copernican and Newtonian revolutions shattered this paradigm. The physics and chemistry which
grew up between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries regarded matter as composed of minute
particles, the ultimately random interactions of which gave matter all of its properties. If the
development of the universe had any direction at all, it was towards randomness or entropy. Indeed,
in 1854 the German physicist Hermann von Helmholtz proclaimed that the universe was, in fact dying.
The remorseless rise in entropy that accompanies any natural process could only lead in the end,
said Helmholtz, to the cessation of all interesting activity throughout the universe, as the entire
cosmos slides irreversibly into a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. Every day the universe
depletes its stock of available, potent energy, dissipating it into useless, waste heat (Davies 1988:
19).
The emerging scientific paradigm rejects both the notion of immaterial forms and the notion of
randomly interacting independent particles, in favor of a recognition of matter itself as relationship and
specifically as a process of organization. According to this view, matter is constituted not out of
fundamental particles, but rather out of fields formed by the four fundamental forces of the universe:
gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces.
... two particles, though spatially separated are still part of a unitary quantum system with a
single wave function ... it is simply not possible to separate the two particles physically, and to
regard them as independently real entities ... (Davies 1988: 177).
Matter is, furthermore, characterized by a tendency to develop increasingly complex forms of
organization --a tendency which runs counter to the law of entropy. This tendency is most apparent not
in the relatively simple, ordered systems studied by classical mechanics, but rather in nonlinear dynamic
systems such as weather patterns, biological organisms, the growth and decline of populations, or the
behavior of an economy, which are the realm of "chaos theory" (Gleick 1987). Rather than merely
reducing biological processes to their chemical and physical components, scientists are beginning to
explore some of the extraordinary pattern generating capacities of living matter. One biologist has
suggested that emerging structures create morphogenetic fields which encourage the appearance of
similar structures elsewhere (Davies 1988: 164). Indeed, there is growing evidence that a whole series
of fundamental physical constants are fixed at just precisely the level that was necessary for the
evolution of intelligent life. Had any of the four fundamental forces been just a little bit stronger or
just a little bit weaker, were the size of the universe just a tiny bit larger or smaller --indeed, if any of
a whole range of constants were altered ever so slightly, the conditions which permit the development
of complex chemical elements and the evolution of life would never have developed (Barrow and Tipler
1986, Gribbin and Rees 1989).
Like Aristotelian philosophy, the new sciences of organization recognize the cosmos as essentially
relational and teleological in character. But unlike that philosophy, which regarded the organizing
principle of the cosmos as something radically distinct from matter itself, these new sciences regard
matter itself as relationship, and the cosmos as a self-organizing process. Being is organization; the
more highly organized a system is, the more profoundly it can be said to participate in being in general.
From this standpoint, the purpose of the cosmos in general is realized in and only in the evolution of
matter from less complex to more complex forms of organization.
If all matter is essentially relational in character, and develops towards increasingly complex levels of
organization, then what, specifically, distinguishes the social form of matter from all other forms?
Matter becomes social when it becomes the agent of its own development, i.e. of its own transformation
towards ever higher degrees of organization. Biological processes merely reproduce the structure of
the biological organism; they do not, as a rule reorganize that structure in a more complex and highly
relational way. The social form of matter, on the other hand is continuously creating increasingly more
complex structures. This productive, reorganizing activity consists of several distinct but closely
interrelated processes. It is the reorganization of physical, chemical, or biological matter (labor), of
social relations (the exercise of power), of experience (the production of knowledge), and the
transformation of members of the animal species homo sapiens into productive, powerful, rational
participants in the self-organizing activity of the cosmos (socialization) with an interest in its
development (spirituality). In other words, as human beings produce themselves, they produce an
increasingly complex, interdependent social organization characterized by growing levels of
productivity, power, knowledge, and love.
At any given point in human social development the socialization of human beings, the labor process,
the exercise of power, and the production of knowledge are organized, by means of a definite social
structure i.e. the kinship/totemic structure of tribal societies, the village community with its elders, the
sacral monarchic structures of tributary social formations, or the marketplace in industrial capitalist
societies. Each of these structures has had the capacity to organize a higher degree of complexity than
its predecessor, but each has ultimately become an obstacle to further development.
There is thus a contradiction between the process of social organization and the structure of any given
society. Resolution of this contradiction involves the transformation of the underlying structure of the
society (relations of production, authority structure, ideology), which in turn unleashes new
developments in the field of production, power, knowledge, spirituality, etc. It is the resolution of these
contradictions, and not the day to day incremental reorganization of matter which constitutes
fundamental revolutionary change. It is thus the contradiction between social organization and social
structure that is immediately the motive force of the historical process.
This process of historical change will continue until human society is structured in such a way as to
maximize its own self-organizing activity, and thus the self-organizing activity of the cosmos. This
means developing a social structure in which
a) production is organized in such a way as to maximize the complexity of the ecosystem and
the development of human social capacities, and thus to best promote the self-organizing activity
of the cosmos,
b) the entire social surplus product is invested in such a manner as to best promote the
technological, economic, political, artistic, scientific, philosophical, and spiritual development
of humanity,
c) all power is exercised in a substantively rational, relational manner and thus in such a manner
as to most rapidly increase the power of the society as a whole,
d) all of humanity understands the cosmos as cosmos, and thus the "line of march, conditions,
and ultimate general result" of the process of cosmic development, and
e) humanity finds its highest good in advancing that development.
Such a society we call synergistic, because all of the elements of the society work (-ergon) together
(syn-) in such a way as to advance the development of a totality which, in so far as it is more than the
sum of its parts, is authentically transcendent. This totality is nothing other than society itself, realized
as the leading factor in the self-organizing activity of the cosmos.
History, therefore, has both a direction, and a goal, or telos towards which it is developing. This
direction, furthermore, is no different than the physical "arrow of time" defined by the development of
complex forms of organization (Davies 1988: 9-34).
II. The Tributary Mode of Production and Revolutionary Communitarian Movements
The earliest human societies were social in only the most rudimentary sense of the term. Human beings
procured their means of subsistence primarily through hunting and gathering --in much the same way
other animals feed. These societies were organized on the basis of kinship relations (Service 1966).
Kinship rules divided the society into various groups, generally refereed to as clans, marriages between
which formed the fundamental social bond (Levi Strauss 1969). Each clan had its own peculiar totem,
generally a plant or an animal, which served as its collective representation, and as the focus of regular
communion rituals which reinforced social bonds, as well as a kind of matrix through which the cosmos
as a whole was organized (Durkheim 1911/1965).
Gradually human beings learned to cultivate plants and --in those areas of the planet where potential
domesticates were available-- to domesticate animals. They established permanent settlements,
characterized by an emerging division of labor. Growing surplus permitted an increasingly large part
of the population to be relieved from the responsibility to produce food. Specialists in various crafts
emerged, as well as a priestly stratum, which organized more complex productive activities, and
engaged in protoscientific study of the motion of the sun and stars, the rising and falling of the tides
and of rivers, and of other aspects of the natural environment which bore on their people's survival.
This was, in many ways, a remarkably productive period in human history. The technological
innovations of this period include:
artificial irrigation using canals and ditches; the plow, the harnessing of animal motive-power;
the sail boat; wheeled vehicles; orchard husbandry; fermentation; the production and use of
copper; bricks; the arch; glazing; the seal; and ... --a solar calendar, writing, numerical notion
and bronze (Childe 1951).
While kinship relations remained important, social relations were increasingly organized by the village
community. The village community either held the land collectively, or regulated its allocation among
several clans living within the village. Land was generally allocated to particular families for
cultivation, in proportion to the number of persons in the family, though collective cultivation was not
unusual. The village community, through the mechanism of a council of heads of household, clan
chiefs, or village elders, was responsible for adjudicating conflicts within the community, and for
organizing its religious life, as well as for planning cultivation. The solidarity of the village community
formed the basis on which the peasant grasped the underlying unity of the cosmos. Indeed, both the
Russian mir and the Hellenic kosmos mean both village and universe (Wolf 1969: 58-63;, Mandel 1968:
30-36).
At a certain point, however, the rapid development of human social capacities which characterized
communitarian societies ground suddenly to a halt. It is possible to specify this point, with respect to
the civilizations of Asia, Africa and Europe, with some precision. It came around 3000 B.C.E., within
a few hundred years of the invention of the plow, and of bronze technology. One scholar writes of the
situation in China:
In the course of a few centuries the villages of the plain fell under the domination of walled
cities on whose rulers the possession of bronze weapons, chariots and slaves conferred a measure
of superiority to which no community could aspire (Watson 1961).
The story was much the same through out India, in the Mediterranean basin, and somewhat later, in
the Americas. As Gerhard Lenski puts it
For the first time in ... history, people found the conquest of other people a profitable alternative
to the conquest of nature ... One might say that bronze was to the conquest of people what plant
cultivation was to the conquest of nature (1982: 145).
While there is some evidence for the use of bronze to produce plowshares, the supply was always
strictly limited. Bronze production depended on the mining of tin, a rare element, the trade in which
always remained a ruling class monopoly. Fearful that the peasants would produce weapons which
could be used against them, or reasoning that their wealth could be increased more easily through
warfare than through investment in agricultural production, the ruling class blocked the extensive
development of bronze agricultural tools.
The emergence of warfare, and of a warlord state radically transformed the religious structure of human
society. The warlord appeared increasingly as the principal organizing force in human society.
Humans not surprisingly began to represent the self-organizing process of the cosmos as the activity of
a celestial monarch. Thus the Canaanite god ba'al, whose name means lord, master, owner of land,
and husband. The term was used not only for the deity, but for the local warlords who were closely
associated with him. This "organizing" activity, furthermore, was conceived less and less on the model
of human productive activity, and more and more on the model of warfare or self-sacrifice. (Kramer
1963, Brundage, Rig Veda X.90, Satapatha-Brahmana).
This tributary mode of production (Amin 1980), so called because the warlords extracted a tribute of
rents, taxes or forced labor from the peasantry, put a real brake on technological development in
general. The emerging ruling class was able to extract almost the entire surplus product from the direct
producers. This had the effect of removing any incentive for innovation on the part of the peasantry,
which knew that it would not benefit from its own increased productivity. In many cases, of course,
the peasants were ground down below the subsistence level, and had neither the time nor the energy to
innovate. The ruling class on the other hand, invested its energies in extensive accumulation through
conquest --extending the area subject to its taxing power-- rather than intensive accumulation based on
improved agricultural techniques. Indeed, warriors and priests increasingly held all forms of manual
labor in contempt. "The two thousand years after" the invention of the plow and the development of
bronze technology, "say from 2,600 to 600 B.C., produced few contributions of ... importance to
human progress (Childe 1951)."
Resistance to the stagnation in the development of human society and the emergence of exploitative
social formations came from two distinct directions. On the one hand, the dependent peasant
communities, which formed the principal source of the social surplus product, organized themselves to
resist the increasingly powerful military and priestly aristocracies of the urban centers. Peasant
movements generally emerged out of the social banditry of peasants driven off their land by
latifundialization. Gradually bands began to hold small territories, usually in mountainous areas, their
banditry developing into a guerilla. Generally such movements aspired to a rationalization of the
tributary mode of production, placing their hopes un a just king (the bandit leader) who would hold the
"mandate of heaven" and rule in accordance with its laws (Wolf 1969: 108, 121). A few movements
were more radical, and looked to restore the communitarian social order, displacing the warlords with
a reformed priestly intelligentsia and relying on village militias to provide for the common defense (Lev
25: 8ff, 1 Sam 8; Gottwald 1979: passim). But even these movements generally yielded in the end to
the need for a standing army --and consequently to the necessity of a tributary state, however
rationalized.
Peasant movements --particularly relatively successful peasant movements-- generally drew to one
degree or another on the rationalizing work of the intelligentsia which was growing up in the urban
centers of the great tributary states. Marginalized by the emergence of the warlords, who deprived
them of the leading role which they had held in communitarian societies, this intelligentsia engaged in
protoscientific investigation of the natural world --in mathematical speculation and in the observation
of the heavenly bodies-- but also in the criticism of the political practices of the warlords and the
religious mystifications of their priestly lackeys, which seemed to be out of harmony with the essentially
relational character of the cosmos. Their teachings stressed the "community and interrelationship of
all things, (Republic 531d)" whether understood representationally, through the symbol of YHWH, the
one God, mystically as the Tao, or rationally, through such philosophical doctrines as the Buddhist
concept of "dependent origination" or the Platonic "dialectic." The cosmos as a whole was governed
by definite laws (Nomos, Torah, Dharma, Tao). Humanity participated in the self-organizing activity
of the cosmos to the extent that it obeyed these laws. For some (for example for emerging Judaism)
this was understood in a more active sense, as a mandate to reorganize society in accord with divine
law. But even mystical doctrines such as Taoism were often quite explicit in their critique of the
tributary state.
When the Tao is present in the universe
The horses haul manure.
When the Tao is absent from the universe
Warhorses are bred outside the city (Tao Te Ching: Forty-Six).
Why are the people starving:
Because the rulers eat up the money in taxes.
Therefore the people are starving.
Why are the people rebellious
Because the rulers interfere too much.
Therefore they are rebellious (Tao Te Ching: Seventy Five).
These movements of resistance were not ultimately able to carry out a complete rationalization of the
tributary mode of production, much less to construct a stable, enduring revolutionary communitarian
social order. There are several reasons for this failure. The low level of development of human
productive capacities meant that the vast majority of the species remained submerged in agrarian
production. Unable to study the dialectic, the Torah, the Dharma, or the Tao, they could not possibly
organize their lives in accord with their principles. A society of philosophers was impossible; the best
that could be hoped for was a society governed by philosopher kings. Even this option was closed off,
however, by the existence of numerous predatory warlords. The need to defend a revolutionary society
against their aggression put a premium on the skills of the military leadership, and ultimately gave the
stratum that Plato had called the guardians an edge over the philosopher-kings-- a development which
made a restoration of the tributary mode of production inevitable.
The rationalizing work of the intelligentsia was, furthermore, often very incomplete. The new religions
that emerged during this period often retained sacral monarchic and sacrificial elements in
"spiritualized" form, something which compromised their effectiveness as catalysts for the
reorganization of society. Christianity, which transformed Jewish religious rationalism into a doctrine
of otherworldly salvation through the substitutionary sacrifice of a crucified messiah is a case in point
(Ruether 1974, Pawlikowski 1982, Mansueto 1989) .
It would be a mistake, however, to regard this process of resistance leading to the formation of new
dynasties as simply the vicious cycle of a stagnant or blocked social formation. On the contrary, while
they never realized their millenarian visions, these peasant revolts played an important role in
periodically rationalizing the tributary state and unleashed, for a time at least the development of the
productive forces and the rationalization of political and religious relations (Wolf 1969: 115). Similarly,
the activity of the intelligentsia contributed to the gradual rationalization of the tributary state, restricting
the rate of exploitation and encouraging investment in scientific research, in the arts, etc. Gradually
conditions emerged for a great leap forward in the development of human organizing capacities. These
conditions developed first in Europe not because Europe was particularly advanced --it was not-- but
rather because the relatively primitive character of the European tributary state prevented it from
blocking the development of the productive forces as effectively as the more advanced Chinese or
Islamic empires (Amin 1980, 1989).
III. The Capitalist Mode of Production
Beginning in the fifteenth century of the common era, and continuing well into the present period, three
great revolutions which began in Europe swept across the face of the planet, transforming everything
in their wake. The first of these was the industrial revolution, which catalyzed a qualitative leap
forward in the development of human productive capacities. The second was the democratic revolution,
which marked the recognition that human society was a human social product, subject to rational
reorganization just like any other form of matter. The third was the scientific revolution which began,
for the first time to unlock the mysteries which governed the complex organization of the cosmos.
Industry proceeds by breaking down the organization of both the natural and the social factors of
production in order to release the energy which they contain, and then harnesses that energy to
reorganize matter into more complex forms to serve human purposes. Industrial generation of energy,
for example, breaks down the chemical (electromagnetic) bonds of various fossil fuels, or the nuclear
bonds of certain heavy metals and uses the resulting heat either directly to drive machinery, or to
produce steam, and eventually electricity, which in turn drives machinery. These machines then combine
various elements mechanically, chemically, or biologically to produce complex structures which serve
human purposes. Similarly, industry breaks down pre-existing social organisms (clan, village, family)
and harnesses the social capacities of the individuals through a complex social and technical division
of labor, enabling them to create products more complex than could any individual worker alone.
Industry involves the vast majority of the population in the civilizational project in a way which was
not previously possible. Much, though not all, of the industrial working class is involved in producing
machines, building structures, etc., which become a semipermanent part of the human environment, and
which contribute not simply to the reproduction of humanity, but to its actual development. And the
high level of productivity characteristic of industry makes it possible to release an increasingly large
part of the population from direct production altogether. At the same time, industrial uses of energy
and natural resources run up inevitably against certain definite ecological limits. It is not at all clear
that industry really increases the overall complexity of the ecosystem, and if it does, there seems to
be a real point of diminishing returns. There are, furthermore, serious limits to the ability of industrial
production to tap fully into human creative potential. Industrial strategies for increasing productivity
reduce the vast majority of the workers (including, increasingly, intellectual workers) to mere cogs in
a wheel, simply moving physical, chemical, biological (or, in the case of intellectual workers) social
matter from one place to another. Both of these limits are rooted in the "exploitative" character of
industrial production, an exploitation which is prior to the marketplace or any other means of surplus
extraction. Rather than catalyzing the development of complexity which already exists in matter
(physical, chemical, biological, social), industry breaks matter down into its component parts and
reorganizes it in a way that serves human purposes.
Throughout most of human history the organization of society has been regarded as an integral part of
the natural order: something fixed eternally, as it were, by the mandate of heaven. The democratic
revolutions of the past four hundred years mark the realization that the organization of human society
is, immediately at least, a human product, and that human beings can, through rational, collective
action, reorganize human society in much the same manner that they can reorganize any other form of
matter. The democratic revolution as a moment in the development of human organizational capacities
thus has little or nothing to do with free elections or with respect for "human rights" as understood by
certain tendencies within the liberal tradition. Democracy is, first and foremost, a matter of humanity's
developing capacity to reorganize its own social structures in such a manner as to catalyze the most
rapid possible development of human social capacities.
The historic limitation of the democratic project has been precisely its inability to advance from formal
to substantive democratic forms. This tendency is partially a result of the constraints imposed by the
mediation of social relations by the marketplace. But it is also, partly a limitation of the democratic
mode of political organization itself, which reorganizes human society in order to serve the purposes
of its members (just as the industrial mode of production reorganizations nature in order to serve human
purposes generally) rather than reorganizing it in order to increase its objective level of organization,
and thus its productivity, power, knowledge, spirituality, etc.
The scientific revolution was at once a precondition for and a product of the industrial and democratic
revolutions. It is only on the basis of a rational understanding of the organization of matter that we are
able to reorganize it in the systematic, rationally manner which characterizes industrial production and
democratic revolutionary politics. At the same time, it is precisely the sort of engagement in
reorganizing the world which provides both the occasion of insights into the organization of matter and
the opportunity to test out new theories in practice.
What science does is to use various tools (experiments, concepts) to break human experience down into
its component parts, and thus determine the precise character of the relationships between various
phenomena. In this way scientific theory, without ever being a copy or representation of the real world,
provides us with a real grasp of the organization of matter, or what is the same thing of matter itself
(which is simply various levels of development of the cosmic organizing process). Science, that is,
provides the knowledge we need to reorganize matter in accord with a rational plan (Bashkar 1989).
At the same time, the scientific process is irreducibly analytical. Science as it has developed over the
past 400 years is largely a compendium of separate theories describing countless relationships and
processes. This is true even of the biological and social sciences where holistic thinking has, from the
beginning, been more fashionable. It is this analytic character which forms the limit to the scientific
mode of producing knowledge (as distinct from limits imposed by feudal or bourgeois ideological
problematics). Attempts to grasp whole systems have been characterized by either statistical
abstractions which tell us little about the organization or the structure of the system, or else by artificial
syntheses which fuse partial scientific theories together with various admixtures of speculation and
prejudice. The full development of the human capacity for knowledge requires that we transcend this
limitation, and that we advance beyond analytic thinking to the dialectic.
By vastly increasing human organizing capacity, these revolutions also increased the real level of human
participation in the self organizing activity of the cosmos. Human beings came increasingly to
understand themselves as the subject of their actions, and to regard humanity as a center of organizing
activity which, if no longer at the center of the cosmos, was, at the very least, its most highly developed
product. On the one hand this required new methods of socialization, which did not merely bring the
underlying biological drives into harmony with larger social imperatives, but which actually forged a
(relatively) autonomous ego able to bring the forces of nature and history under its control. On the
other hand, these developments involved a qualitative leap forward in human spiritual development.
The realization of human organizing capacities (labor, the exercise of power, the production of
knowledge) as an integral dimension of, in fact the leading factor within, the self-organizing activity
of the cosmos meant that this self-organizing activity was, for the first time, clearly recognized as
progressive.
These developments had particular significance in the light of the eclectic philosophical tradition which
Europeans had synthesized out of Hellenic and Jewish elements. The cosmos was not simply ordered
--it did not simply follow certain rationally knowable mathematical laws-- nor was it simply organized,
(structured in order to fulfil a particular purpose). Its structure actually developed through time, in
order to more adequately fulfill the designs of its creator. And human productive, political, and
scientific activity was precisely the locus of this progressive activity. Human beings had both the
capacity, and the awesome responsibility to fulfill God's plan for the universe. The ancient teaching
that humanity had been created in the image and likeness of God thus took on a radically new
significance.
At the same time, the organizing activity of the social form of matter fell increasingly under the
regulating influence of the marketplace. The marketplace played, from the beginning, a contradictory
role in the development of human social capacities. On the one hand, market relations were able to
organize far more complex activities, and to mediate a far more complex level of interdependence than
the centralized, redistributional states of the old tributary social formations. Indeed, we have already
suggested that it was precisely the weakness of these state structures in Europe which permitted
capitalism to develop in what was otherwise, by comparison with China or the Islamic civilization,
something of a rustic backwater of human civilization. In this sense the market served as a catalyst for
the development of human social capacities (Hayek 1988: 38-47).
But even as it was catalyzing development of the highest level of productivity ever known by humanity,
the marketplace was rapidly undermining the complex fabric of relations which held society together
and which gave meaning to humanity's place in the cosmos. Development of a world market
presupposed, first of all, the destruction of communitarian and tributary civilization. Direct producers
had to be separated from the means of production, and the institutions which protected the complex
social fabric of communitarian and tributary organization --from the village community to the "Chinese
wall"-- had to be destroyed. Often this involved destroying large populations as well (Zinn 1980, Wolf
1969, Mandel 1968, Zitara 1971).
But the destructiveness of the marketplace was not confined to preindustrial modes of production. At
the economic level, the principal limitation of the marketplace is in the type of information it can store
and transmit. While it is true that the marketplace can organize a far greater quantity of information
regarding human productive activity than any hitherto existing centralized redistributional system, this
information is limited to quantitative expressions of the quantity of each product available (and thus
indirectly, of the quantity of labor time each product contains) and of the effective demand for the
products in question --i.e. the degree to which they satisfy the empirical wants of the individuals who
have the money to purchase them. It should come as no surprise therefore, that the marketplace
develops human productive capacities not in such a way as to maximize the development of human
social capacities, much less the complexity of the ecosystem generally, but rather in such a way as to
best satisfy the empirical wants of consumers, given certain constraints on the availability of resources,
etc.
This distorted dynamic of development is expressed in the contradictions which Marx noted in the
system of generalized commodity production (Marx 1867/1978; Mandel 1968). On the one hand,
assuming a constant rate of exploitation, as the organic composition of capital increases (i.e. as more
is invested in machine technology), the rate of profit declines. In response to this tendency, capitalists
invest instead in low technology, low wage activities characterized by a high rate of exploitation --e.g.
in the Third World (the phenomenon known as imperialism). This pattern of investment leads,
however, to underconsumption, as workers are unable to purchase the products they produce.
We should note that these tendencies are the result not of the private ownership of property, but rather
of the system of generalized commodity production.
The marketplace also tends to undermine organization in the political and cultural arenas. While making
possible relations between a far greater number of individuals, the marketplace also tends to make all
relationships one-dimensional --i.e. into merely a means of realizing individual consumer interests.
Eventually people have no other interests. This undermines the capacity of people to organize for any
purpose other than to improve their position in the marketplace. The marketplace, furthermore,
mystifies social relations. The Chinese, African, or Aztec peasant knew why he was poor: he worked
one half of his time to support his warlord. The medieval craftsmen saw some relationship between
the quality of his work and his progress from apprentice, to journeyman, to master. The worker in a
capitalist society, however, is paid the full value of his labor power, but grows poor as the capitalist
grows rich. And the marketplace rewards even capitalists not in accord with their skill in organizing
productive activity which develops human capacities or increases the qualititative complexity of the
ecosystem, but rather in accord with how well they serve the spontaneous interests of consumers with
the money to purchase their products.
These dynamics are reflected at the religious level in Calvinist doctrine. The Calvinist God is the
religious reflex of the marketplace, which humanity experiences as at once a dynamic and progressive
process which catalyzes economic growth and development, and as a mysterious force beyond its
control. The Calvinist God, likewise rewards and punishes not in accord with the merits of the
individual, but rather in accord with the imperatives of an inscrutable divine cosmic plan. Individuals,
interested as they are only in their own development are radically depraved and can be saved --i.e.
become interested in serving God's plan for the cosmos-- only by assimilating the mind of an Other,
outside themselves, which, from a human standpoint, can only seem radically self sacrificial. In this
sense Calvinism forms the human person intellectually and morally for participation in a market
economy not only, as Weber demonstrated, by creating a powerful religious sanction for productive
activity, but also by fostering an ethic of submission to imperatives which are beyond human
comprehension --and thus to the judgement of the marketplace regarding the price of one's productive
activity.
As a result of its internal contradictions, capitalism began, during the nineteenth century, to suffer from
a long series of economic crises. In order to overcome the contradictions of capitalist development,
progressive sectors within the bourgeoisie (those centered in advanced technological sectors) began to
ally themselves with the working class and to undertake a restructuring of the capitalist accumulation
process. First, the state expanded significantly its investment in the development of infrastructure: in
roads, railroads, and urban mass transportation, and later in telecommunications and air travel networks,
and eventually in the beginnings of a cosmonautics industry (Moore 1966: 111-158, Howe 1979, Davis
1986). This was accompanied by more limited investment in public housing, health and education.
Then, beginning in the middle of this century, they undertook several measures to increase effective
demand within the working class. Capital agreed to permit, albeit on a regulated basis, collective
bargaining on the part of the principal industrial unions. A system of "model contracts" developed,
centered around the automobile industry, which pegged wage increases to the rate of increase in
productivity --terms which made sense to most workers, and which meant substantial wage increases
without any attack on the average rate of profit. A system of transfer payments was developed which
guaranteed that in the event of a recession effective demand would never drop too low, making general
crises of underconsumption, such as the Great Depression, a thing of the past (Davis 1986).
This type of progressive bourgeois planning was always more developed in Europe, where the workers
movement was stronger, and in Japan, where corporate structures strengthened the hand of rationalizing
managerial strata, than in the United States. But even in the U.S. it produced some remarkable results.
Throughout the post war period, scientific research and technological development proceeded at a rapid
pace. The development of microelectronics, in particular, has laid the groundwork for a comprehensive
automation of industry, and put us on the threshold of an era in which routine manual labor, as we have
understood it since the late eighteenth century, is all but obsolete. Other research, less fully developed,
has laid the groundwork for development of clean, effectively limitless sources of energy (solar, wind),
and an extraordinary prolongation of human life. We have begun our long journey towards the stars.
There is a broad consensus that the developments of the postwar years constitute at the very least a
Third Industrial Revolution (Mandel 1978) --and perhaps the first signs of a new, postindustrial society
(Tung n.d.) in which human labor will no longer be absorbed in direct material production, but rather
in the design, monitoring, and organization of the production process itself. The product of North
American popular culture which best expresses the possibilities of this period is the television series Star
Trek, now in its 26th year and its "Next Generation." In the 24th century society depicted in the series,
every worker is at least a trained technician, contradictions between nations and to some extent even
between intelligent species have been overcome. Indeed, the market economy itself appears to have
been transcended.
The strategy was, however, marked from the beginning by several profound contradictions. It did
nothing to reverse the dynamics of imperialism and of unproductive consumption which are intrinsic
to capitalism itself. First, as wages rose in the advanced capitalist countries, capital flowed to low
technology, low wage activities the Third World, or to unproductive, speculative investments, leading
to a decline in the rate of growth of productivity, and ultimately to a decline in the rate of profit. Most
of the revenue redirected towards the working class under the pressure of the labor movement was used
for unproductive consumption --i.e. for consumer goods such as larger homes, automobiles, fancier
clothes, increased meat consumption, etc., which did not increase the productivity of this class, rather
than for of education, political and cultural development. High levels of deficit spending drove up
interest rates, blocking capital formation and further restricting productive investment. This was
particularly true in the U.S. where investment in technological and human development competed for
state funding with a massive military apparatus. Existing markets for mass consumer durables
(automobiles, refrigerators) derived from the technologies of the second industrial revolution were
saturated, and development and penetration of new markets in the Third World were held back by the
low level of effective demand.
From a purely economic standpoint, the crisis could have been resolved rather easily. Sharply
increased, highly progressive taxation, coupled with reduced military outlays, would have made it
possible to maintain and increase public investment in technological and human development, increasing
productivity, while bringing down state deficits and thus holding down interest rates. Radical land and
wage reform in the Third World (and among "Third World" sectors in the advanced capitalist
countries), would have increased effective demand and opened up new markets. Redirection of capital
in the advanced industrial countries into high technology capital goods production would have permitted
capture of lower technology industries by developing countries while maintaining a healthy market for
exports. Payments to labor, meanwhile, in both the advanced industrial and the developing countries,
could have been channeled into collective expenditures on housing, health care, mass transportation,
education, and culture in order to promote the all development of the productive capacities of the
working class.
While these measures represented in many ways simply an extension of existing policies, the political
conditions for carrying them out did not exist in the United States, and existed only imperfectly in the
other advanced industrial countries. Support for these measures among the U.S. bourgeoisie was
weakened by the fact that higher rates of return were available from investment in low technology, low
wage production in the Third World, from speculation of various kinds, and, for what should have been
the cutting edge, advanced industrial sectors (electronics, aerospace), from defense contracts completely
shielded from market pressures. European and Asian capitalists, meanwhile, were able to profit from
the abandonment of intermediate technology production (steel, auto) and increasingly of non-military
high technology activities, by the North Americans, reducing the pressure to create new markets for
high technology capital goods in the Third World. High rates of taxation, and high rates of expenditure
on physical and social infrastructure created the conditions for continued economic development in
Europe and Japan, while complex corporate and state structures guaranteed reinvestment of a high
percentage of surplus in strategically important industries.
The penetration of market relations into every sector of society, meanwhile, undermined the political
organization and solidarity of the working class. This process is most visible in the decline of the so-
called "mediating institutions," institutions intermediate between the individual and the state, which
historically served to organize the complex interests which characterize industrial society. Among the
most important mediating institutions, we would note the trade union, the neighborhood organization,
the mutual benefit society, local political clubs, and local religious congregations. As capitalism has
developed, the functions once performed by these intermediate institutions are increasingly taken over
by the marketplace. As the network of mediating institutions has eroded, people have forgotten how
to form public relationships.
We have already noted above the reifying and mystifying power of the marketplace. In our own time
this process has reached a qualitatively new stage of development. We are increasingly aware of the
fact that our scientific concepts are themselves social products --that the human mind is less a mirror
of reality than an organizer of information. Our location within a social matrix wholly determined by
market relations, however, makes it impossible for us to see these scientific concepts as among the
highest expressions of the self-organizing activity of the cosmos, and thus true precisely because they
are social products and not merely the result of the persistent and patterned bombardment of our sense
organs by physical stimuli. Social products in a market society are, after all produced to meet
individual consumer interests. No one product is "correct." Thus the hyper-relativism of the so called
"post-modernist" epistemologies.
Eventually the penetration of market relations obscures entirely both the reality of human cooperative
labor in the production process and the reality of growing human interdependence. Where every action
is simply a means of realizing individual consumer interests, it is increasingly difficult to conceive of
any overarching plan or purpose which human labor might serve. As the alienating tendencies of the
marketplace begin to assert themselves and to overwhelm the progressive aspects of capitalist
development, capitalism sloughs off its Calvinistic clothing and presents itself in all its naked, atheistic
degradation.
As a result of these developments, the working class in the advanced industrial countries has become
increasingly fragmented and unable to organize itself for change. This process is most advanced in the
United States, where an already weak labor movement has all but disintegrated. But even in Europe
support for investment in the public good is declining --something demonstrated by both the crisis of
the Italian Communist movement, once among the strongest in the world, and by anemic vote totals for
social democratic parties across the European continent, while xenophobic and even explicitly fascistic
tendencies are on the rise. And Japan has actually made it a state policy of fostering the development
of consumerism!
Lured by the high rate of return on imperialist, military, or speculative investments, without support
(and pressure) from a powerful and organized working class, the weakened forces of the advanced
industrial bourgeoisie have been unable to carry out the kind of restructuring which is necessary for
continued social progress under capitalism. Somewhat different regimes of accumulation are, to be
sure, developing in the various capitalist metropoles. The United States is rapidly tending towards a
kind of pure imperialism, transforming itself into a military and administrative center for a shrinking
world empire centered in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. military hegemony will make possible the
continued exploitation of most of Latin America, and a continued supply of the cheap Arab petroleum
which has prevented the U.S. from investing in development of mass transportation and alternative
energy sources. North American society will continue to polarize, as ever larger strata of the
population become superfluous to an economic strategy which does not require a large skilled work
force. As real relations of collaboration disintegrate under the pressure of the marketplace, the
bourgeoisie will attempt to shore up labor discipline and social order by means of an appeal to
nationalist and religious identities, or simply, as the rise of the "Ross for Boss" movement suggests,
by an appeal to the imperatives of "competitiveness" and "efficiency." In this sense broadly fascist
tendencies must be seen as integral to the process of capitalist development, particularly as capitalism,
having destroyed the last vestiges of communitarian and tributary civilization, turns on its own
organizing capacities in a final orgy of unproductive consumption.
In Europe, high levels of tax supported investment in technology, research, and education will insure
continued development at an advanced industrial level, and provide a high standard of living for citizens
of the European Community. The prognosis for full European unification remains good, although
rationalization of the European economy under intensified market pressures is likely to produce some
protectionist influences, especially in the less developed countries of the Community. A united Europe
will dominate a periphery including most of the former Soviet bloc, the Islamic world and Africa, and
will likely face growing contradictions with all three of these regions. In Japan similarly high levels of
investment will be guaranteed by the country's unique corporate structure which minimizes investors'
claims on income and maximizes the power of rationalizing managerial elites. Japan will preside over
a periphery including much of the Pacific Basin.
In both Europe and Japan, however, there are already signs that market pressures are undermining the
fabric of social relationships on which the social democratic and corporatist consensus depends.
Consumerist pressures are eroding support for high levels of investment in both regions, and neither
has demonstrated a strong commitment to developing --and thus unlocking markets in -- the Third
World. Indeed, both regions have witnessed a rise in national-chauvinism in recent years. We can thus
expect Europe and Japan to begin to degenerate in much the same way as the United States, though the
process will undoubtedly be slowed by the absence of a massive debt burden and by relatively low levels
of military expenditure.
The Third World itself will continue to undergo rapid differentiation. Industrializing countries from
Mexico and Brazil to Thailand and Korea will capture growing shares of intermediate technology
manufacturing, as Europe and Japan move into advanced industrial sectors. The populations of these
countries will not, however, benefit from this development which will be largely oriented towards
export markets in Europe, Japan, and North America. Petroleum producers will continue to extract
monopoly rents for a resource the continued availability of which holds back development of
authentically postindustrial energy sources. They will continue to consume the bulk of the revenue they
garner in this fashion attempting to revive Panarab or Islamic neoimperial projects. The rest of the
Third World (Africa, and much of Asia and Latin America) will simply stagnate.
What this analysis suggests it will be impossible to significantly unleash human creative potential
without reorganizing society in such a way as to transcend the marketplace. This is not so much because
the possibilities for structural reform within a capitalist framework have been exhausted. On the
contrary, we have suggested several reforms which might catalyzed renewed growth. Rather, the
operation of the marketplace, by eroding the social fabric and thus the organizing capacity of the
working class, tends to undermine the political conditions for this type of structural reform: thus the
stagnation of the past quarter century.
IV. Socialism
The historical materialist tradition located within these contradictions the basis for the transition to
communism --to a society in which the marketplace, and all other relations of exploitation would be
transcended, and in which the surplus would be controlled collectively and invested in such a manner
as to best promote the all development of human social capacities. We need now to examine why this
claim turned out to be incorrect.
A. Marx's Approach to the Question
Marx recognized that the cosmos is essentially relational in character, and that it develops towards
increasingly complex levels of organization. And unlike previous social theorists, Marx recognized the
centrality of human labor in this complex and contradictory process of development (1846/1978: 150).
Human society develops from relatively simple ancient communal and state forms of organization,
through more complex slave, feudal and capitalist forms. At certain points in the development of a
society, the existing economic, political, cultural relations become an obstacle to the further
development of that society (1848/1978: 477-478). This leads to complex economic, political, and
cultural contradictions, and ultimately to either the decadence and degeneration of the society or to
social revolution and renewed growth and development. This, precisely, is what is happening in
capitalist societies. On the one hand, the development of industrial forces of production, of democratic
political life, and modern science have created an extraordinarily high level of material interdependence,
and made it possible for humanity as a whole to participate in a qualitatively new way in the self-
organizing activity of the cosmos. At the same time, mediation of this interdependence through the
marketplace makes all activity simply a means of realizing individual consumption interests (1844/1978:
70-81). This leads to a whole complex of economic contradictions which gradually undermine capital
formation and lead to economic and technological stagnation (1848/1978: 478). Furthermore, it
obscures our interdependence and our participation in the ongoing self-organization of the cosmos, so
that work, rather than expressing the high level of creativity and relationality which makes us human,
in fact alienates us from nature, from other human beings, and from our own nature as a species
(1844/1978: 72-77). The relationality interrupted by the marketplace finds expression in religious
consciousness, which is an alienated expression of the social nature of humanity, and of our
participation in the creative, relational, self-organizing activity of the cosmos (Marx 1867/1975: 118).
Resolution of the contradictions of capitalist society requires not simply the elimination of private
property, but the transcendence of market relations (Marx 1844/1978:84, 1848/1978: 473-483). This
means that communism requires an extraordinarily high level of human development --a point which
Marx recognized, but did not really develop in depth. First of all, human productive capacities must
be developed to the point that all labor is a direct, conscious participation in the self-organizing activity
of the cosmos and thus a spontaneous expression of human creativity and relationality. Work, in short,
must be the very purpose for which we live, and not merely a means to individual consumption.
Second, humanity must have developed a way in which to organize the complex interdependence
between billions of human beings which is free from all coercion and which takes into account, and
mobilizes, the full creative potential inherent in the virtually infinite qualitative differences within the
society. This, in turn, means the ability to organize an extraordinarily large mass of information, and
to grasp the complex dynamic relations between the members of the society. Finally, each individual
must have as his or her own highest interest participation in the self-organizing activity of the cosmos -
-they must, in other words, have achieved a level of spiritual development equivalent to that historically
associated with the greatest mystics --and achieved it through inner worldly productive/political/cultural
activity.
The least developed dimension of Marx's thought was clearly his analysis of the process by which
socialist consciousness emerges within the proletariat, and by which the working class develops these
extraordinarily complex capacities. Marx argued that workers developed socialist consciousness very
gradually, through their struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first workers merely resisted the development
of capitalism and the destruction of their traditional way of life. Later they struggled for higher wages
within the context of the capitalist system. Eventually, they recognized the need for political power.
The achievement of a Communist standpoint represented the end product of this process, and the highest
stage of class consciousness.
The Communists, therefore, are, on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute
section of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all
others; on the other hand theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the
advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general
results of the proletarian movement (1848/1978: 484).
This final stage of development, Marx argued, required the conscious leadership of a section of the
intelligentsia.
What this analysis leaves unanswered is precisely how the great masses of the proletariat --and not
simply the conscious leadership-- are to develop technologically, politically, theoretically, and spiritually
to the point required for Communism --particularly in the face of overwhelming market forces which,
Marx amply demonstrated, are constantly undermining human development. The international workers
movement has struggled ever since with these questions --and thus far has failed to resolve them
adequately.
B. Development of the Socialist Tradition
1. Social Democracy
Most of the leadership of the workers movement neglected or rejected Marx's insights regarding the
limits to the spontaneous development of socialist consciousness among the working class. Indeed, many
seemed to expect that socialist consciousness would develop more or less automatically, or else that the
social democratic parties simply had to make conscious tendencies which were already developing
spontaneously among the workers on the basis of their day to day experience. This view had definite
strategic implications.
German Social Democracy occupies a special position and there, at least in the immediate future,
has a special task. The two million voters whom it sends to the ballot box, together with the
young men and women who stand behind them as non-voters form the most numerous, most
compact mass, the decisive "shockforce" of the international proletarian army. This mass
already supplies over a fourth of the votes cast ... Its growth proceeds as spontaneously, as
steadily, as irresistibly, and at the same time as tranquilly as a natural process ... If it continues
in this fashion, by the end of this century we shall conquer the greater part of the middle strata
of society, petty bourgeois and small peasants and grow into the decisive power in the land,
before which all other powers will have to bow, whether they like it or not (Engels 1895/1978:
571).
As capitalism developed, however, and as market relations penetrated every sphere of life, the working
class underwent the process of disorganization which we have described above. It in fact became
increasingly difficult to organize workers for any purpose other than the improvement of the position
as consumers in capitalist society. There was thus a tendency to redefine socialism in increasingly
modest terms, as simply the "universalizable" interests of the working class, or even of the people, in
general (Bernstein quoted in Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 32) expressed through the ballot box. Social
democracy mobilized working class support for the type of advanced industrial capitalist reforms we
noted above, but did nothing to restrict the operation of imperialist or consumerist dynamics. It should
thus come as no surprise that European social democracy faces in the present period much the same sort
of crisis as North American social liberalism faced during the 1960s.
2. Populism
Socialists on the periphery of the world capitalist system opted for a rather different strategy for
developing socialist consciousness. Capitalist development, they argued, because it presupposed the
ruination of the peasantry and artisanate, also presupposed the existence of a large colonial empire
which could serve as an outlet for capitalism's inevitable overproduction. This was impossible for
countries on the periphery of the world system, which were themselves being colonized by the advanced
capitalist metropoles. The real basis for socialism, they argued, lay in the long-standing collectivist
traditions of the peasantry, and in particular, in the redistributional land tenure characteristic of the
peasant community, which constituted a distinct "popular mode of production" and which would form
the basis for a "non-capitalist road" to socialism. Transfer of the land to the peasantry would put an
end to the exploitation of the countryside, leading to rising rural demand, which would in turn provide
a market for manufactured goods --both "soft" consumer goods and agricultural implements which
would, in turn, increase agrarian productivity and open up the road to development, which would
proceed within a collectivist framework guaranteed by the institutions of the peasantry (Radkey 1958,
Venturi 1966). Similar ideas developed among social theorists in Europe, who looked to the urban
guild or journeymen's association as the basis for the development of socialist consciousness (cf.
Durkheim 1893/1964, 1897/1951; Therborn 1976, Lukes 1980).
While there is no self-consciously "populist" theoretical tradition, the principal claims of the populist
analysis of industrial society and of the socialist transition have been restated several times throughout
the course of the past century, generally by the leaders of national liberation movements in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, who were struggling to discover a noncapitalist road for their societies. In the
economic arena the "dependency theory" which developed among students of underdevelopment during
the 1960s and 1970s has taken up and elaborated a number of traditional populist themes (cf. e.g.
Wallerstein 1974, Frank 1975, Amin 1980). Roger Lancaster's recent study of the Nicaraguan
revolution (1988) probably represents the most advanced contemporary statement of populist political
and cultural analysis.
Close inspection of events in Nicaragua allows us to formulate a picture of revolution and the
proletariat distinct from Marx's predictions, with their reliance on a modern proletariat divorced
from religion, and counter to all progressivist philosophy, which politicizes from the critical
position of pure reason. What the fully modernized proletariat represents is a weak and
ultimately alienated normative impulse, frequently divorced from any sort of class agenda or any
sense of itself as a class. Under the reign of fully developed capitalism, the normlessness of the
marketplace no longer incites envy, a desire to level one's superiors, a need to reclaim the
tradition. Unable to mount a normative challenge to the flux and uncertainty of capitalist
production, the modernized proletariat can only visualize itself at best as a partly hostile, partly
integrated component in the production process. Trade unionism and social democratic
reformism, then, are its highest forms of class consciousness, and it is frequently unable to attain
even that level of self-organization.
Revolutionary class consciousness seems virtually impossible for a fully modernized proletariat
reproduced in the womb of advanced capitalism. But it is possible in earlier stages of capitalist
development, and in regions where advanced capitalism is structurally prevented from fully
emerging. That is, revolutionary class consciousness is possible where modernity collides with
tradition, and this collision is implicit in the nature of ongoing relations between the West and
the Third World. This real revolutionary consciousness draws on rural or peasant traditions in
such a manner that it invents a revolutionary proletariat out of vaguely articulated "popular
classes," rationalizes its class outlook and agenda, and projects the image of a stable
conservative normative society as its version of the good life (Lancaster 1988: 212-213).
There are, broadly speaking, two difficulties with the populist strategy. The first is that popular
communal institutions and popular religious traditions bear an ambiguous relationship to the socialist
project. On the one hand, they have conserved important nonmarket social networks and a powerful
sense of the underlying unity of the cosmos. At the same time, reflecting as they do preindustrial
realities, they have a limited sense of humanity's leading role in the self-organizing activity of the
cosmos. Static communitarianism is often more important to these movements than the development
of human social capacities. And popular religious traditions often embody alienating elements derived
from their fusion with the sacrificial sacral monarchic cults of the great tributary states.
Second, the past century has demonstrated that capitalist development is in fact proceeding in the
periphery, the market for manufactured goods being provided by the capitalist metropoles themselves.
In a few Third World states with a large resource base, it has been possible to take significant steps
towards development, though high levels of military expenditure, often motivated by Pan-Arabist or
Islamic neoimperialism, have tended to sap resources (Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq). Populist regimes
without valuable raw materials to export have generally been forced to choose between self-sufficiency
at a low level of technological development (Myanmar, Tanzania) or else reincorporation into the world
capitalist system (Mexico, India, Egypt). As capitalism develops, the village community and the
communitarian traditions it conserves are beginning to disintegrate, gradually undermining the basis for
development of socialist consciousness along the populist road. Where populist regimes have come to
power this has almost inevitably meant either maintaining the populist orthodoxy by means of political
and cultural repression, or else witnessing growing demands for consumer goods from a population for
which advertising has become a more important regulator of cultural norms than village elders.
3. Leninism
Lenin was already aware of the dangers of both the social democratic and the populist strategies in the
early part of this century. He recognized that capitalist development did not automatically lead to the
emergence of socialist consciousness within the working class. Socialist "consciousness could only be
brought to" the working class "from without (Lenin 1902/1971: 40-41)." Lenin also recognized that
the mir was beginning to disintegrate under the pressure of capitalist development, and that socialists
could no longer rely on the spontaneous communitarianism of the peasant masses as a substitute for the
socialist consciousness which seemed to be lacking within the working class (Lenin 1894/1959). It was
thus necessary to build an organization of professional revolutionaries (1902/1971: 114, 159ff) which
could organize and direct the working class movement, and develop within it an understanding of the
ultimate aims of the revolution.
The tasks of the party were complicated, however, by the fact that in Russia, as in most countries
outside of Western Europe and North America, the development of capitalism and the democratic
revolution were far from complete, and were in fact blocked by the collaboration of foreign capital and
entrenched feudal elites. In the advanced capitalist countries, furthermore, the "broad masses" of the
working class were "still, for the most part, apathetic, inert, dormant, and convention ridden" (Lenin
1920/1971:573). According to the classical Marxism of the Second International, it was impossible for
the Party to undertake socialist tasks until capitalism and democracy were fully developed and the
masses were fully proletarianized --and at least broadly committed to the struggle for socialism.
Lenin saw matters differently. The bourgeoisie, Lenin reasoned, however much it might include
democratic demands within its program, will never be consistently democratic. "The very position the
bourgeoisie holds as a class in capitalist society inevitably leads to its inconsistency in a democratic
revolution (1905/1971:78)." There are, in effect, many demands which, while very far from being fully
socialist, are beyond the capacity of the bourgeoisie to fulfill. This makes it possible to win the support
of the masses without developing them politically or ideologically to the point that they support, or even
understand, the long-range aims of the Communist Party.
This presented a unique opportunity for the party. The Communist Party, Lenin reasoned, could come
to power quickly in a semi-feudal country like Russia, by demonstrating that it was the most consistent
advocate for the democratic demands of the broad masses of the people. In the Russia of 1917 this
meant prosecuting with greater vigor than any of the other parties the peasants' demand for land, the
workers' demand for bread, and the demand of the whole people for Russian withdrawal from the First
World War. Similarly, the party could come to power in advanced capitalist countries by mobilizing
the working class around concrete demands which, while not fully socialist, could not be met by the
bourgeoisie.
This is, in effect, the formula which has been followed by all Communist parties since Lenin's time,
the innovations of Dimitrov, Mao, Gramsci, Mariategui, Fidel and Che notwithstanding. On the one
hand, the party develops a rich internal culture, and forges a highly developed sense of revolutionary
class consciousness on the part of its members. On the other hand, it forms a popular front embracing
all sectors of society, including the working class, which are struggling for essentially democratic and
non-socialist aims, whose respect and allegiance it wins on the basis of a superior discipline, knowledge,
power, and effectiveness. Leninist parties learned --sometimes unconsciously-- to draw on the
spontaneous collectivism of the peasantry, using it as a bridge to the formation of socialist
consciousness, while remaining aware of the fact that the development of capitalism is gradually eroding
this critical strategic reserve. In advanced capitalist countries, communist parties have followed a
modified form of this strategy by positioning themselves as the most effective defenders of the (trade
union) interests of the working class and/or building popular fronts around the struggle against fascism,
and for broad structural reforms, investment in human capital, etc.
Lenin's analysis has the merit of recognizing that communist ideology does not develop spontaneously
within the working class in the context of capitalist society, but must be carefully cultivated. Lenin did
not, however, develop a strategy for raising the masses to a fully communist level of development, but
rather a strategy which would permit Communists to secure the support of the masses and "seize state
power" without requiring the masses to undergo such development.
C. The Crisis of Socialism
This meant that Leninism had serious limitations as a strategy for actually building socialism. Broadly
speaking Lenin's successors adopted one of two strategies. The first known as "primitive socialist
accumulation," was based on the conviction that industrialization is the precondition for the
development of socialist consciousness. According to this view the persistence of commodity production
was inevitable, and did not present an insuperable obstacle to socialist construction. Land was to be
rapidly and forcibly collectivized, and what amounts to a tribute levied on the peasantry to finance rapid
industrialization and the creation of a massive political-military complex and highly developed
educational, scientific, and cultural institutions (Bettelheim 1976, 1978, Lewin 1978, Amin 1980, 1982).
This strategy was implemented rather brutally in the Soviet Union by Stalin, and in more moderate form
in most of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet-aligned countries of the Third World.
The second strategy, advocated by Stalin's adversary Bukharin in the Soviet Union, and implemented
in China, stressed the importance of maintaining the popular front with the peasantry on the one hand,
while radically restricting commodity production and bourgeois ideology on the other hand. Rising
rural incomes guaranteed by radical land reforms created internal demand for manufactured goods --
primarily agricultural implements designed to increase agrarian productivity, and cheap consumer goods
for the peasant population (Amin 1982). Since persistence of "small production engenders capitalism
and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale (Yao WenÄyuan
1975)," the party integrated this economic policy with a struggle against "bourgeois right" and
"bourgeois ideology." The party took steps to radically restrict wage differentials and to insure equal
exchange between the city and the countryside (Amin 1982: 57). Members of the intelligentsia were
required to spend time working side by side with the peasantry, and workers were involved in the
management of their enterprises. At the same time, the party initiated an effort to actively develop
socialist consciousness among the masses. The masses were encouraged to study the sayings of
Chairman Mao. Collectives at every level practiced criticism and self-criticism.
Both strategies clearly have merits from the standpoint of their contributions to human social
development. "Primitive socialist accumulation" permitted the Soviet Union to develop to the point that
it could turn back Hitler's armies and save the world from fascism, and is responsible for the creation
of one of the most extraordinary educational, scientific, and cultural complexes in the history of the
planet. Rural demand led industrialization has helped China to achieve food self-sufficiency, and has
helped to maintain a base of support among the peasantry for the process of socialist construction.
Neither strategy, however, transcends the system of generalized commodity production. In the Soviet
Union, the persistence of market relations led to growing demand for consumer goods --demand which
the Soviet economy, oriented of necessity towards defending socialism and towards promoting
technological and human development, could not meet. When the party finally relaxed the intense
political and ideological discipline which had prevailed since roughly 1928, this essentially consumerist
pressure was strong enough to shatter the party and its state. In China, where the party has been more
careful both to meet the legitimate demands of the masses, and to restrict the development of bourgeois
ideology, the party has been able to maintain its leading role. But restricting individualism is not the
same thing as developing an active interest in promoting the development of human social capacities
and the self-organizing activity of the cosmos.
Ultimately the socialist project ran up against the twin limits imposed by the low level of the productive
forces and the system of generalized commodity production, both of which persist after the revolution.
The industrial worker is never a fully conscious participant in the self-organizing activity of the cosmos.
Even under the best conditions he carries out production plans developed by scientists and engineers
who understand far better than he the imperatives of the production process. Only when all routine
tasks have been automated, and when every worker is an engineer, organizer, artist, scientist,
philosopher and teacher, will work truly become humanity's greatest need rather than merely a means
of satisfying other, less developed interests.
Socialist strategies have, furthermore, tended to ignore the corrosive effects of generalized commodity
production on the struggle to develop socialist consciousness among the masses. Where this problem
has been recognized, the solution has been linear in character: ideological education or "cultural
revolution." Rather than actually developing the masses intellectually to the point that they actually
grasp humanity's "line of march" towards communism, and see the incredible beauty of this process,
such strategies simply mobilize quasireligious dogmatisms latent among the people as a means of social
control. Ultimately the penetration of commodity relations into every sphere of life undermines
communism along with every other species of religious tradition. This Chinese wall, like all before it,
falls inevitably before the superior power of cheap consumer goods. The result, as Mao quite correctly
pointed out, is a profound tendency towards the restoration of capitalism --a process that even the most
pro-Soviet forces cannot deny is now underway in the former Soviet bloc.
Socialism reflects what might be called a "model of order" rather than the "model of organization
(Davies 1988)." It attempts to restrict the exploitative and alienating effects of generalized commodity
production by means of external economic, political, and cultural sanctions, rather than by transcending
commodity production itself. In doing this it may rely on sheer technological prowess, on more or less
radical forms of state "control" or "planning" of production, or on more or less rationalized religious
and moral sanctions. Socialism fails to distinguish adequately, and to understand correctly the relations
between, human organizing capacity on the one hand, and the social structures which regulate that
capacity on the other hand. It is not enough for synergism that humanity is able to use the labor of the
masses productively (industry), and then secure control over the social surplus product and invest it in
ways that promote the development of human social capacities (socialism). Each and every worker must
be a conscious participant in the self-organizing activity of the cosmos and resources must be allocated
in such a way as to best promote the all-sided development of each person and of society as a whole,
and increase the qualitative complexity of the ecosystem. It is not enough for synergism that the masses
give their support --even their voluntary support, to the Communist Party (dictatorship of the
proletariat). They must actually participate in the reorganization of social institutions. It is not enough
to believe that the cosmos is developing towards ever higher degrees of organization, and to be willing
to sacrifice oneself for the collective (communist ideology). One has actually to understand that process
scientifically, and find it so beautiful and compelling that service to the revolution ceases to be a
sacrifice. Otherwise communist ideology (which is capable of supporting a highly developed and very
sophisticated spirituality) inevitably degenerates into a species of inner-worldly millenarian dogmatism.
V. Towards Synergism
A. Conditions for the Transition to a Synergistic Society
We are now in a position to develop in some detail our analysis of the conditions necessary for the
construction of synergism, and our strategy for the synergist transition. First, it should be clear, we
need to develop authentically synergistic technology. This technology must be based on an
understanding of production as a conscious participation in the self-organizing activity of the cosmos.
From the ecological side this means that it must not be based simply on the exploitation of natural
resources, but rather on the struggle to actually increase the complexity of the ecosystem. This means
using sources of energy and raw materials which are renewable, the "capture" of which does not reduce
the energy or raw material available for other uses. Production must also be clean enough that valuable
species of plants and animals, which make up an irreplaceable part of the genetic endowment of this
planet, are not lost. At issue here is not a sentimental ecologism, but an understanding that production
ought actually to increase the level of organization of the cosmos, and not simply displace organization
from one part of the ecosystem (say certain carbon based organisms) to another (metal and silicon based
machines). Similarly, synergistic production must not simply exploit human labor; it must tap fully into
the creative potential of the working classes, and actually regard the task of increasing that potential as
the principal force for economic growth.
Synergistic production cannot be organized adequately by either the marketplace or by a centralized state
planning apparatus. The marketplace, in so far as it allocates resources in such a way as to maximize
profit, has no access to information regarding the qualitative complexity of organizations, and certainly
has no mechanism at its disposal for encouraging the development of such organizations. Centralized
state planning mechanisms, when coupled with de facto state ownership of enterprises, have proven
rather more effective at centralizing surplus necessary for promoting such development --such as health
care, housing, employment, education, scientific research and technological development-- and (where
there is the will) for curtailing ecologically destructive activities. Such planning mechanisms have no
realistic prospect, however, of collecting and organizing information regarding the interests and
capacities of billions of virtually unique individuals, much less a way of organizing the activities of
those individuals in a way which taps directly into, rather than suppressing, those interests and abilities.
The problem of transcending, rather than merely curtailing, the destructive effects of the marketplace
remains in the very early theoretical stages of development. There are three aspects to this problem.
First of all, we must have a way of knowing the interests and abilities of each individual in the society,
and of organizing their activity in a way that taps into that interest and ability to promote the all-sided
development of humanity. Second, we must have a way of organizing information about the complex
interactions of these individuals --of planning chaos. Finally, each individual, whatever his or her
particular interests, abilities, etc., must find the highest level of happiness in promoting the all
development of humanity and of the cosmos as a whole. Clearly this is a tall order. There are,
however, three developments which seem particularly promising in this regard:
--institutional organizing
--the emergence of new sciences of organization, and of chaos theory and social network theory
in particular, and
--the emergence of new spiritualities centered on service to the common good and global
interdependence.
The institutional organizer begins his or her work by conducting hundreds or even thousands of
individual meetings. The purpose of the individual meeting is, first of all to develop a map of the self-
interest and the social networks of each individual, and second to identify potential leaders and lay the
groundwork for developing relationships with them. The organizer then brings together small groups
of individuals with similar interests, and involves them in analyzing the complex relationships which
affect those interests, and in developing a plan of action. The organizers then meet to compare notes,
and to outline possible directions of development for the organization as a whole. Eventually, they
bring together key leaders to discuss and modify this plan, and to secure the collaboration of their
constituencies. By the time the plan is brought before an organizational assembly, it has been refined
in a way that takes into account the interests and aspirations of the vast majority, from whom it can
count on enthusiastic support.
While this kind of organizing has thus far been deployed primarily in the political arena, there is no
reason that it cannot be used to organize, and in fact to manage productive enterprises. Such a process
permits the managers, who become organizers, to know in depth the interests and abilities of their
workers, to involve the workers in studying the factors affecting the enterprise, and to design the
production process. Inept or unproductive workers can be challenged by their more developed
comrades, who in turn become organizer candidates themselves. The workers play a real role in
governing the enterprise, without transforming it into simply a means of satisfying their own
spontaneous interests.
Organizing a single enterprise is one thing; organizing a complex world economy is quite another. One
of the key obstacles in this regard is the need not merely to collect vast quantities of information and
to perform superficial statistical analyses, but to perform complex qualitative analyses and organize the
results of these analyses to give us a precise, accurate, in-depth grasp of the optimum line of
development for human society. One of the most promising developments in this regard is chaos
theory, or the science of complex organizations.
Partisans of the marketplace argue that its great strength is its ability to organize vast quantities of
information, and to promote a higher level of complexity than is possible on the basis of traditional
linear methods of state planning. One of the principal insights of chaos theory, however, is that the
behavior of complex systems, such as an advanced economy, while strictly speaking unpredictable in
the sense that we can never know precisely what any given actor will do at any given point in time, nor
just what economic conditions will prevail at any given conjuncture, are nonetheless governed by
relatively simple mathematical algorithms, and do follow certain definite patterns. Chaos theory has
already been applied with some success to the analysis of capitalist economies. What we need to do
is to develop, using the insights of chaos theory, a model of the way in which a synergist economy, the
individual enterprises of which were managed using institutional organizing methods, would behave,
and then feed this information back to the individual enterprise strategy teams, so that they can take this
information into account in their planning. This would, in effect, provide them with continuous
information regarding the constantly changing impact of their decisions on the system as a whole, and
permit them to make the necessary adjustments in order to promote the long term interests of the entire
system, while taking adequate account of the interests, needs, and aspirations of their own
constituencies.
The proper functioning of such a system of institutional organizing, informed by a constant flow of
information regarding the behavior of the system as a whole, in turn presupposes that each individual
actually has an interest in the ongoing development of humanity and of the cosmos generally. This is
a question of spirituality. Synergism is possible only on the basis of a spiritual culture which is as
advanced as its technology, its politics, and its science. The interest of the individual and of the
society as a whole --or even of a given society and of the species as a whole may not be identical. But
this is only because the individual or species in question has not yet developed an interest in systems
larger than itself. Synergist spirituality never involves submission to the imperatives of higher systems,
but rather development of an interest in those systems which permits us to grasp their incredible beauty,
beside which our own concerns seem petty and boring.
B. Strategic Analysis of Current Situation
We need now to consider just what social forces are working on behalf of synergism --and what social
forces are arrayed against it. The world capitalist system integrates social forces from three distinct
modes of production: the dominant capitalist mode of production, residual tributary social classes, and
incipient socialist social categories.
The principal force for the development of synergism is the proletariat, understood to include all of
those sectors of society which derive their income from the sale of productive labor power (including
the labor of organizing social relations or of producing knowledge). By productive labor we mean labor
which objectively develops human social capacities and increases the complexity of the ecosphere. The
proletariat is the principal force for the development of synergism because
a) it is the labor of this class which actually creates the new technology, the new organizational
forms, the new knowledge, and the new spirituality which makes synergism possible and
b) the entire surplus produced by this class is available for rational investment. The class stands
to lose neither control over, nor unproductive consumption rights in, the social surplus product.
The proletariat thus has an objective interest in transcending all structures which obstruct its labor. This
does not mean, however, that the proletariat has a spontaneous subjective interest in this transition. The
alienation engendered by the operation of the marketplace, which effaces all but individual consumer
interests, is sufficient to prevent this.
There are differences within the proletariat based on the level of development of the sectors in which
they are employed. Workers in protosynergistic (education or solar energy) or advanced industrial
(electronics, astronautics, or telecommunications) generally have a deeper interest in social progress than
those in relatively more backward sectors, but there are exceptions. Unskilled workers entirely
marginalized by the prevailing regime of accumulation may well have a more profound stake in
synergism than moderately skilled workers headquartered in backward industries (automobiles) or highly
skilled workers in the military-industrial complex. Thus the demand for education --the synergistic
demand par excellence is as popular among Hispanic workers in Dallas as it is among the intelligentsia.
The proletariat as a class of producers is largely unorganized. Trade unions represent the interests of
workers as consumers and thus as a class within capitalist society. Socialist and communist parties
have been largely transformed into the instruments of bureaucratic redistributers. We will discuss below
the nature of a synergistic organization of the working class.
There are other social classes organic to the capitalist mode of production which are engaged in labor
which contributes to the development of synergism. The productive petty bourgeoisie consists of those
sectors of society which derive their income from the sale of the products of their labor (and thus retain
control of some or all of the surplus which they produce). This stratum includes highly paid salaried
professionals and managers as well as independent professionals and small entrepreneurs. The
synergistic bourgeoisie consists of those sectors of the bourgeoisie which perform useful labor either
developing new technologies or building organizations which promote technological or human
development, but which derive most of their revenue from surplus extracted from workers they
employ. The synergistic bourgeoisie and the productive petty bourgeoisie are, in a very real sense
partners in the creation of synergism, but have a stake in retaining control over the surplus which they
produce and/or extract --something which is an obstacle to the rational deployment of society's
resources. They must transcend their character as members of the petty bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie in
order to become full participants in the construction of the new society. For this reason we call these
classes strategic reserves, or strategic allies, rather than part of our core constituency.
The principal political expression of the productive petty bourgeoisie and the progressive bourgeoisie
is in the so called "new social movements:" ecologism, feminism, and pacifism which look towards the
development of new, ecologically sound, objectively synergistic ways of producing, toward increased
investment in human development, and towards the development of a relational understanding of power,
without really grasping the need to transcend the marketplace --and actively resisting any attempt to
capture the surplus they produce or extract. The principal cultural expression of these strata is in the
"New Age" movements which reflect some understanding of the relational character of the cosmos but
which fail to grasp the central role of human labor power in its self-organizing development.
In addition to the classes organic to the capitalist mode of production there is one residual
communitarian and one incipient socialist category which form part of the broad progressive bloc. The
peasantry has a negative interest in synergism, as one of several forces which might assist it in resisting
the penetration of market forces. The peasantry contributes positively to the struggle for synergism less
at the level of production than at the level of social organization and spirituality. While under attack
by advancing market forces, the village community and the popular religious institutions associated with
it remain important conservers of non-market social networks, and bridges to the formation of
synergistic consciousness. Residual forms of the village community persist in many urban working class
communities, particular those with large numbers of recent immigrants from rural areas, in the form
of mutual benefit societies, lay religious confraternities, parish communities existing within larger
ecclesiastical structures, and informal neighborhood networks. They play a vitally important role as
a bridge to the formation of higher forms of organization at a time when much of the social fabric has
been disrupted. This sector of society is organized largely through political organizations based in
village organizations, local congregations, communidades de base etc., which generally serve as the
vehicle for the hegemony of some other social class (the progressive bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy, or
the clergy). The peasantry finds its principal cultural expression in various forms of religious socialism,
liberation theology, etc., which play a similar role in linking the peasantry to the political projects of
the progressive bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy, or the clergy.
The bureaucracy, in and out of power, also constitutes a strategic reserve in the struggle for synergism.
This stratum makes the contribution of centralizing resources for investment on behalf of technological
or human development. Its affinity for synergism is limited however by its location in centralized
redistributional structures which, like the marketplace, are inadequate to the task of organizing
synergism. The principal political vehicle of this sector remains the social democratic and communist
parties, and its principal cultural expression a rationalist secular humanism.
There are two sectors of society which ought to be regarded as "center forces." The advanced industrial
bourgeoisie, and allied investment banking sectors organize the resources necessary for investment in
such sectors as electronics, astronautics and aeronautics, pharmaceutical, etc. These sectors of society
would fare better under a regime of accumulation which partly restricted market forces and which used
centralized redistributional power to leverage greater investment in infrastructure, research and
development, education, etc. At the same time, advanced industrial corporations have clearly prospered
from high levels of military spending --something which has ultimately compromised their whole nature.
These sectors find their principal political expression in certain progressive sectors of the leading
bourgeois parties. In the U.S. they generally make generous contributions to both parties in order to
hedge their bets (Fergusen 1989).
The clergy (a residual tributary class which derives its revenue from quasi taxes) plays an important role
as a conserver of non-market social networks, and of a discourse concerning the common --and even
the cosmic-- good. Religious institutions have played an important role in anti-imperialist struggles,
and in general in resisting the degeneration of capitalism. At the same time, the clergy resists the
comprehensive rationalization carried out not only by the proletariat, but also by the progressive
bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, and in general resists the notion that humanity participates fully in
the self-organizing activity of the cosmos directly through its ordinary labor, political life, scientific
research etc. --a fact which deprives it of its leading role in society. Thus the rightward turn in the
Catholic hierarchy in the face of rationalizing tendencies such as liberation theology. The principal
political expression of the clergy is in congregation-based organizations and confessional parties directly
or indirectly controlled by religious institutions (Mansueto 1992).
Among the forces more or less unambiguously opposed to the development of synergism we should
include the remainder of the bourgeoisie. This is not to suggest that the remaining sectors of the
bourgeoisie do nothing useful for humanity, but simply that they have become inextricably entangled
with social relationships which hold back human social development or which degrade the ecosystem.
Of these forces the financial and commercial bourgeoisies, which are not involved in production, are
clearly the most backward, though large sections of the intermediate and low technology industrial
bourgeoisie and the agrarian bourgeoisie are increasingly involved in defending ecologically destructive
production processes, or in driving down wages as an alternative to automating production. We should
also include within this bloc the unproductive sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and those large
landowners who are not yet fully capitalist, together with the military and the national security
bureaucracy.
What is the current balance of social forces? We have already noted above the low level of organization
of the proletariat. What the proletariat does have is the organizing capacity to create the conditions for
the transition to synergism. Specifically, we have:
* an actual interest in promoting the development of human social capacities and in participating
in the self-organizing activity of the cosmos,
* a grasp of the dialectic and thus of the "line of march, conditions, and ultimate general
result" of human and cosmic history,
* the organizing methods necessary to build an organization to lead the transition, and
* the labor power to carry out the transition.
These capacities remain, however, merely potential. We will argue in the following section that our
principal task in the present period is precisely to develop them: to organize the working class as a class
of producers, organizers, artists, scientists, and spiritual leaders.
In addition to these organic strengths, we can draw on:
* the creative capacities, and superior financial resources of the productive petty bourgeoisie and
the progressive bourgeoisie and their social and cultural movements,
* the non-market social networks and communitarian values conserved by peasant communities
and their residual forms, and
* the economic, political, military and theoretical resources of the socialist countries, the
communist parties, and the national liberation movements.
These forces are strategic reserves in the sense that, provided we deploy our resources correctly in order
to build relationships with potential allies, they can be counted on throughout most of the course of the
struggle.
We can also count on more vacillating financial and institutional support from:
* the clergy and
* the advanced industrial bourgeoisie,
which we regard as tactical allies.
Our adversaries, on the other hand, while lacking the capacity to resolve the crisis of their own mode
of social organization or to carry forward the development of human social capacities, nonetheless have
at their disposal not only the vast majority of the world's capital, but also its principal political and
military apparati, the mass media, and to a large extent the universities. The most potent weapon of
the bourgeoisie, however, is the disintegrating effect of the marketplace, which, as we have noted, tends
to undermine every organizing process (even those initiated by the bourgeoisie itself).
In addition to these organic strengths, the bourgeoisie, like the proletariat, can draw on certain strategic
reserves. The most important of these are the clergy and the religious institutions generally, and
nationalistic elements headquartered in the military and the national security bureaucracy. Under the
leadership of the advanced industrial bourgeoisie, these elements (particularly the clergy) can become
a force for carrying out needed structural reforms while blocking the development of autonomous
working class movements --a phenomenon most apparent in the congregation based organizing network
built by the Industrial Areas Foundation. Even these formations have shown some fascistic
tendencies. But under the leadership of the imperialist and speculative sectors of the bourgeoisie
the clergy is rich in fascistic potential. The military and national security bureaucracy, of course,
play a critical role in transforming the advanced industrial bourgeoisie into a proimperialist force,
integrating it into the "military-industrial complex," while itself enjoying much the same protection
from market pressures to which its socialist counterparts aspire.
C. Strategy, Tactics, and Organization
We are now in a position to discuss our strategy in some detail. Before proceeding to this discussion,
it will be useful to clarify the distinction between strategy and tactics. The word strategy derives from
the Greek words stratos (army) and agein (to lead). Military strategy encompasses the full range of
activities which are necessary to prepare for, plan, and win a war, and thus involves not only the
selection of appropriate methods of struggle at various phases in the conflict (tactics), and the
determination of the direction of the main blow at each point in the struggle, but also a long term plan
for developing and organizing the technological, economic, political, and cultural resources necessary
to fight the war. Development of a particular military strategy depends not only on one's reading of
current conditions, but on one's general theory of how wars are fought and won.
The same is true of political strategy. A political strategy is a long range plan for developing,
organizing, and deploying the resources necessary to reorganize the structure of a given society. These
resources include both the general technological, economic, political, and cultural conditions for the
transition in question, and the revolutionary and progressive forces in any given period. A political
strategy, therefore, must include:
1) a plan for promoting the technological, economic, political, and cultural development of the
society as a whole. This is especially important if the conditions for the transition are not yet
fulled developed.
2) a plan for organizing and developing politically, theoretically, morally, and spiritually the
core constituency for the transition and for building relationships with and eventually for
mobilizing strategic reserves, etc.
3) a plan for deploying these forces politically in such a way that at any given moment their
principal blow is aimed at the enemies weakest points, and so that the support of allies, strategic
reserves, etc. is constantly strengthened.
The word "tactics" comes from the Greek word tassein (to arrange), and refers to the disposition of
forces in the battlefield. Tactical leadership involves
1) training one's forces in the full range of different methods of struggle, and
2) selection of the methods of struggle which, at any given point, are most appropriate to the
current situation.
In so far as our aim here is to present a general statement of our tasks in this period, which is accurate
not only for the United States but for other regions as well, our discussion of tactics will be very
limited, and will be incorporated into our discussion of the proper deployment of our forces.
As we have suggested throughout this study, the strategic perspective we promote differs from that of
classical Leninism in its insistence on actually raising the masses to a fully synergistic level of
development. The masses must be capable of synergistic production, relational power, dialectical
thinking, and cosmic-relationalist spirituality. In so far as these capacities cannot be exercised by
individuals in isolation, but only in the context of a definite system of institutional arrangements, the
accomplishment of this long range task is identical with completing the transition to a synergistic
society. Our analysis also suggests, however, that even the achievement of certain intermediate goals
--structural reforms, resistance to developing fascistic tendencies-- requires an extraordinary
development of the social capacities of the masses, which have been undermined by the penetration of
market relations. It is impossible to organize the masses for structural reforms without developing
protosynergistic organizing capacities. It is impossible to effectively resist the emergence of fascistic
tendencies without attacking the social disintegration which is its most fundamental social basis.
1. Developing the Conditions for the Transition
We have argued above that the technological, economic, political, and cultural conditions for the
transition to a synergistic mode of social organization are only beginning to emerge. We have also
argued that the activities necessary to develop these conditions cannot, for the most part, be carried out
on a capitalistic basis. From these two observations follows necessarily the first task of advanced
progressive forces in the present period --a task which sets our approach apart from Leninist strategy.
Advanced progressive forces must work to actually develop the conditions for the transition to a
fully synergistic society. For the most part this task consists in pure and applied scientific research
in the following areas:
1) development of renewable energy sources and processes of production which use renewable
natural resources and which tap fully into the interest and creativity of the human participants
in the labor process,
2) adaptation of institutional organizing techniques to the management of complex economic,
political, and cultural institutions, and to the management of the society as a whole.
3) continued development of the new sciences of organization, and in particular of unified
theories within and between scientific fields,
4) development of a way to actually defeat the alienating action of the marketplace and produce
individuals who are interested in promoting the self-organizing activity of the cosmos.
2. Organizing the Progressive Forces and Building Relationships with Potential Allies
In so far as it requires the labor of thousands of highly developed scientists, teachers and organizers,
all of whom have at least a general understanding of and commitment to the general line of transition,
the task of developing the conditions for synergism at least partially presupposes the organization of the
progressive forces. Developing the conditions for the transition to synergism thus means identifying,
training, and organizing leaders, and who can carry out the work of developing the those conditions.
By leadership in general we mean simply the ability to advance human organizing capacity. There are
both different dimensions to and different levels of leadership. It is possible to lead in any one of the
several dimensions of human organizing activity. One can be a leading engineer, an organizer, a
leading scientist, artist, or a spiritual leader. Those who are interested in their work only to the extent
that it advances their position as consumers are not really capable of leadership, or lead only at a very
primitive level, mobilizing networks of persons who have interests identical to their own. Intermediate
leaders grasp the relationship between their interest and that of others, and work, or organize, in order
to realize that interest more effectively. Advanced leaders, on the other hand, have an actual interest
in the contribution that their work or organizing activity makes to human development. In this context,
however, we are most interested in revolutionary leadership: i.e. in the capacity of a leader to
organize given social forces in such a way that they transcend the existing social structure.
Revolutionary leadership presupposes leadership ability in one or more particular social spheres. One
cannot reorganize society if one cannot participate productively in any of its organizing processes. We
distinguish, however, between those who are simply advanced leaders in their particular spheres, and
who are unconsciously developing new technologies, new organizational methods, new theories, new
forms of spirituality, and those who understand clearly that realization of the full potential of such
work presupposes the reorganization of society as a whole --specifically the transcendence of the
marketplace and of centralized redistributional systems, and who have an interest in and the capacity
to participate in carrying out just such a reorganization.
When we say that our task is to organize our core constituency we mean both organizing and building
relationships with people who, in virtue of their particular abilities, can contribute to creating the
general conditions for the transition to synergism, and building an organization of leaders committed
to and capable of carrying out that transition. Concretely this means building two types of organization:
what the left historically has called mass organizations and a leadership organization of a new kind:
the synergistic collective. The collective and its mass organizations together make up the synergistic
network.
Our mass organizations must, unlike trade unions, organize people in their capacity as producers,
organizers, scientists, and spiritual leaders. This means building organizations which can train unskilled
workers to be productive at a new synergistic level and which can carry out synergistic production,
organizing, research, and spiritual development, rather than organizations which pursue consumer goals
for workers within the structure of capitalist society. Our mass organizations must therefore be
cooperative enterprises, political organizations, research institutes, schools, and congregations, rather
than trade unions. This may mean either building new or reorganizing old organizations. The choice
between these two alternatives is a tactical decision. But it is vitally important that the resulting
organizations become an authentic mass base for the synergistic collective, and not merely strategic or
tactical allies.
The collective has the task of developing these "mass organizations," and, when the conditions for the
transition are more fully developed, for deploying them in such a way as to transcend outmoded market
and centralized redistributional structures. The collective is thus:
1) a research organization, organized in order to develop the conditions for the transition to a
synergistic society outlined above,
2) a teaching organization, identify, training, and organizing revolutionary and progressive
leaders, and
3) a strategic and tactical leadership organization, deploying the progressive forces in such a
manner that they will always strike at the adversary's weakest link, and preserve and strengthen
relationships with other progressive forces.
The process of building such an organization is no different than the method of institutional organizing
generally, with the single difference that we are interested in identifying, training, and developing
leaders at a much higher level. The process begins with individual relational meetings designed to map
out the potential leader's interests and networks, and to reinterpret their interests for them in a way that
creates the possibility of some relationship. Groups of potential members are then brought together to
analyze the social forces affecting their interests. In the case of candidates for membership in the
collective this should involve fairly high-level theoretical work. Candidates should also be provided
with organizing training. Ideally, there should be counselling available to help overcome psychological
obstacles and to work out contradictions which emerge in public and private relationships as a result
of the member's new level of development. Members are then involved in practical work of some kind,
primarily to test them out and to develop their capacities. The work should generally be in their area
of their principal expertise. After a period of testing and evaluation, they are then deployed in accord
with the organization's strategic priorities.
As an organization of leaders who grasp the general line of the transition, and who are actively engaged
in developing and implementing the strategy for the transition, the collective is by nature characterized
by the highest degree of unity and discipline. This unity and discipline differs fundamentally, however,
from that which characterized the Leninist party, where unity and discipline were, in the final analysis,
based on assent to political and ideological points of unity, and to obedience to the centralized
leadership, which was accountable to the cadre only in the most formal sense of the word. In our
organization, unity and discipline must be based on highly developed relationships of mutual respect and
accountability, on intellectual conviction, and on a real desire to promote the self-organizing activity
of the cosmos.
Power within the organization must take on the same relational character as the power which the
organization exercises in relation to civil society as a whole. If I am going to ask someone, inside or
outside the organization to carry out a certain strategy based on a certain analysis of the current
situation, then it is not enough for me to show that I have more experience in political analysis or
strategic planning than they do. Indeed, exercising authority on that basis would stifle their initiative
and encourage conformism and submission. On the contrary, my analysis must be sufficiently powerful
to convince the members of the organization of the merits of my assessment and convince them that
following the line I propose is actually in their interest --will actually increase their productivity, power,
knowledge, or love.
The process of developing relationships with strategic allies is rather more complex, since members of
the productive petty bourgeoisie and the progressive bourgeoisie have contradictory class interests. On
the one hand we can help them to realize their interest in developing synergistic technology, power
relations, science, spirituality, etc. At the same time, we threaten the autonomy of the petty bourgeoisie
and the wealth and power which the progressive bourgeoisie enjoys as an extractor of surplus value.
Those who lead petty bourgeois or progressive organizations will not necessarily enjoy the same
standing within our network. Similarly, we can assist the peasantry (or newly proletarianized workers)
to protect their social institutions against the disintegrating effects of the marketplace, or assist the
bureaucracy in its efforts to organize resources for investment in technological or human development,
but our very assistance involves reorganizing communitarian and bureaucratic institutions.
Generally speaking the basis of our relationship should be our capacity to contribute something to their
struggle to realize their own interests --i.e. our ability to contribute something to the efforts of a solar
energy company to procure state support for solar energy development, of an ecological organization
to secure protective legislation, of a peace organization to reduce the military budget, of a recently
proletarianized Hispanic immigrant community to repair its fractured social fabric and to realize its
communitarian values, or of a socialist country to defend itself against U.S. aggression. But the very
process of making this contribution to realizing the group's interests necessarily involves struggle:
helping the solar energy entrepreneur understand the bankruptcy of the "free" market, helping the
"Green" organization or the peace group develop a disciplined organization, helping the Hispanic
immigrant community to sort out just what in its religious tradition promotes --and what holds back--
human development, or the socialist country to develop more complex, less linear ways of exercising
power.
What we are building, therefore is both more and less than a Leninist popular front. It is more because
far from simply being allies in a struggle against imperialism or fascism, we are collaborators with the
progressive sectors in the human civilizational project. We need to build our relationship with the
progressive forces on the sound basis of our shared participation in the self-organizing activity of the
cosmos, and not merely on the basis of our common desire to break the back of the present regime of
accumulation. We must be willing to learn from our collaborators, and create conditions in which it
is relatively easy for them to learn from us and to come to respect our contributions to the common
struggle. At the same time, what we are building is less than a traditional Leninist popular front
because we do not envision achieving "state power" on the basis of antifascist or advanced industrial
reformist demands.
There is a great temptation, given the weakened state of the workers' movement, for advanced
progressives to simply "put aside" their long range aims, and work within the limits set by the advanced
industrial bourgeoisie, the clergy, etc. This is a serious mistake. We know that the strategies of these
center forces will, in the long run, prove inadequate, and we have an obligation to demonstrate this to
the people. If we fail in this regard we will be discredited along with our bourgeois collaborators. Our
relationship with both strategic and tactical allies will always be characterized by intense struggle.
Indeed, this struggle is, as Mao argued (Mao Zedong 1940/1972: 184), the real basis of our unity.
What we bring to the table, the analysis, organization, and strategy that we bring to bear on behalf of
our allies, is precisely what challenges their existence as classes within bourgeois society.
It follows from this that the task of organizing our core constituency is prior to and must always take
precedence over the task of building relationships with the progressive bourgeoisie and other progressive
forces. So long as we approach the progressive bourgeoisie as individuals we will be regarded, at best
as highly qualified professional employees. All relationships must be built on an organization to
organization basis.
3. Developing a Plan for Deploying the Progressive Forces
It is our assessment that during the present period our forces are insufficient to permit effective
deployment against our adversaries' principal strategic strongholds: i.e. the key economic, political,
military, and cultural institutions of our society. We are, rather, in a period of the "accumulation of
forces" during which the principal purpose of any action, and the criterion against which success and
failure must be judged, is our success in developing our theory, recruiting members of our core
collectives and organizing network, and building relationships with potential allies. Recruitment to the
collective, furthermore, must take precedence over building relationships with potential allies, at least
until we have a sufficiently developed core to meet allies on equal or superior terms. In this sense we
are involved in a kind of institutional guerilla where our goal is not to hold institutional terrain --even
where this is possible it is too costly and would tie down our limited forces for too long-- but rather to
demonstrate our power, recruit, attract allies, and then withdraw.
As we gain strength we can begin to move into a second phase of the struggle: deployment of our forces
in order to seize terrain on the scale of organizations. This may mean penetrating and gaining
hegemony over an organization or it may mean building a new organization which can contend
effectively for power within a particular institutional arena. Generally speaking penetration of existing
organizations will prove more fruitful in those countries where large progressive organizational
complexes already exist, and where it is more difficult to build new organizations: the socialist
countries, in those countries of the Third World with progressive or populist regimes, and in Europe
and the Pacific Rim. In the United States, where the progressive sphere is smaller, and in much of the
Third World, we will need to build new organizations which can produce, organize, conduct research,
and develop people spiritually at a synergistic level.
Only after we have developed not only a powerful leadership organization of hundreds of thousands,
and a complex organizational network of workers collectives, mass political organizations, research
institutions, schools, and congregations, all working at a synergistic level, and all committed to the
transition to synergism, will we be ready to deploy our forces in a final assault against our adversaries'
principal institutional strongholds. By this point we will have already created a situation of effective
dual power: our productive capacity, our political power, our knowledge and our spirituality will be
greater than that of the adversary not only potentially but really. More progressive ruling classes (the
bureaucracies of the socialist countries, some populist regimes, and perhaps the leadership of European
Community and the Pacific Rim) may actually be enticed to transform themselves. The structures of
societies with reactionary ruling classes will already be crumbling around us.
In this way we will be able to realize the long journey of matter towards synergism, and at long last
bring into being a society which realizes fully the human contribution to the self-organizing activity of
the cosmos.
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