Dialectic, Cosmos, and Society
Issue Number 11
Table of Contents
Introduction
Ernesto Cardenal: Espiritualidad Física/Physical Spirituality
Helena Knyazeva: Towards A Synergetic Theory of Human Nature
Pavel Gurevich: Is Humanity a Blunder or the Summit of Creation?
Anthony and Mary M. (Maggie) Mansueto: Against Philosophical Appeasement
Introduction
With this issue we introduce some changes in Dialectic,
Cosmos, and Society which, we think, will help us to carry out
our mission more effectively. Readers should note, first of all,
our new editorial statement, which states more clearly the aims of
this journal. Second, in order to conserve resources and make
possible more frequent publication, the ordinary form of
distribution for Dialectic, Cosmos, and Society will be electronic.
Paper copies will be sent only to paid subscribers, to contributors,
and readers in the Third World and the former Soviet bloc who do
not have access to email. We are in the process of building a web
site on which current issues will be posted and back issues will be
indexed and available by electronic mail. Finally, in order to
encourage dialogue, we will begin publishing brief responses to
articles, reflections on issues raised by articles, and thoughts on
issues relevant to the purposes of the journal. It is our hope that
this will encourage readers engaged in practical work, who may
not have the time or training to prepare major theoretical articles,
but who have insights of their own to contribute, to join the
debate. Eventually we hope to put on-line a full text data base of
articles from Dialectic, Cosmos, and Society, as well as other
material on related themes. We also hope, in the not too distant
future, to resume publishing Strategic Analysis, which focuses on
analysis of the current economic, political, and cultural situation
and fosters debate around questions of public policy, strategy, and
tactics. We believe these changes are necessary in order to permit
us to carry out our core mission under the rapidly changing
conditions of the present period. Contributors should rest assured
that paper copies of the journal will continue to be available. Once
we have increased the frequency of publication sufficiently and
increased our exposure through electronic distribution, we will
begin soliciting subscriptions from university and other research
libraries. We are also seeking ways to improve exposure in
academic indices, etc.
The current issue continues exploration of the philosophical
implications of recent developments in the sciences. Helena
Knyazeva, Senior Research Associate at the Institute of Philosophy
of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and currently a visiting
fellow at the Institute for Synergetics and Theoretical Physics at
the University of Stuttgart, explores the implications of theories of
self-organization for our understanding of humanity. Pavel
Gurevich, also of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, where he serves as Director of a
Laboratory, explores the broader question of the existence of a
stable human nature in dialogue with diverse scientific and
philosophical trends. We once again publish a poem by Ernesto
Cardenal, formerly Minister of Culture of the Republic of
Nicaragua and currently Director of the Casa de Tres Mundos in
Managua. The issue concludes with a sort of philosophical
manifesto which I prepared with my wife and associate Maggie,
which argues that the nihilism which is hegemonic in
contemporary philosophy is at once rooted in and serves to
reinforce the market order, and that friends of social justice and
social progress must sharpen their struggle against this nihilism
and resist the temptation to philosophical appeasement.
Espiritualidad Física
Ernesto Cardenal
La teora de que la materia sólida se disuelve
en excitaciones de invisibles campos de energía
y ya no hay distinción entre substancia material
y vacío (esto es, espacio aparentemente vacío).
Y el universo es casi imaginario
o más bien es pura información.
Una partícula sub-atómica no tangible pero
de ellas est hecha la materia tan tangible.
La "onda de probabilidad" medio aristotélica,
una especie de realidad f¡sica
entre la realidad y la possibilidad.
Volviendo a lo mismo:
que la realidad no observada no es real.
Y un objeto es sin atributos si nadie lo ve
(von Neumann).
Y el que toda visión de ojo es ilusión óptica,
mi amiga.
"Ni siquiera el color de beefsteak es real."
Igual que el electrón si no es observado no existe.
La materia es real o irreal, como tu quieres.
Los cuantos, un cosmo esquizofrénico.
Que la materia son partículas es met fora
y que son ondas, también met fora.
Y con los tomos, dice Bohr, el lenguaje
sólo puede usarse como en poesía.
Ah, el tomo que es casi todo espacio vacío
y todas las coas est n hechas de tomos,
y vos y yo.
No existe mundo cuántico dijo Bohr
sino descripción cuántica del mundo.
Y:
"La física no es para entender la naturaleza,
sino lo que decimos de la naturaleza."
La indeterminación al fondo de la materia.
El principio cuántico ya en Parménides.
Y para Bohm el universo entero es un holograma.
Y la conciencia una forma m s subtil de la materia.
Part¡cula que es de una manera o de otra
según se le observe o no.
Mi decisión de cómo observar el electrón
cambia al electrón.
No es objectivo un electrón.
Porque no se observa un electrón
sin aumentarle energ¡a al electrón
así que no sabemos cómo era el electrón.
Pero las partículas virtuales
que no pueden nunca ser observadas:
¨cómo es que existen realmente
las partículas virtuales?
Y los tomos que est n hechoes de partículas
que no están hechas de nada material,
sin substancia, sólo danza de energ¡a,
movimiento sin nadie que se mueve,
sólo danza sin danzantes.
"Se puede gozar de las delicias de la teoría cuántica
con tal de no tratar de entenderla."
Y entonces lo de Bohm:
"todo interpenetrado con todo".
Antigravedad nunca se ha observado.
Para Newton: el espíritu, investigable por la física.
El alma ten¡a tomos para Demócrito ( tomos especiales).
Electrones de mi cuerpo que han estado en el viento,
en el mar, árboles, animales,
y aun en otras galaxias.
Es esto lo que nos hermana a todos.
¨Un destino confinado a un planeta solamente?
Que el tiempo transcurra a velocidades diferentes.
Y la distancia entre dos sitios lejanos sea cero
(porque la diferencia es de tiempo nada más).
Por eso preguntaron a Eddington si era cierto que
sólo tres en el mundo entend¡an la doctrina de Einstein.
Tras larga pausa contest¢: "¨Quien es el tercero?"
¨Que demente geometr¡a es ésa
en que el espacio es curvo?
Curva de nada sobre la nada
sin ninguna dirección en que curvarse.
(Ahora lo entienden los niños de la escuela).
No es el espacio el curvo sino el espaciotiempo
y ninguna cosa es curva.
La realidad de los físicos modernos
es fundamentalmente ajena a la mente humana, dice Davies.
Complejidad del cerebro y simplicidad de la mente.
Y entre lo complejo y lo simple
¨dónde est n almacenados los recuerdos?
Los recuerdos, ay, y el olvido.
Nuestra vida y el tiempo en direcciones opuestas
como un tren corriendo en un túel
y las luces corriendo hacia atrás.
Cuando no tengas respuestas, mira las estrellas
(las estrellas que están en tu retina).
No es que respondan. También ellas preguntan
mirándonos a nosotros, habitantes de una estrella.
La repuesta seremos todos, ellas y nosotros,
porque somos todos la tristeza.
Tal vez el que seamos muchos en las galaxias
ser la salvación.
Physical Spirituality
Ernesto Cardenal
Theory says that solid matter dissolves
into the excitations of energy fields
and that there is no distinction between material substance
and vacuum (that is, apparently empty space).
And the universe is almost imaginary
or rather is pure information.
A sub-atomic particle is intangible but
from them is made ever so tangible matter.
The "probability wave" is a sort of Aristotelian mean,
a kind of physical reality
between possibility and reality.
Returning to this same theme:
reality which has not been observed is not real.
And an object is without attributes if no one sees it
(von Neumann).
Everything the eye sees is an optical illusion,
my friend.
"Not even the color of beefsteak is real."
Similarly, the electron which is not observed does not exist.
Matter is real or unreal, as you prefer.
Quanta: a schizophrenic universe.
To say matter is composed of particles is a metaphor
and of waves, also a metaphor.
And with atoms, says Bohr,
one can only use language as one does in poetry.
Oh, the atom which is almost all empty space
and everything is made of them,
and you and I.
The quantum world doesn't exist, says Bohr
but only a quantum description of the world.
And:
"Physics is not for understanding nature,
but what we say about nature."
The indeterminacy at the font of matter.
The quantum principle already present in Parmenides.
And for Bohm the whole universe is a hologram.
And consciousness a more subtle form of matter.
A particle is one way or another
depending on whether one observes it or not.
My decision to observe an electron
changes the electron.
The electron is not objective.
Because one cannot observe an electron
without augmenting the energy of the electron
and thus we never know the state of the electron
prior to our act of observation.
But the virtual particles
which can never be observed:
in what sense can these virtual particles
be said to exist at all?
And the atoms which are made of particles
which are not made of anything material,
without substance, only a dance of energy,
movement without anyone that moves,
dance without dancers.
"One can enjoy the delights of quantum theory
provided that you don't try to understand it."
And thus Bohm:
"everything interpenetrated by everything else".
Antigravity has never been observed.
For Newton: the spirit, an object of physical investigation.
The soul had atoms for Democritus (special atoms).
The electrons of my body have been in the wind,
in the sea, in trees and animals,
and even in other galaxies.
It is this which makes us brother and sister to all.
A destiny confined to one planet only?
That time might pass at different velocities.
And the distance between two remote sites be zero
(because the difference is one of time only).
For this reason they asked Eddington if it was true that
only three people in the world understood Einstein's teaching.
After a long pause he answered: "Who is the third?"
What crazy geometry is this
in which space is a curve?
Curve of nothing on nothing
without any direction in which to curve.
(Now even schoolchildren understand it).
It is not space which is a curve, but spacetime
and no thing is a curve.
The reality of the modern physicists
is fundamentally alien to the human mind, says Davies.
The complexity of the brain and the simplicity of the mind.
And between the complex and the simple
where are our memories stored?
All our remembering --and Oh!, all our forgetting.
Our life and time in opposite directions
like a train running through a tunnel
and the lights rushing behind.
When you have no answer, look up at the stars,
(the stars which are in your retina).
It is not that they have answers. They too are asking,
looking back at us, habitants of a star.
The answer will be all of us, them and us,
because we are all sadness.
Perhaps the fact that we may be many in the galaxies
will be our salvation.
Towards a Synergetic Theory of Human Nature
Helena Knyazeva*
Synergetics, or the theory of self-organization and evolution,
which originated mainly in the natural sciences (nonlinear
mathematical analysis, nonequilibrium thermodynamics, the theory
of deterministic chaos and fractal research) turns out to be very
fruitful in the humanities as well. Nonlinear synergetic models can
be heuristically applied to comprehension of a number of problems
of human cognition and human culture, including the nature of
human creativity, individual and social health, education and
communication, the information revolution, and the historical
development of science and culture. Synergetics thus acquires a
human face.
1. Synergetics is a multidimensional phenomenon
By synergetics we mean the theory of self organization which
has grown out of the work of such scholars as H.Haken (1978),
I.Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers,1984), S.P.Kurdyumov (1989
1990), E.Laszlo (1995), B.Mandelbrot (1982), E. Moran (1992),
and F.Varela (Maturana & Varela 1988), etc. Synergetics
represents a new stage of development within the traditions of
cybernetics and system-structural analysis, but at the same time
involves a significant departure from the mechanistic assumptions
of these traditions --and indeed a new departure for scientific
thinking generally.
At the core of the theory is the notion that far from being inert
or tending towards disintegration, all matter tends naturally to
develop towards ever higher degrees of organization. Synergetics
has identified a number of the principal characteristics of this
tendency. The following are among the most important (Knyazeva
& Kurdyumov 1994, 1995):
* the constructive role of chaos in evolution,
* the connection between chaos on a micro-level with the
evolution of structures on a macro-level,
* the purposefulness of evolutionary processes and their
determination by this purposefulness, resulting in a resurgence
of teleological notions,
* the existence of changing rhythms and regimes in evolutionary
processes,
* the nonlinear character of the mathematical formalisms which
describe evolution,
* the emergence of complex, higher-order systems from simple
seeds or kernels, and
* the possibility of affecting complex systems, and catalyzing
their development towards still higher levels of organization,
through small-scale, but resonant, intervention.
The methodological considerations presented here are based on
the analysis of the results of mathematical modelling and
computational experiments with evolutionary processes in open
nonlinear media (or systems), conducted by the Moscow
Synergetic School at the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics
of the Russian Academy of Sciences. A number of these results
have been obtained and proved in the form of mathematical
theorems. The ideas elaborated in this paper are thus based on
solid mathematical foundations. The details of the mathematical
models used and nonlinear analysis can be found in the recent
publications of Prof. S. P. Kurdyumov and his collaborators
(Achromeeva et al,1989; Kurdyumov 1990; Samarskii et al 1995).
First. Synergetics reveals the creative role of chaos in the
evolutionary processes of nonlinear complex systems. There must
be a certain degree of chaos and destruction in the world. Chaos
and fluctuations on a micro-level play an essential role in
determining the actual trends or "aims" of processes at a
macro-level. Chaos manifests itself as "a force", as a mechanism
underlying an exit to one of several evolutionary structural
attractors. The macro-organization evolves from disorder or chaos
on micro-level. Dissipative processes, being the macroscopic
revelation of micro-chaos, act in the same way as a sculptor, who
chisels and shapes a statue from a block of marble.
Order and chaos, organization and disorganization, construction
and destruction are all well-balanced in the world. Thus, it is
senseless to resist chaos, or to strive to completely eliminate the
negative, destructive elements from the world. They are necessary
conditions for self-organization.
Besides this, chaos serves as a basis for unification of simple
evolutionary structures into more complex ones. It is a mechanism
for coordinating their tempos of evolution. Chaos, fluctuations on
micro-level, can also be a way of evolutionary switching,
allowing a transition from one evolutionary regime to another one.
Second. One of the most essential and paradoxical consequences
of synergetics is that even as they emerge out of chaos,
evolutionary processes are, in a sense, predetermined. At issue
here is the notion of final cause. The future states of complex
systems escape our control and prediction. The future is open, not
unequivocal. But at the same time, there is a definite spectrum of
purposes or "aims" of development available in any given
nonlinear medium. If we choose an arbitrary path of evolution, we
have to be aware that this particular option may be not feasible in
a given medium. Only a definite set of evolutionary pathways are
open, only certain kinds of structures can emerge. These spectra
of evolutionary structural attractors look much like purposes.
There is, so to speak, "a tacit knowledge" on the part of the
medium itself. The spectra are determined exclusively by the inner
properties of open nonlinear media.
In spite of the existence of a whole set of possible evolutionary
paths many structural attractors remain unrevealed. Many
possibilities will not be actualized. Many inner purposes cannot be
achieved within the given parameters of the medium. A lot of
things remain unrevealed and latent. Nevertheless, the evolutionary
structural attractors, as possible future forms of organization,
determine the course of historical events. The future predetermines
the present. The future is in some sense available in the present.
How can this be so? How can the future influence the present
state of affairs?
The attractors as future states are predetermined. Patterns
precede processes. They can be interpreted as a memory of the
future, a "remembrance of future activities". All attempts that go
beyond the basin of attraction (the "cones" of the attractors) are
"infernal attempts." Everything which is not in accordance with
the structural attractors will be wiped out, annihilated. For
example, a human can fight unconsciously against those forces that
"pull him" from the future, but all these attempts are doomed to
failure.
Third. The evolution of structures undergoes a periodic change
of state from one regime of development to another. There are
some universal laws which govern these rhythms. They are
peculiar to living beings as well as to inanimate nature. There are
cyclical changes of state: upsurge - slump - stagnation - upsurge
- slump etc. Only by obeying these "life rhythms" or oscillatory
modes, can complex systems maintain their integrity and develop
dynamically. This mechanism of "self-movement", of
auto-oscillation, reminds one of the oriental image of Yin-Yang.
Yin is complete potentiality and aspiration: the subconscious, the
unverbalized and the unrevealed. Yang is the realized: the
verbalized, the revealed.
Fourth. Synergetics has also discovered new principles which
govern the emergence of complex totalities from simpler elements.
Holism has an evolutionary character in synergetics. A complex
structure is an integration of structures of "different ages", that is:
structures at the different stages of evolutionary development. The
principles which govern the integration of such structures of
"different ages" are gradually being revealed. The integration of
simple structures into a complex one occurs by the establishment
of a common tempo of development in all unified parts (fragments,
simple structures).
2. Towards a synergetics of human beings and human society.
Synergetics originated in the natural sciences, and in particular
in the fields of nonlinear analysis, chaos theory, fractal geometry,
and the modeling of catastrophic processes, but it is increasingly
demonstrating its usefulness in analyzing human beings and human
society as well. It has been especially fruitful in trying to make
sense out of the mysteries of human consciousness and human
psychology (Knyazeva 1996).
Synergetics is optimistic by nature. In the current modern
situation of accelerated but also unstable development synergetics
brings new hope. It's an optimistic attempt to understand the
principles of evolution and coevolution of complex systems, to
reveal the causes of evolutionary crisis,instability and chaos and to
master the methods of the nonlinear management of complex
systems in unstable states.
How can we manage a complex system without rough handling?
How can we encourage development with small, resonant
influences? How can we provide for self-maintaining and
sustainable development?
Part of the answer, at least, lies in our attitude towards chaos.
Synergetics reveals the sympathetic, creative face of chaos. Chaos
is, ultimately a field producing sparks of social and cultural
innovations. Because chaos opens up the possibility for the
appearance of something completely new, an element of chaos is
desirable.
Synergetics allows us to understand destruction as a creative
principle. "A passion for destruction is creative", wrote the
Russian philosopher M. Bakunin. Thanks to the liberation from the
old and to the turn of evolutionary processes to an opposing
regime, something new can emerge from the remains of the old.
A nonlinear synergetic situation is a game with reality. It's a
kind of physical experiment, a mental or even existential game,
which involves wandering over a field of different paths into the
future. Nothing is predetermined in this evolutionary game except
the most general rules, which have the character of bans on some
evolutionary paths which don't correspond to the inner
evolutionary trends of the system in question.
This means there are no recipes for managing nonlinear
situations. It is the nonlinear situation itself which somehow solves
itself and, moreover, builds the subject. A nonlinear creative
relation to the world means,therefore, a discovery of possibilities
under construction.
This means developing a playful approach to reality. Human
being, according to synergetics is homo ludens, a playing human.
Synergetics presents itself in such case as a kind of intellectual
yoga: intellectual exercises on a mental field, developing our
capacity to master the complex. It views everything as flexible and
open. Synergetic management centers on identifying and
stimulating the latent potential of the system in question.
Synergetics is a new approach to individual and collective health
(sociotherapy). Since synergetics discovers the principles which
govern the emergence of the complex from the simple, it lays the
groundwork for a new evolutionary holism. As it concerns human
health, it can be compared to gestalt-therapy. Healing is at once a
"self-opening" and a "returning to self".
It turns out that healing is a kind of "synergetic adventure" in
which the latent attitudes (structural attractors) to a favorable and
healthy future are gradually revealed. It is discovering some of
the self-maintaining paths and the inner forces that follow them.
From a synergetic point of view it is possible to discuss the
following: is it healthy to be chaotic? What are the causes of the
effectiveness of weak influences such as homeopathic medicine or
acupuncture? Is it possible to be psychically healthy and to have
simultaneously a somatic disease?
The synergetic approach to education can be characterized as a
gestalt-education. The process of education is not a transfer of
knowledge from one head to another. It is not an enlightenment
and a rendering of some already discovered truths. It is, rather, a
nonlinear situation of open dialogue with an intermediate feedback,
a solidary educational adventure, falling out (in the course of
solving some problems) into one and the same self-concordant
tempoworld. It is a process which awakens the forces and abilities
of a pupil and stimulates progress on her own paths of
development. Gestalt-education is an initiating education, a
reopening of ourselves, a collaboration with ourselves and with
other people. It is a way to discover reality as well as to search out
paths into the future.
3. The creative mind from a synergetic point of view
The task of applying new synergetic models to understanding
cognitive evolution and the growth of scientific knowledge lies
within the general scope of the problems raised by evolutionary
epistemology. There are only a few publications devoted to the
subject so far. One has to mention the works of H.Haken (Haken
1996; Haken & Stadler 1990) and G.Vollmer (1984).
To consider the human brain from the synergetic point of view
is a most difficult task. As H.Haken puts it, "Creativity appears to
be the deepest of all puzzles concerning the brain. It means the
birth of thoughts that have never been generated before and, in
particular, whose generation was extremely unlikely. One may
compare the creation of a new idea to a jigsaw puzzle" (Haken
1996).
Synergetics can be applied to human cognitive processes because
it is oriented to the revelation of the universal patterns of evolution
and self-organization of complex systems of any kind. Synergetics
tries to construct certain bridges between inanimate and animate
nature, between the quasi-purposes of natural systems and human
rationality, between the birth of the new in nature, the so called
"creativity of nature" and the creative and imaginative capabilities
of humanity.
There is a complex mutual connection between conscious and
unconscious processes, purposeful and spontaneous ones, the
processes of organization and self-organization. Synergetic
mechanisms act in processes of scientific research which occur
regardless of the scientists' intentions and free creative aspirations.
The mechanisms concern those processes which are realized, so to
say, "above the creating minds".
As concerns the development of scientific knowledge on the
individual level, the functioning of the scientist's creative thinking,
it is reasonable to search the synergetic mechanisms in those
processes which are not under the control of consciousness, which
occur on both subconscious and unconscious levels. As to the level
of collective consciousness, the activities of the scientific
community, the mechanisms of self-organization are connected
with the unpredictable consequences of the scientists' creative
activities, with the integration of the actions of separate scientists
into general trends of scientific investigation and of the evolution
of scientific knowledge.
Three arguments in defence of the possibility of the synergetic
approach to evolution of scientific knowledge should be noted.
These are, first, the obvious role of the cooperative, coherent
effects in science, second, the fruitfulness of the structural
approach as well as, third, the long approbation of the informative
approach to scientific knowledge.
The functioning of creative intuition and imagination in general
can be considered in the light of synergetics as a process of
self-organization, a self-completing of visual and mental images,
ideas, notions, and thoughts. Cognitive chaos, in the sense of an
openness to multiple alternatives plays a positive, stimulating role
in creative thinking. At the initial stage of creative intuition a
maximal widening of the creative field takes place. The maximally
possible variety of elements of knowledge seems to be embraced.
Besides, the proper balancing of the main and the subordinate, the
essential and non-essential, that is the radical revaluation of all
cognitive values in front of the creative aim is the basis for the
productive choice of an idea. The initial wandering over a mental
net of spaces serves as a good preparation for the innovative leap
of thought.
The notion of evolutionary attractors which organize the given
elements of knowledge from the future is also important for the
explanation of the mechanisms of the creative thinking. If a system
falls into the cone of a certain attractor, it will inevitably evolve
towards this relatively stable state.
The central thesis can be formulated in the form of paradox:
new knowledge is emergent, is not derivable from the elements of
the available conscious knowledge and at the same time the
knowledge is latent predetermined in the present elements. The
translation of knowledge from the potential to actual is non-trivial
and means the event of discovery. The appearance of a special
creative state --an inspiration-- means, from the synergetic point of
view, hitting the field of one of the creative attractors.
The mechanism of self-organization, the self-completing of
visual and mental images includes, first, the purposefulness of an
emerging whole. The attitude (a plan, a main idea or an image)
serves as "a guiding thread" for research. This is an attractor for
creative activities.
Second, the selection, the cutting off of "all that is unnecessary"
takes place on the basis of the initial increase of variety, the
revaluation of the cognitive values. Latent attitudes play a selective
role. The mechanism of creative thinking is not an accidental
sorting of variants. It is a choice of the main in order to organize
a whole. Self-organization occurs around the key element. The
intellectual and verbal creative process is connected with the
pitiless throwing away of many ideas and images which were
admitted a little bit earlier during the stage of cognitive chaos.
Third, the mechanism of self-organization in creative thinking
can be presented as a mechanism for filling up gaps in the nets of
knowledge, a self-completing of ideas, a self-assembly of a
complete image. Not simply the instantaneous organization of a
whole structure is taking place, as it was assumed by gestalt-
psychologists. According to the synergetic model, creative thinking
is a self-growing of a whole from some parts as a result of
self-complicating of the parts. The flow of thoughts and images
becomes complicated owing to its inner potentials. The flow builds
itself spontaneously.
Fourth, scientific discovery can be interpreted as the
organization of a problem field (a field of questions), as a
crystallization of knowledge, an exit to a structure. As a rule,
whole series of new knowledge crystallizations are occurring in
creative processes in science. A whole cascade of talent
crystallization takes place in the individual life of a really creative
scholar.
The synergetic model of the evolution of scientific knowledge
has, so far, only a phenomenological character. But it lets us
consider many old epistemological problems in a non-traditional
way, and opens wide prospects for further investigation.
3. The archetypes of the tree of knowledge and the mandala
The phylogenesis and ontogenesis of human consciousness can,
therefore, be analyzed from the synergetic point of view. This
evolutionary process has been captured in such traditional images
as the tree of knowledge (echoed in the modern icon of the "search
tree") and the mandala. The image of "the tree of knowledge"
showed the availability of an intuitive sense of the fruitfulness of
cognitive chaos, of considering a variety of possibilities, in the
search for the truth. The plurality of ways means not only the
unrolling of possibilities, but also their rolling up, not only the
element of divergence in the creative processes, cognition, life,
human practice, but also the element of convergence. The dynamic
character of development is maintained only by the alternation of
two complementary regimes: the regime of increasing of intensity
of processes and that of their decreasing, the tightening around a
central traditional kernel and a spreading out from that kernel.
Only by a partial return to the old, to tradition, to a foremedium
of consciousness, can a stable line of development maintain itself.
The feature of developmental processes is intuitively reflected
in the repeating images of mandala cycle. It turns out that "the
past is still ahead", as M. Tsvetaeva once said. The attractors of
development as future states are pre-given. They look like a
"memory of future," "a remembrance of future activities".
There is a profound connection between the spatial and the
temporal notions in the infant as well as in the archaic thinking.
Spatial and temporal characteristics can be mutually turned round:
a spatialization of time or a temporalization of space. In archaic
thought and language, as L.Levy-Bruhl shows, "to be in this or
that place" means at the same time "to be at this or that time".
This feature correlates with the synergetic notions of evolutionary
structural attractors in which the space and time are not
independent, but are connected with each other. The latter
circumstances opens the possibility of "finding out" the past and
the future of a structure considering the course of evolutionary
processes in different spatial fragments of the structure. One can
see the future picture of the processes today by analyzing the
available configuration of structural attractors.
There is an intrinsic connection between space and time in the
evolutionary structural attractors of a behavioral system. On the
one hand, it seems that time has a topological structure. We can
imagine a tree of time, a tree of historical events. On the other
hand, the spatial configuration of a structure-attractor contains, in
itself, the information of the past and the future of the structure.
And we could try to extract the information by simply analyzing
the available spatial configuration of the given evolutionary
structure. The future and the past penetrate by showing their
"faces" in and through the present configuration of the
structure-attractor. So, we can speak about a special, synergetic
status of "here and now". We can understand in a synergetic sense
the term "chronotop" introduced by Russian psychologist A.
Ukhtomsky.
Acknowledgement.
The paper was prepared with the support of the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation (IV - RUS 1033436 STP).
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* Current address: Institute of Theoretical Physics and Synergetics,
University of Stuttgart, Pfaffenwaldring 57/4, D-70550 Stuttgart,
Germany; fax: 0049/711/685-4909, e-mail:
[email protected]; Permanent address: Institute
of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Volkhonka St.14
119842 Moscow, Russia; fax: 007/095/200-3250.
Is Humanity a Blunder or the Summit of Creation?
Pavel Gurevich
Erich Fromm considered human beings to be "the most eccentric
creatures of all Creation." But is human nature something constant
and unchanging which remains stable even as beliefs and values
change? Or is human nature itself transformed as human beings
create ever new social environments?
For many years three principal theses dominated philosophical
discussions of human nature: that "humanity is the summit of
creation," that "humanity is the measure of all things," and that
"human nature is an objective reality possessing certain stable
features." Today, however, two new theses have come to the
fore, resulting in a crisis of the "enlightened" model of humanity:
that "humanity is nature's blunder" and that "humanity is in no
sense a measure of all that exists."
Clearly we have learned that the boundaries of the human are
much broader than was once thought. But does this mean that
there is no such thing as human nature? Or is there something
unique about humanity which makes human beings immeasurably
more interesting than, say, a perfectly designed machine?
It may be useful, in trying to resolve this question, to set the
debate in historical context. The ancient Greeks developed a cult
of the human body. They glorified its beauty and admired it as a
wonderful creature of nature. The Greek Gods even adopted
human form. This is eloquently evidenced by the many sculptural
monuments of the time. And yet the Greeks did not yet have a
clear sense of the mystery of the human person. True, a
philosopher of those distant times, Protagoras (480-410 B.C.E.),
went so far as to declare that "humanity is the measure of all
things." He identified humanity's unique quality --not only reason
but the whole realm of human subjectivity. But he was not
understood by his contemporaries, who even accused him of
atheism. In order to approach this mystery it was necessary to
separate out human personality from its embeddedness in nature,
in the universal substance of the cosmos.
This vital step was first taken by Christianity, which regards
humanity as bearing in itself the imprint of an absolute personality
--that of the Creator-- like a temple, a receptacle of the highest
thoughts and the highest feelings. From this time on, humanity
acquired a value independent of its place in nature. It became the
center and culmination of Creation. And it is from this
anthropocentric point of view that all the rest --nature, social
reality-- was comprehended. At the same time, with Christianity
came a discrediting of the human body, which allegedly diverts
humanity from its highest end. And since humanity is created in
the image and likeness of God, this imperfection is a result of sin
and not of any flaw in creation.
The advent of Darwinism, however, changed all this. For
Darwin (1809-1882) humanity is merely a link (however perfect)
in the evolutionary process. The search for specifically human
properties is in vain. Humanity is not at all the summit of
biological and universal evolution, but nature's error, her step-
child.
This debasement of humanity in modern philosophy has passed
through several distinct stages. Beginning in the 1920s,
philosophical anthropologists tried to collect all kinds of
information on humanity and to subject it to analysis from many
different perspectives. They posed the question of humanity's
biological peculiarity. The conclusions they arrived at were
unexpected and paradoxical in many respects. Humanity, it turns
out, is poorly rooted in nature. Many of our biological features
are identical to those of other animals, but we possess still others
which appear to be without purpose. And incorporated into
humanity are two distinct programs, one instinctual and the other
sociocultural. In our bodily arrangement and physical functions
we humans belong to the animal kingdom, the life of which is
directed by instincts. An animal is not generally capable of going
beyond the limits of instinct. But humanity has lost many of its
natural characteristics by living in community. Cultural standards,
which counterbalance instinct, dictate different rules of behavior.
These two programs, like two demons, pull our personalities in
opposite directions.
The development of culture seems to have allowed the
elaboration of a unique system of reference points which are
unnatural in their very essence. This is why, according to many
Russian scholars, humanity's instincts have become weaker and
have been ousted by cultural requirements and motives.
Recent research, however, seems to call this approach into
question, and to suggest that humanity has always had blunted and
undeveloped instincts. On the whole, humanity had inherent in
itself only broad predispositions. And this is due not to the impact
of some social program, but rather because of our genetic
imperfection --an imperfection which many anthropologists believe
would have doomed us to perish had it not been for a certain
tenacity.
Nature offers each species many different chances for survival,
and humanity is no exception. Primitive humanity had no clear-cut
program, and did not know how to behave in specific situations.
This is why we unconsciously stare at other animals which are
more firmly rooted in nature. As a result we escaped from our
own genetic program and, by learning from other animals,
developed ways to survive conditions under which we would
otherwise have become extinct.
Unconscious imitation of other animals was not instinctual, but
it proved a vital capacity. By changing, as it were, into now one
and now another animal, we not only survived but gradually
worked out a definite system of reference points which were
superimposed on the instincts and supplemented them. Gradually
our flaw (undeveloped instincts) was transformed into a strength
and a strategy for adapting to the environment.
And what were the consequences of humanity's ability to create
a network of ties outside of instinct? A vast space filled with
symbols arose between humanity and reality, and yet another non-
natural program took shape. Reality, as it were, doubled and this
was reflected in the sphere of thought and consciousness.
Humanity found itself submerged in the specific conditions of its
existence. This space which can be referred to as culture, became
the particular sphere where humanity has unexpectedly revealed it
creative potential.
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that far from implying
some sort of determinism, a correct understanding of the unique
biology of human beings in fact points out the role of openness and
creativity in our adaptive strategy.
The question remains, however, whether this capacity for
adaptation can be further reduced to certain stable, unchanging
features which thus define human nature, or whether it points to
such a plasticity under the pressure of biological and historical
forces that any talk of human nature is meaningless. Anthropology
provides the following evidence: the human species has remained
biologically stable for several tens of thousands of years, since the
time of the Cro-Magnons. Our biological evolution is thus
complete. And psychology has found little evidence of the
emergence of new intellectual or affective capacities, or of the loss
of old ones, from one generation to the next.
In the present century, however, the notion that there is no basis
for speaking of a stable human nature has unexpectedly gained in
popularity. The idea here is that culture imposes a deep imprint
not only on our behavior, but also on what we are. It has become
increasingly popular to suppose that we can change ourselves into
anything that we please, and that what ever stable core we may
possess can be destroyed or transformed by changes in social
conditions. Cultural anthropologists point to the striking diversity
of customs, traditions, and values. It turns out that even the
capacity to think, which seemed to be universal, depends on
culturally specific factors.
There is yet another reason to question the existence of a stable
human nature. This is the fact that the notion of human nature has
been appealed to in order to support the most diverse philosophical
and political programs. Many Greek philosophers, for example,
pointed to human nature as a justification for slavery, and yet it
also provided one foundation for the Enlightenment ideals of
liberty, equality, and fraternity. Nazi ideologists made appeals to
human nature, as did the architects of socialism. But if such
different programs can be justified on the basis of human nature,
then is it really possible to regard the concept as meaningful at all?
In spite of these concerns, we want to argue that it is, in fact,
possible to speak meaningfully of human nature. This nature is not
a projection of unchanging instincts, nor is it utterly unaffected by
cultural pressures. But it is real. Perhaps it would be most
accurate to say that culture changes, and humanity tries to adapt
itself to these changes. Often, however, these adaptations produce
stresses and resistance which express our underlying character as
human beings.
We can, for example, adapt ourselves to slavery, but this does
not mean that slavery is an ideal expression of our nature. We can
adapt to a culture marked by profound sexual repression, but this
will result in the development of neuroses. We can adapt to the
most diverse cultural standards, but only at enormous intellectual
and emotional cost.
Humanity is neither a blank slate on which culture can inscribe
its character nor a specialized animal able to survive only in a
single, narrow niche. We are, rather highly adaptable, but in a
way which reflects certain ineradicable capacities which exercise
resistance when subject to unfavorable conditions. It is this
resistance to the abuse of our essential nature which gives us our
social dynamism and which ensures the survival of our species.
What about the claim that "Man is the measure of all things"?
This claim has usually been interpreted in cognitive terms.
Humanity possesses a unique gift --reason-- and this allows us to
know and judge the world. In our own time, however, this notion
has been questioned. Both our biological nature and our reason
are at best limited, and at worst flawed. How can we be the
measure of all things? Many thinkers have spoken out against
anthropocentrism and proposed to free our consciousness from a
humanism which has dubious value.
The real question, however, is not that humanity has
undeveloped instincts or an intellect more perfect than that of other
animals. Much more important is the peculiarity of an existence
conditioned by the combination of these two qualities. What
makes us unique is our openness to change and "non-
replenishment." Unlike other living organisms, human beings are
able to overcome the limitations of their own species and thus to
become a permanent part of the world, and indeed to tower over
it. In short, human nature consists in the infinite variations of
self-development, a process in which what initially was a weakness
turns out to be a strength.
The great attention which is being paid to the problem of
humanity stems first of all from the need to solve the problems of
everyday life. These problems have become acute. It is unlikely
that in the whole history of humanity a generation can be found
which is as uprooted as our own. The world's population is rapidly
rising. Chemical and nuclear wastes accumulate. The integrity of
the biosphere itself is threatened --a threat which is echoed in the
appearance of immune disorders and in the erosion of the moral
structures which help to maintain the integrity of the personality
and of human society. In their place we have seen the emergence
of social control by mass media manipulation. The result is a loss
of confidence in the authenticity of even our inner world.
In the light of this situation, people are increasingly calling
reason, or at least the rationalist tradition into question. They seek
direction not in reason, but in myths, daydreams, and intuitive
vision. Science, cut off from its spiritual roots and metaphysical
principles, has lost the drive to understand human nature and to
discover universal human values. Philosophers speak freely about
the "end of humanity."
To put the matter plainly, humanity, when it cannot develop by
rational means a credible explanation of itself and of its place in
the universe, often resorts to psychological experiences, creating
a fantasy world which replaces reality.
In the light of this situation it is all the more important that we
return to the important task of philosophical anthropology --the
task of understanding what it means to be human. Biology,
psychology, culturology, history and ethnography have
accumulated a great deal of conflicting evidence --evidence which
requires careful analysis and evaluation. Much work remains to
be done. But there is reason for hope. We are on the verge of a
new and deeper understanding of human nature, one which stresses
our openness and creativity --and thus our ability to survive and to
grow under the most difficult conditions.
Against Philosophical Appeasement
Anthony and Mary M. (Maggie) Mansueto
Nothing is harder for this skeptical age than to believe that the
universe ultimately has meaning --except, perhaps, the idea that
such belief is not only warranted, but is in fact commanded, by
reason. And yet, there is no greater obstacle to the struggle for
social progress and social justice than gnawing doubt about the
question of ultimate meaning. Hope, both individual and collective,
withers and the highest objects of our love dissolve like so many
phantoms or mirages. The existentialist claim that "life begins on
the other side of despair (Sartre 1943, 1960)," has shown itself to
be little more than wishful thinking as existentialist humanism has
given way to postmodernist nihilism, and existentialist atheism into
a critique of the human subject itself (Foucault 1966/1970). Unable
to find an adequate ground for their moral ideas, people become
incapable of judging --and thus of seeing injustice. Unable to find
an adequate ground for hope, they become incapable of action on
behalf of the Good.
But the current trend towards nihilism has a more specific
significance: it is at once rooted in and serves to reinforce the
market system. From the very beginning the marketplace has
eroded humanity's confidence in the ultimate meaningfulness of the
universe. In a market economy people experience society as a
system of externally related particles, governed, perhaps, by
certain formal laws, but lacking any global meaning or ultimate
purpose. Soon they begin to see the universe in much the same
way. This tendency was already apparent in petty commodity
societies such as ancient Greece, where doctrines such as atomism,
sophism, and skepticism attracted widespread support. Indeed, the
whole project of Socratic philosophy can be understood as an
attempt to reground a doctrine of meaning and value in the light
of sophistic and skeptical critiques (Mansueto 1995, 1998a). What
is unique in the present period is, first of all, the existence of a
generalized market economy and second what appears to be a more
or less permanent crisis in the capacity of human civilization to
progress under this regime.
By a petty market economy we mean one in which production
is increasingly for exchange, but labor power and capital have not
yet been commodified. Production is carried out by village
communities, individual peasants or artisans, or by large producers
using nonmarket means of extracting surplus (rents, taxes, forced
labor, or slavery). As the development of the marketplace
proceeds, first labor and then capital are transformed into
commodities. The transformation of labor into a commodity began
with the industrial revolution which involved, among other things,
the proletarianization of peasants and artisans and continues in the
present period as ever-larger numbers of intellectuals are
transformed into little more than skilled wage labor. The
transformation of capital into a commodity is largely a
phenomenon of the present period, as the perfection of capital
markets and electronic information processing have made possible
the constant reallocation of capital among different activities in the
constant pursuit of an ever higher rate of return (Mansueto 1997a).
In petty market societies there remains a "fixed-frame" of
reference (the network of nonmarket relationships) against which
exchange takes place. This is reflected in an enduring belief in the
objectivity of sense-experience, the existence of a fixed space
within which events take place over time, etc. It is merely
judgements of value which are relegated to the realm of
subjectivity. In a generalized market society, on the other hand,
the "fixed frame" tends to disappear. As in the derivatives
markets, everything is defined in terms of everything else --and
thus nothing has a stable definition at all. The fixed frame of
Newtonian physics gives way first to relativistic and eventually to
quantum schemae in which even the underlying structure of
spacetime becomes a dependent variable (Mansueto 1997a, Tipler
1994).
The second factor in the emergence of contemporary nihilism is
the existence of a global crisis in the human civilizational project.
While it was still involved in its struggle against the old feudal
nobility, the bourgeoisie needed allies among the intelligentsia, the
industrial proletariat, and the peasantry. It thus pressed for
economic, political, and cultural reforms which helped unleash the
development of human social capacities. After about the middle
of the nineteenth century (the precise time varied from one country
to another) this dynamic gave way to an increasing concern with
containing the rising socialist movements. Even so, economic
imperatives --coming to terms with the tendency of the rate of
profit to fall as the economy became more technologically
developed and the tendency for wage-depression to lead to crises
of underconsumption-- coupled with the dynamics of the class
struggle itself, often forced the bourgeoisie to use nonmarket
mechanisms to centralize resources and invest them in research,
development, education, infrastructure, and other things which
promote the development of human social capacities. By the early
1970s, however, this dynamic seems to have spent itself. And with
the collapse of the Soviet Union the rationale for high levels of
military spending, which indirectly financed much of the scientific
progress during the course of this century, seems to have
disappeared. As Eric Lerner points out (Lerner 1991) there have
been no fundamental scientific innovations since the beginning of
this century (relativity and quantum mechanics) and no
fundamentally new technologies since the end of the Second World
War (nuclear power and microelectronics). The much vaunted
"technological revolution" of the present period is simply a result
of improvement in and implementation of existing technologies.
The underlying science is still relativity and quantum mechanics --
science which is nearly a century old.
When progress is still taking place, even if this is in spite of
rather than because of the market system, the bourgeoisie can
present itself as a liberating and progressive force. In reality the
Enlightenment, far from being a real "age of reason," was in fact
the first phase in a prolonged attack on the ability of human reason
to grasp the ultimate meaning of the universe. This should be
apparent to anyone who compares the powers allotted to reason by
Ibn Rushd or Aquinas, with those allowed by Kant or Hume. But
in the context of the other advances which were taking place at the
time, it was possible to present the skeptical criticisms of the
empiricists and the philosophes as a liberation from the authority
of prelate and peer and a blow for freedom and progress. No one
thought to ask just how the value of liberation or progress was to
be grounded if reason cannot ascend to a principle which is
infinite, necessary, perfect --and thus divine. One can still pick up
the fading notes of this tune from neoliberals such as F.A. Hayek
and Frank Tipler, so popular during the present period of relative
stabilization, though the liberation they proclaim is no longer from
prelate and peer but rather from commissar and community. When
authentic progress is grinding to a halt, however, as it has been
since the middle of the nineteenth century, it is necessary to attack
head on the idea of progress as such, lest capitalism be found
wanting by its own criteria. Thus the emergence in the mid-
nineteenth century of pessimistic and nihilistic philosophies such
as those of Schopenauer (Schopenauer 1819) and Nietzsche
(Nietzsche 1889). Thus the advance of these trends into the
forefront by the middle of the present century, when the (very
different) "existentialisms" of Sartre (Sartre 1943, 1960) and
Heidegger (Heidegger 1928) became so popular. And thus the
triumph, in the present period of the postmodern nihilism which
acknowledges that the present order is founded on violence, but
which cannot imagine an order founded on anything else (Derrida
1967/1978).
What nihilism does is to undermine the possibility of any
criticism of the market order and to make the search for ultimate
meaning in terms of which criteria for judgement might be
formulated into an object of ridicule, a neurotic obsession of those
who are too weak to face the darkness of the abyss, to risk
themselves in action in the knowledge that everything ends in
absolute loss. And it glorifies the capitalist and the imperialist
warlord who stops at nothing to make his mark on the world,
knowing full well that with the rapidly shifting sands of time it
will soon be eroded.
The effects of nihilism, however, extend well beyond the open
partisans of Nietzsche and Derrida, of Heidegger, Foucault, and
Deleuze. Nihilistic criticism has sapped the confidence and energy
of those who see themselves as friends of meaning and of
progress, and has resulted in profound ideological disorientation.
Those who claim to believe in God, for example, increasingly
come to this belief not because they find in the universe, as
apprehended by ordinary common sense or by science, an
organized system ordered to an end which can only be infinite,
necessary, and perfect, but rather by means of "nonthematic
preapprehensions" or leaps of faith which circumvent or set
aside the evidence of the senses and of reason. Such intellectual
sleight of hand and affective leaps of faith, however, can conclude
only to a principle which is either impotent and unable to do much
with this world of ours, or else hopelessly inscrutable with regard
to His plans. In the first case, the object of belief is limited and
thus not really God at all. And a universe governed by divine
caprice is not really distinguishable from one governed by the
"will to power." The result is practical atheism in religious
disguise.
If knowledge of God, furthermore, is possible only on the basis
of something other than rational inference from sensory
experience, then we cut a chasm between our ordinary sensual
appetites and any possible love of God. Love of God is not just
higher than love of objects we know through the senses --it is
radically different. And this is, of course, precisely the position
of the whole tradition, beginning with Augustine, continuing
through the Reformers, the Traditionalists, the Ontologists, and the
Objective Idealists, who ground knowledge of God in this way. A
whole host of evils follows in train --hatred of matter, of women,
of sensuality, and ultimately of the whole universe. It is difficult
to see how, from this point of view, "natural" humanity, still
submerged in sensation and the sensual appetites, is not radically
depraved, or how such a "natural" humanity would ascend to even
civilized behavior, without benefit of divine intervention --which
is, of course, precisely what the religious right argues. But clearly
"theism" of this kind has nothing to do with the ultimate
meaningfulness of the universe. On the contrary, it is, as Marx
suggested, an opium for those who, living under conditions of
brutal oppression, have lost faith in the world (Marx 1843/1978:
54). What he failed add is that it is also a practical atheism --a
conviction that the universe, if it is indeed the handiwork of some
great power, is shoddy work indeed, showing nothing of divine
majesty, and pointing not towards God but towards a cosmic tyrant
--and an cosmic incompetent.
Much the same must be said for the secular left. Marx and
Engels can perhaps be forgiven if, in the middle of the nineteenth
century they had not yet sorted out the internal contradictions of
the Enlightenment and the scientific revolution. The polemic
against "prelate and peer" had not yet spent its progressive
potential, and it was difficult to reject what seemed like the
inevitable cosmological implications of the very same
thermodynamic theory which made possible the heat engine and
the enormous technological progress it brought in its wake. But
even then it should have been apparent that a consistent dialectical
materialism, with its commitment to the infinitely self-organizing
potential of matter, was no more compatible with atheism than it
was with cosmic tyranny preached by Augustinian theology.
Matter which evolves infinitely towards ever higher degrees of
organization produces, over the whole span of an infinite space
time, all logically possible forms of organization. The resulting
system is thus perfect and, having no cause outside itself, is self-
caused or necessary Being. This is what the philosophical tradition
has historically understood by God. And this point was not lost on
such diverse philosophers as Bogdanov and Lunacharsky, Deborin
and Mil'ner-Irinin (all of them Soviet) who worked in various
ways to resolve the internal contradictions of dialectical
materialism, with the result that they were condemned as, among
other things, conciliators of religion (Wetter 1958, Joravsky 1961,
Dahm 1988).
Even the official Soviet tradition, however, showed a more
consistent resistance to nihilism than European Marxism. Already
by the beginning of this century most European Marxists had
rejected the "dialectics of nature" --Engels' doctrine that not only
human history, but the universe as a whole evolves towards ever
higher degrees of organization, in favor of a de facto existentialism
which treats humanity as an island of meaning in a universe which
is ultimately indifferent to his concerns. The basis for this
concession was, of course, a recognition that dialectical
materialism was incompatible with the bourgeois cosmology which
made the universe subject to chaos and contingency. The resulting
doctrine left commitment to create meaning and value, and to build
a society which develops and unleashes human potential --a
commitment the depth and sincerity of which cannot be doubted--
without any cosmological or ontological ground. The European
and North American proletariats can perhaps be excused if they
chose not to invest in an enterprise which they were being told was
ultimately without basis and was doomed to failure in the long run
by the laws of physics itself!
Since the 1960s this existentialist humanism has given way to a
rapproachment with postmodernism. Partly shift this is a result of
the internal logic of European Marxism itself. Lacking an adequate
cosmological or ontological ground the commitment to the
proletariat and to socialism becomes just an arbitrary option.
Attempting to make this partial interest seem universal by dressing
it up in "totalizing metanarratives" (Lyotard 1979) which proclaim
the "leading role" of the working class in the "historical process"
seems no less an ideological cover for a bare exercise of power
than the bourgeoisie's narrative of freedom and progress through
individual initiative. Incomplete, atheistic dialectical materialism
disintegrates into existentialism and then into postmodernist
nihilism. But partly the shift must also be attributed to a decision
by a section of the intelligentsia, faced with proletarianization, to
attempt to save its class position by leaving behind its socialist
sympathies and adopting a stance more useful to the bourgeoisie.
That the ruling classes seem to have "bought" this alternative
should be apparent to anyone who analyzes the composition of
university faculties. Neoliberalism and postmodernism, the
ideologies of the globally hegemonic bourgeoisie in its periods of
stability and crisis respectively, are effectively hegemonic, as one
would expect. But self-proclaimed "Marxists" are in no short
supply --as social conservatives are always wont to point out. One
can even find open supporters of the extreme left --of organizations
such as the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso. But on closer examination
it becomes apparent that these "Marxists" are all postmodernists in
disguise, who regard their "option" for the proletariat as simply
that --as an ungrounded choice, and who, therefore, present no
real danger to the hegemony of the market order. On the
contrary, the nihilism they teach their students contributes more to
the formation of intellectual cadres for the global market than their
publications in chic left journals could ever do to challenge the
hegemony of the "neoliberal metanarrative."
One might imagine that the religious left which has risen to such
prominence since the late 1960s, especially in Catholic circles in
Latin America, would have offered an alternative to the cosmic
autocracy of the Augustinians and the crypto-nihilism of the
secular left. It has not. The road forward for the Catholic left in
the 1960s --a synthesis of traditional Dominican Thomism and
Soviet dialectical materialism, which were already quite close on
a number of core philosophical questions-- was a road not taken.
Instead, liberation theologians opted for a biblicist theology which
grounds the struggle for justice and the option for the poor (not,
it should be noted, the working classes) in divine decree rather
than in the natural law accessible to human reason. Any
impression of cultural chauvinism which may result from so
privileging the biblical tradition is then softened by copious
references to such postmodernist touchstones as the "hermeneutic
circle" and by assurances that this tradition is normative only for
those who place themselves within it. As a result the whole
enterprise remains utterly ungrounded. It is little wonder that with
the defeat of their sponsors in the Vatican at the end of the 1970s,
and of their allies in the Kremlin at the end of the 1980s,
liberation theologians have entered a period of prolonged
disorientation.
Nihilism represents the avant garde of the bourgeoisie's
offensive against the ideological resolve of the working classes, the
cutting edge of their assault on the human civilizational project --
the project of participation in the self-organizing activity of the
universe. But the so-called friends of meaning and of progress, be
they "theists" who can find no good reason to believe in God or
"socialists" who can find no good reason to believe in the
proletariat, are engaged in acts of philosophical appeasement which
are nearly as dangerous. We are at war. We are losing. We can
give no quarter to the enemy. We must combat nihilism and
combat all forms of philosophical appeasement.
This means that we have before us a difficult but vitally
important philosophical task. Exposing the social basis and
political valence of nihilism is important, but it is only the
beginning of our work. We must restore humanity's confidence in
the ultimate meaningfulness of the universe. And it must be
admitted that, given the ideological confusion and philosophical
obfuscation of the past four centuries, this is a formidable task.
It involves addressing epistemological, cosmological, metaphysical,
and ethical questions, any one of which might present a stumbling
block to an honest seeker of truth in the present period. But the
fact is that there are answers to the nihilistic critique. Consider the
problem of knowledge. Relativism and subjectivism of one sort
or another have been almost de riguer in bourgeois philosophical
circles since the middle of the nineteenth century. Any claim that
we know real objects has been treated as a sure sign of a lack of
philosophical sophistication. But recent work in neuropsychology
(Luria 1973, Sacks 1985, Damasio 1994) suggests that sensation
does in fact produce an image in the brain which records data
about the organization of the universe, rather than merely
organizing sensations in a way which has little or no relationship
to the objective determinations of the things which give rise to
them. Cognitive development theory (Luria 1976) and the
sociology of knowledge (Durkheim 1911/1965, Lukacs 1922/1971,
Fromm 1941, 1947) have certainly demonstrated that the way in
which we abstract the intelligible content of these images is
radically dependent on participation in human society and indeed
on the specific structure which shapes the way in which live. But
far from implying a radical relativism, this evidence in fact
provides a new way in which to understand the medieval debates
around the Agent Intellect and the Thomistic doctrine of connatural
knowledge. The Agent Intellect in Aristotelian psychology
(Aristotle. De Anima III) is the faculty which illuminates the
images we garner from experience and reveals their intelligible
content. Due both to ambiguities in Aristotle's thinking on the
matter, and contemporary socioreligious interests, the Middle Ages
witnessed a vigorous debate between those (including most of the
Arab commentators) who saw the Agent Intellect as a single
unified intelligence illuminating all of humanity, and those who,
like Thomas, treated it as a faculty of the human person (von
Steenberghen 1980). Connatural knowledge is knowledge we have
preconceptually due to a similarity of nature with the object known
(Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II Q 45 a2). In a forthcoming
work I will argue, against both Thomas and the Averroists, that
the "Agent Intellect" is both individual and collective --that it is in
fact nothing other than human society. By living in the way social
structures of varying degrees of complexity require us to, and thus
in a very real sense "living" these social structures, we gain a kind
of preconceptual connatural knowledge of these structures which
then illuminates the images we garner from experience, revealing
their intelligible content. This "social intellect" is of course
internally differentiated across different social systems, and is
internalized differently by each individual within each society,
depending on social location, the specifics of family structure and
socialization, etc. Together these ideas help us to transform the
"hermeneutic circle" in which the theory of knowledge has been
caught at least since Kant, and which the sociology of knowledge
has only tightened, into a dialectical spiral which permits an
authentic ascent to Truth.
Once the epistemological problems facing us have been
resolved, it is then necessary to demonstrate that the universe is
structured in such a way as to point to a principle infinite,
necessary, and perfect in character. We have come to take for
granted claims rooted in science which is over a century old that
that the universe is governed by chaos and contingency, and that
meaning and value are at best temporary and fragile constructs of
the human individual and human society --and at worst illusions
which cover a weak-hearted inability to confront the darkness and
the abyss. And a universe which is itself little more than a
"quantum fluctuation," and the behavior of which is governed by
chaos and contingency, hardly requires for its explanation (indeed
would seem to exclude) a principle infinite, perfect, necessary,
and thus divine. Only such a principle, however, can ground
meaning which is ultimate in character. All else is partial and
contingent.
And yet this science is in crisis --and has been almost since its
inception-- because of a complex of internal contradictions. First
of all, the claims of evolutionary theory seem to contradict those
of equilibrium thermodynamics --the one pointing towards
increasing and the other towards decreasing complexity. Both
together, furthermore, with their emphasis on directional change
over time (be it disintegration or evolution) contradict the time
reversible laws of both classical and quantum mechanics. Finally
mechanics (which, contradiction or no, forms the basis of the
entire edifice of modern science) has shown itself unable to resolve
contradictions between relativistic and quantum descriptions of the
universe (Prigogine 1977, 1979, 1984, 1989, Lerner 1991,
Mansueto 1998).
In the light of this crisis of the sciences perhaps it is time to
review the seventeenth century verdict against Aristotelian physics
and teleological explanation. Aristotle's physics was rejected for
two reasons. First, it was unable to advance a unified theory of
motion. How does one explain teleologically a decaying corpse or
a thrown javelin? These processes do not seem in any sense
ordered to the perfection of form. Thus the distinction between
natural and violent motion. This in turn led to a distinction
between the celestial realm, where all motion is natural, and the
sublunar realm where both kinds of change occur. Second,
Aristotelian science had considerable difficulty coming to terms
with the growing evidence that even the heavens were not ordered
in the perfect manner required by his theory (Murdoch and Sylla
1978, Grant 1978, Pedersen 1978, Lindberg 1992).
There were two ways to resolve this problem. One would have
been to generalize the concept of teleology in such a way as to
accommodate the reality of violent motion, and to abandon the
particular cosmological models developed by Aristotle in order to
save the principle of teleological ordering. There were powerful
reasons to take just precisely this approach. Aristotle and his
interpreters had, after all, already implicitly shown that the only
complete explanation is a teleological explanation. This is because
a complete explanation must terminate in a principle which
(directly or indirectly) explains everything else while being self-
explanatory. Such a principle must be necessary, infinite, and
perfect (and thus divine), and it must cause exclusively by the
attractive power of its own perfection (otherwise it would be in
motion itself and would thus require some other explanatory
principle, resulting in an infinite regress) (Aristotle, Metaphysics
1071b-1076b, Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Q2).
This was not, however, the road taken. Teleology was
abandoned altogether, and (though this was never acknowledged,
or perhaps, even really recognized) the possibility of a complete
explanation along with it. Instead, an attempt was made to develop
increasingly general mathematical formalisms which describe
motion (now conceived exclusively as change in place). Thus the
whole history of mathematical physics, beginning with the special
theories of Galileo and Kepler, up through the "first unification"
by Newton, and each of the successive generalizations and
unifications: Hamiltonian dynamics, Maxwell's equations,
relativity, quantum mechanics, and most recently quantum
cosmology.
But is mechanistic mathematical physics any better able than its
Aristotelian predecessor to offer a unified theory of motion? The
contradictions cited above suggest rather pointedly that it is not.
Perhaps it is time to consider the road not taken. And this is
precisely the direction implicit in the work of a number of
physicists and biologists who are (sometimes in spite of
themselves) rediscovering the necessity of teleological explanation
to a complete science, and gradually helping to reground a
teleological cosmology. One need only mention the work of such
diverse thinkers as David Bohm (Bohm 1980), Benjamin Gal-Or
(Gal-Or 1986), Ilya Prigogine (Prigogine et al 1977, 1979, 1984,
1989; Lerner 1991), Rupert Sheldrake (Sheldrake 1981), and Lynn
Margulis (Margulis and Fester 1991).
If we can establish cosmic teleology then we can also, for the
reasons cited above, prove the existence of God. A system which
evolves infinitely towards ever higher degrees of organization
eventually, over an infinite spacetime, realizes all logically
possible forms of organization. It is infinite, perfect, necessary,
and thus divine. And the teleological character of the divine
causality which we are proposing effectively answers the old
Marxist critique of religion. God is a lure the incredible Beauty
of which attracts the potential latent in matter, not a cosmic tyrant
who imposes order on something inert or who creates ex nihilo
beings which are merely dependents. Knowledge of such a God
awakens our powers; it does not dope them. And we can say with
confidence to the postmodernists that such a God, which is the
power behind the infinite diversity of a rich and growing universe,
is never the Same, never effaces creative difference.
Finally, only after we have demonstrated the ultimate
meaningfulness of the universe --only after we have shown it to be
a system evolving necessarily, if often in a hesitant and
contradictory manner, towards God-- can we return to harvest the
principle of value and the criterion of judgement which makes it
possible to challenge the market order. This principle is, of
course, nothing other than the drive of matter towards ever higher
degrees of organization, a drive grounded in the attractive power
of a God whose Beauty, Truth and Goodness inspires in all things
a dynamic of growth and development. Knowing this principle,
we also know what we must do --and how resources must be
allocated. We know that resources must be allocated first and
foremost to those activities which make possible the full
development of human social capacities: to guaranteeing the
biological and social infrastructure for human development, and to
cultivating the human intellect and the human will. And we know
as well that the market does not do this, cannot do this, because it
has no access to information regarding the impact of various
activities on the integrity of the ecosystem or on the development
of human social capacities.
It may seem strange for secular socialists to hear that their great
error has not been to have claimed too much for reason, but to
have claimed too little --to have failed to follow the dialectic
through to its conclusion, which is God. It may seem strange for
the partisans of the religious right to find themselves accused of
practical atheism, and for those on the religious left to be told that
it is precisely their concessions to relativism and postmodernism
which give aid and comfort to the bourgeoisie. But this is the
truth, a truth which the bourgeoisie was long able to conceal with
its rhetoric of "Enlightenment" and its polemic against "prelate and
peer." But now, its rise to power at long last completed, the final
residues of nonmarket institutions approaching their final
disintegration, the Soviet Union defeated and the working classes
in political and ideological disarray, the mask has been dropped.
The rhetoric of Enlightenment and progress has given way to the
cynical laughter of the nihilist. We can see our adversary as he
really is, and we can understand how and why he has deceived us
in the past. There is no reason (and of course no way) to settle
scores with those who (Catholic or Communist) were unable a
century ago to understand the real terms of the battle. But now
there is no excuse.
The struggle against the marketplace is first and foremost a
struggle against nihilism, against atheism, and against the
philosophical appeasers who are unwilling or unable to take a stand
for meaning and value.
The struggle for meaning and value, for the God we know in the
self-organizing potential of matter itself, in the beauty of the stars
and in the shade of the oaks, in the laughter of lovers and in the
child's commanding "Why?" is also always the struggle against the
nihilism of the marketplace, which knows nothing except
consumption --nothing except the ruthless predation of the
bourgeoisie.
Comrades arm yourselves! The sword of Divine Wisdom hangs
over the heads of the bourgeoisie. We need only claim it as our
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