Salerno Landings on 9 September 1943.

A) First Part.

Order of Battle-Germans

Actual situation at Salerno: the forces taking part to fighting.

XIV Korps

 Gen. Herman Balck

Panzerdivisionen Herman Goering 

Gen. Paul Conrath 

PanzerGrenadier Division 16th 

Gen. Rudolf Sickenius

PanzerGrenadier Division 15th (ex Sizilien)

Gen. Rodt 

Parachut Division 3rd 

Gen. Hans Kroh (Deputy)

 

76th Corps

 Gen. Trangott Heer

PanzerGrenadier Division 26th 

Gen. 

PanzerGrenadier Division 29th

Gen. Fries 

Parachut Division 1st

Gen. Richard Heidrich

Order of Battle--Allies

U.S. VI Corps

Gen. Ernest J Dawley

Division 45th of Infantery

Gen. H.L.Middleton

Division 36th of Infantery

Gen. Fred L.Walker

 X British Corps

Gen. McCreery

UK Division 56th

Gen. D.A.H. Graham

UK Division 46th

Gen. J.T.L. Hawkeswoorth 

Main Object:

 
A)The Allies had two main objects: (1)Take away Germans from Southern Italy as far as possible, landing at northern top of fly covering by air force land based and then (2) seize airfields of Foggia to enable actions against Germany, Austria and Balkans.

B) The Germans had to yield Italian army, take the control over most italian mainland, avoid to be surrounded in Calabria after the evacuation of Sicily.

The Battleground:
The place where happened the battle can be shown as a flat triangle bordered by hills and open towards the sea, fitted of garden cultivar as graspes, olive-groves and tobacco fields (large possibility of hidding and covering). The side open on the sea was long about 50 km, the two lateral cathets, each 30 km. The mountains that bordered the two sides had peaks reaching also 1000 m. height. On the whole, the place choosen for the battlewas so: a space too large for a breackthrough attack, too small for a army manoeuvre. The approach from the sea didn't show any problems: flat beaches, lack of the banks.

From tactics view the key points were:
- the airport of Montecorvino;
- the several villages, on the creeks or on the top of hills, outstanding the plain.

The tactic object of Allies was to seize the gaps in the wall of the mountains. From
Ogliastro, in the south, to mountain pass, at north of Salerno, there is only a good road, the n.18. Its control, especially between Battipaglia and Barizzo was essential for the defender, while to seize the mountains creek was essential for invader. Moreover, the battleground was divided by Sele River(too deep to ford), that flowed in the middle of the plain and by its tributary, the Calore River, that flowed into the Sele at 10 km before its mouth.

 

The available Tactics:
The chance for Germans to get back the invasion depended on capability of PanzerGrenadier 16th Division to hold the landings awaiting the reinforcements, that had very scattered in all the Center and the South Italy. If it failed, it was necessary to delay as far as possible the Allied drive and, by fighting, to withdraw gradually on the Gustav Line, an halting line, prepared between the mouth of River Garigliano on the Tyrrhenian Sea and the mouth of River Sangro on the Adriatic Sea.
The initial burden of the battle had be supported by German PanzerGrenadier 16th Division and by Allied Corps US 6th and UK 10th.


The German tactics of the defence to the last, as how as improved, consisted of three elements: weak front, deepth, immediate counterattacks to reconquist the lost ground. Ideally, The front was organizez as following:
1) a first line of outposts, with few men, but strong by machin-guns ant antitank guns;
2)a second line, enough remote from action of enemy patrols and of artillery observation, called "main line of resistance". From here the local counterattacks should be started to contain the breackthroughs of the autposts line, carried aut from reserve units along the line;
3)a third line, called "Reserve line", with units charged to launch a co-ordinated counteroffensive, in the event of breakthroughs of the main line.

This pattern, however, at Salerno wasn't possible. Gen. Sickenius, commander of PG 16th Division, didn't have the needed forces and then had carry out the defence in distinct way. As regards to tactics above recalled, there isn't the Reserve Line; he then had to curtail the autpost line to only eight redoubts, formed each by a platoon of infantry, supported by machin-guns and antitanks, shielded by fire of field artillery behind located and defended from mined fields. They had situated in the most problable places of landings. At 3-10 km behind the redoubts he settled down four Kampfgruppen, well hidden and ready to get back every raids in the rear.

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