A) First Part.
XIV Korps |
Gen. Herman Balck |
Panzerdivisionen Herman Goering |
Gen. Paul Conrath |
PanzerGrenadier Division 16th |
Gen. Rudolf Sickenius |
PanzerGrenadier Division 15th (ex Sizilien) |
Gen. Rodt |
Parachut Division 3rd |
Gen. Hans Kroh (Deputy) |
76th Corps |
Gen. Trangott Heer |
PanzerGrenadier Division 26th |
Gen. |
PanzerGrenadier Division 29th |
Gen. Fries |
Parachut Division 1st |
Gen. Richard Heidrich |
U.S. VI Corps |
Gen. Ernest J Dawley |
Division 45th of Infantery |
Gen. H.L.Middleton |
Division 36th of Infantery |
Gen. Fred L.Walker |
X British Corps |
Gen. McCreery |
UK Division 56th |
Gen. D.A.H. Graham |
UK Division 46th |
Gen. J.T.L. Hawkeswoorth |
A)The Allies had two main objects: (1)Take away
Germans from Southern Italy as far as possible, landing at
northern top of fly covering by air force land based and then (2)
seize airfields of Foggia to enable actions against Germany,
Austria and Balkans.
The Battleground:
The place where happened the battle can be shown as a flat
triangle bordered by hills and open towards the sea, fitted of
garden cultivar as graspes, olive-groves and tobacco fields
(large possibility of hidding and covering). The side open on the
sea was long about 50 km, the two lateral cathets, each 30 km.
The mountains that bordered the two sides had peaks reaching also
1000 m. height. On the whole, the place choosen for the battlewas
so: a space too large for a breackthrough attack, too small for a
army manoeuvre. The approach from the sea didn't show any
problems: flat beaches, lack of the banks.
From tactics view the key points were:
- the airport of Montecorvino;
- the several villages, on the creeks or on the top of hills,
outstanding the plain.
The tactic object of Allies was to seize the gaps in the
wall of the mountains. From
Ogliastro, in the south, to mountain pass, at north of
Salerno, there is only a good road, the n.18. Its control,
especially between Battipaglia and Barizzo was essential for the
defender, while to seize the mountains creek was essential for
invader. Moreover, the battleground was divided by Sele River(too
deep to ford), that flowed in the middle of the plain and by its
tributary, the Calore River, that flowed into the Sele at 10 km
before its mouth.
The available Tactics:
The chance for Germans to get back the invasion depended on
capability of PanzerGrenadier 16th Division to hold the landings
awaiting the reinforcements, that had very scattered in all the
Center and the South Italy. If it failed, it was necessary to
delay as far as possible the Allied drive and, by fighting, to
withdraw gradually on the Gustav Line, an halting line, prepared
between the mouth of River Garigliano on the Tyrrhenian Sea and
the mouth of River Sangro on the Adriatic Sea.
The initial burden of the battle had be supported by German
PanzerGrenadier 16th Division and by Allied Corps US 6th and UK
10th.
The German tactics of the defence to the last, as how as
improved, consisted of three elements: weak front, deepth,
immediate counterattacks to reconquist the lost ground. Ideally,
The front was organizez as following:
1) a first line of outposts, with few men, but strong by
machin-guns ant antitank guns;
2)a second line, enough remote from action of enemy patrols
and of artillery observation, called "main line of
resistance". From here the local counterattacks should be
started to contain the breackthroughs of the autposts line,
carried aut from reserve units along the line;
3)a third line, called "Reserve line", with units
charged to launch a co-ordinated counteroffensive, in the event
of breakthroughs of the main line.
This pattern, however, at Salerno wasn't possible. Gen. Sickenius, commander of PG 16th Division, didn't have the needed forces and then had carry out the defence in distinct way. As regards to tactics above recalled, there isn't the Reserve Line; he then had to curtail the autpost line to only eight redoubts, formed each by a platoon of infantry, supported by machin-guns and antitanks, shielded by fire of field artillery behind located and defended from mined fields. They had situated in the most problable places of landings. At 3-10 km behind the redoubts he settled down four Kampfgruppen, well hidden and ready to get back every raids in the rear.