Let me know what you think! | Next chapter | Back to home |

Chapter 4

Normative Multiplicity

We all exist in multiplicity to some degree or another. Ego state theory argues that we all have various covert ego states governed by an executive control that only become overt in such extremes of dissociation as Dissociative Identity Disorder (Watkins & Watkins, 1990). Other theorists distinguish between "host" and "alter" personalities (Dawson, 1990; Putnam, 1985), as if one is more real or more important. This is an unnecessarily hierarchical, socially constructed view of the personality system.

I propose that the basic personality system is more of an organized, self-regulated body of operations that together form the dynamic consciousness system (DCS). The system is dynamic because of its changing, adaptive nature. Varying levels of awareness and consciousness exist within the system, which is organized on a modular, decentralized basis.

By multiplicity, I am referring to the embodiment of alternate identities, not just "covert ego states" (Watkins, 1993) or "subpersonalitites" (Rowan, 1990) but the actual experience of a highly dissociative psychological organization. This challenges the "humanist notion of the coherent, essentially rational individual who is the author of her own meanings and the agent of her own productions" (Rivera, 1988, p. 40).

There is a wide range of natural variation in the forms of psychological organization, although this is likely to be developmentally skewed in North American culture. If the embodiment of multiple identities is a natural aspect of psychological organizing for some people, this criteria for Dissociative Identity Disorder needs to be re-evaluated. The definition of the "disease" of Dissociative Identity Disorder may ultimately be highly culturally-specific and ultimately fallacious.

The Executive Self in the Executive Society

One of the hallmarks of Dissociative Identity Disorder is the clear presence of multiple responses to one situation. In order to understand the concept of multiplicity, we need to let go of the linear concepts of a unified personality.

In North American culture, we are trained to respond to the world in linear, singular thinking. We create hierarchies and use models of the "executive personality" which controls the other ego states (Watkins, 1993; Braun, 1986, Kluft, 1991), rather than acknowledging the biochemical multiplicity, modularity and decentralization of our central nervous system.

Recent theories in physics, such as Quantum theory and fractal theory (Briggs, 1992; Peitgen, 1992a; Peitgen, 1992b; Bohm, 1980,Davies, 1980), imply that multiplicity is an organizing principle of much of the physical and biological world, ecosystems, matter and energy and spacetime.

Modern psychology has been predicated on the principle of the divided self, but this divisiveness is cast as a struggle for dominance with only one self being able to rule at any given time.

In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud (1963) argued that this struggle for a rational, unified self was ongoing. Subjugating the irrationality, destructiveness, lust and forbidden thoughts of the unconscious mind was necessary for maintaining civilization. Failure to do so would result in the descent of our selves and societies into barbarity.

This linear, hierarchical thinking is also reflected in concepts of monotheism, Newtonian and reductionist thinking, colonization, mind/body dualism with the body being properly subjugated to the mind, human/animal dualism with the animal being properly subjugated to the human and the lack of willingness to acknowledge and understand our other identities (Ross, 1991). The need for structure, reason and law in order to prevent barbarity, chaos and anarchy from overwhelming and destroying humanity is a common theme. Western psychology has acknowledged that children experience discrete, distinct and discontinuous states of consciousness, and they argue that learning to integrate these states is a crucial part of the maturation process (Wolff, 1987). However, deconstructing the social context of this theory leads to reinterpreting these findings as meaning that children initially experience the world as it is, rather than cognitively processing it. As children begin the process of perception, and the concomitant construction of a world view, socialization plays a large part in determining how this world view will develop. The act of perception, which involves superimposing abstract concepts and relational patterns, involves interpreting how the world is patterned. The end result of this process, a world view, varies widely from culture to culture. In Western culture, children are socialized to believe that reality is unified, continuous and organized, and that the inner reflection of this world, the identity, is also unified, continuous and organized.

A number of research findings support the hypothesis of normative multiplicity. There is already evidence that children have more dissociative experiences and are more hypnotizable than adults (Ross, 1991). Both hypnotizability and dissociative experiences peak in late childhood and early adolescence, and then drop quickly as the individual progresses into adulthood (Ross, 1991). The normative multiplicity hypothesis also predicts that level of dissociation and hypnotizability in children of different cultures would be more similar than adults across cultures, and that levels and types of dissociation in the general population are likely to vary widely across cultures and individuals, with more dissociative experiences occurring in cultures that have polytheistic religions, trance and possession ceremonies and nonindustrial economic bases.

We are socialized to repress, deny and dissociate from our "unacceptable" thoughts and feelings on a daily basis (Rivera, 1988). We create the illusion of singularity (Watkins & Watkins, 1979). Many of us present a unified response to situations, without acknowledging the complexity of our lives and our selves (Beahrs, 1982; Watkins & Watkins, 1990; Braun, 1989). Often, it takes therapy or dream work to access the responses deemed unfit and suppressed from our consciousness - anger, fear, resentment, self-blame, blaming others, hope - all these responses can be discovered in layers of feeling, thoughts and selves (Rowan, 1990). Sometimes it is astonishing how many and how different thoughts and feelings can be elicited in response to a single situation.

Everyday multiplicity

The irony of the Executive Self model is that we change roles, or identities, all the time. It's just that all these changes are supposed to happen under the auspices and regulation of the Executive Self (Watkins, 1993). Conscious awareness of these everyday internal conflicts has sparked much of the scepticism of Dissociative Identity Disorder, after all most people experience states of "I don't know what possessed me" and "I just wasn't feeling myself" at some point or another (Kelley & Kodman, 1987). In order to overcome the socialization that only one response is allowed to exist within each person, family therapy models use the analogy of a cast of characters who represent different needs, moods, beliefs and social identities (Kramer, 1968; Watanabee, 1986; Watanabee-Hammond, 1987). The feeling that other people are living inside us, marginalized and unacknowledged, appears to be very common. John Rowan (1990) details a number of common "subpersonalities" that he believes exist in everyone. Common subpersonalities include an inner child, a critical self, a protector for the child, a working or intellectual persona and other aspects that represent all the selves that are needed to function in modern society. Not surprisingly, these are the identities most commonly found in individuals with Dissociative Identity Disorder (Ross, Norton & Wozney, 1989).

The cultural continuum of dissociation

Dissociation is not a pathological state, but a natural function of the human brain which is present in all stages of life (Jung, 1934). Degrees of dissociation form a part of our everyday lives, in fact, if we did not have the ability to dissociate, and respond to our environment at a level below the consciousness awareness, our lives would be very difficult (Hilgard, 1977). Physical reflexes rely on dissociation to function rapidly, dissociation is what makes typing or driving a car possible (Hilgard, 1977). Even reading involves deciphering the letters and words faster than would be possible if full attention was needed to think through the meaning of each letter (Hilgard, 1977). These descriptions of everyday dissociation imply that dissociation is commonly used in Western societies in making boring or repetitious tasks go easier and faster. The relative ease of learned dissociated processes makes our conscious minds able to function on more complex tasks.

Dissociative experiences happen to everyone, in dreams, in fantasies, trance states, driving and meaningful religious experiences (Rivera, 1988). Dissociation is also used in hypnosis as a tool in therapy. Of course, this list of everyday dissociations may be commonplace only in industrialized societies. One problem with rapid industrialization in some countries is the unsuccessful adaptation of the people to the repetitious, mind-numbing nature of work in an industrialized environment (Stavrianos, 1981; Elliot, 1989; Beckford, 1972) and comprehending the apparent obsessive-compulsive relationship to tiny increments of time (Stavrianos, 1981). While Westerners develop a high dissociative capacity to endure a lifetime of alienated labour, it cannot be assumed that this is the same in all cultures. In North America, attention deficit "disorder" is used to describe children who cannot sit still for the required length of time and focus on one task (Levinson, 1990).

The process of focusing attention in this way is a basic form of autohypnosis, and involves a certain capacity for dissociation. This may be further indication of the wide natural variation in dissociative capacity, as well as testimony of how well this capacity can be developed with practice. On the other hand, certain types of dissociation that are regarded as commonplace in some cultures, such as having spirits take control of the body or channelling the presence of dead ancestors, is regarded with singular dismay in Western psychology (Mulhern, 1991). The Western tradition, both religious and psychological, are strongly negative with regard to possession and trance states. Often, such states are equated with Satanic possession or medical pathology (Leavitt, 1993). However, in many parts of the world, possession is considered a normal aspect of religious life and a psychologically and medically healing activity (Bourguignon, 1973).

The same types of dissociation as in Dissociative Identity Disorder, including the embodiment of an alternate identity, are not considered an illness (Leavitt, 1993; Mulhern, 1991) when they take the culturally appropriate form of shamanic visions (which do not involve any loss of memory or consciousness) or an external entity possessing the body (usually leaving the host with no recollection of the specific event). Within the same culture, one can find cases of unwanted possession, for which the best cure is often divine possession to cast out the other spirits, often as part of the same religious ceremony (Leavitt, 1993).

Few cultures would perceive the embodiment of the divine as an illness or pathology (Ward, 1989; Obeyesetere, 1977; Mulhern, 1991; Leavitt, 1993). Bourguignon's (1973) cross-cultural sampling found that possession was seen in the public, religious experiences of 251 out of 488 societies. Leavitt (1993) provocatively proposes a "Trance and Possession Suppression Disorder", often suffered in Western society, which involves the inability to lose oneself and become someone else for even a little while. He argues that the over-emphasis on rigid personal control and guilt is the root of the Western "allergy to dissociation."

Multiplicity in any cultural context, even the context of Western society, belies the view that multiplicity itself is an appropriate criteria for mental illness. Kluft (1991) observed in a study of individuals with high numbers of identities, that it is the degree of conflict between identities, not the state of multiplicity, that is at the root of pathology. Ross (1991) studied the general population of Winnipeg searching for an indication of Dissociative Identity Disorder in the general population. He found 3.1% of respondents to an interview could fit the criteria of Dissociative Identity Disorder. However, of these 14 individuals (out of 454 participants), the majority (8) seemed to be radically different from Dissociative Identity Disorder patients in therapy. These individuals often did not report abuse history and often reported experiencing little psychopathology. In a test of the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES), all but one had scores of less than 20. The DES has a scale out of 100, with the mean score of a person with Dissociative Identity Disorder was 41.4 with a standard deviation of 20. The mean score in the general population is 10.1 (Ross, 1991), meaning that the scores of this subgroup were above average for the general population, but well below average for clinical cases of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Only 6 individuals in the general population appeared to have what Ross described as "pathologic posttraumatic MPD," which was 1.3% of the entire sample. These individuals had abuse histories and reported difficulties in functioning.

Ross describes a number of possibilities that explain these findings. He contemplates that the non-pathological group could be false positives, that the individuals could be amnesiac for abuse, that the Dissociative Identity Disorder could be in remission or that:

"multiplicity exists in a non-pathological endogenous form in the general population. About 2% of people may be natural multiples who do not have dysfunctional posttraumatic MPD. They may simply have a highly dissociative psychic organization" (Ross, 1991, p. 510).

I would add that this sub-population in this study are individuals who maintained this structure despite years of socialization. I would predict that the size of this subgroup would be much higher in other cultures. Ross went on to state that "simply having distinct personality states that feel subjectively like separate people may not in itself be a mental illness" (p.511).

Hughes (1992) described 10 trance channelers who scored comparably to individuals with Dissociative Identity Disorder on the DES (i.e. reported high levels of dissociative experiences). The dissociative processes underlying Dissociative Identity Disorder and trance channelling seemed to be similar, yet the trance channels exhibited none of the secondary features of Dissociative Identity Disorder, had little evidence of childhood abuse or pathological profiles.

Krippner (1987) reported on Brazilian approaches to Dissociative Identity Disorder, which integrate traditional concepts of spiritism and Western psychology. A local physician, Eliezer Mendes, is a follower of the Kardec spiritist movement and works with Dissociative Identity Disorder patients. He views the phenomenon as either dissociation resulting from child abuse, or the intrusion of spirits and past lives into the psyche of the individual, depending on the results of a differential diagnosis process. Mediums are used as diagnosticians because individuals with multiple identities are often found to have mediumistic abilities. Training as a medium involves learning to set aside spirits and past life identities into the parallel universe where such spirits live, until it is time to call on them during a seance or for healing and other practices. The explicit goals of such therapy is to move from involuntary possession to a voluntary incorporation of an embodied alternate identity. Traditional Brazilian practices, which incorporate the concept of embodying alternate identities, make a smooth link between traditional views of spirit possession and Dissociative Identity Disorder. Again, multiplicity is considered normative, even a necessary requirement for working as a medium, the pathology results from ego-dystonic intrusion of the spirits and/or trauma resulting from child abuse.

This cross-cultural investigation gives a very different picture than the one currently held in the North American study of Dissociative Identity Disorder, which implies that multiplicity represents the "extreme point on the dissociation/association continuum" (Rivera, 1988, p. 22) on a scale where increased dissociation becomes "increasingly pathologic, terminating in the severe dissociative disorders" (Braun, 1990, p. 973). It is clear that although the embodiment of alternate identities represents a radical departure from socially expected behaviour in Western societies, it is not in and of itself a pathological state of being. Leavitt (1993) concludes in his article on involuntary possession and Dissociative Identity Disorder, if "dissociation is not in itself a disorder, then cases of negatively-valued trance and possession represent a symptom of something else ... a culturally mediated distress whose expression through dissociation is part of a cultural complex that itself very likely holds the key to resolution" (p. 56).

Division versus multiplication

The often used heuristic model in dealing with dissociation is a form of "division" that occurs in the personality, resulting in a "divided consciousness" (Rivera, 1988; Jung, 1937; Marmer, 1991; Braun, 1990). However, this heuristic has limited applicability and does not adequately describe certain phenomena, such as polyfragmented Dissociative Identity Disorder. Kluft (1988) described several cases of polyfragmented Dissociative Identity Disorder, where more than 26 personalities existed in a variety of identities. One patient was reported as having 4,500 identities. However, despite the high number of identities and identity fragments, most of the time a core of one to six identities were present and performing ongoing roles. Kluft noted that the degree of conflict, rather than the number of identities, determined the level of pathology and the ability to function. In individuals with many identities, each identity spent less time in open manifestation. Polyfragmented patients presented little of the classical symptomology of Dissociative Identity Disorder, such as overt switching and clearly defined identities.

The concept of "divided" consciousness has little meaning in the context of the complexity of Dissociative Identity Disorder. It conveys the sense of cutting up a pie into pieces, with the resulting effect of having fewer and fewer resources for each identity. The term implies that the original self, sometimes called the "host" personality (Braun, 1986), is diminished as a result of its loss, and that what was once unified is now broken.

A better heuristic to use is that of a multiplied consciousness, where the individual creates an isomorphic self (Kluft, 1988a). Kluft stated that "the mind, rather than dividing itself, rather multiplies itself, recopies itself selectively, or rearranges a finite number of elements in patterns of great potential variety (Kluft, 1988a, p. 57). Kluft (1991) reported, in his presentation of atypical forms of Dissociative Identity Disorder, a category of "isomorphic" multiple personality, where a group of very similar identities are in control and try to pass as one. The traumatized child creates another version of him or herself to store the memory.

This concept is supported by a neurological model of multiplicity. Substructures in the brain can operate differently when they function in the context of different modules or relays. The neurology is not limited or finite, because the basis for identity alternates comes from shifting existing patterns, not developing new components.

Let me know what you think! | Next chapter | Back to home |

This page hosted by Get your own Free Home Page