Remark: Undertaken at my request and in response to my doubts about the competence of the first review (7th meeting) and my suggestion that, in an arena of science which does not yet exist (Koch, Leahey, etc.), perhaps the SPP was taking the academic credentials business a bit too seriously. "Its not like we're doin' physics, you know."
Comprised of 126 critical remarks (especially the handwritten ones) and only 2 which were complimentary, the SPP's second review came as a bit of a shock, particularly since I had included the Manicas Secord endorsement which, for some strange reason, was never mentioned.
Synopsis: The first review was right on the money in all respects (#2D). Is A Science... is "very naive" in that it assumes that behaviorism is still a vital force (#3B). Nonetheless (as one who would like to have his behaviorist cake and eat it too), since Nisbett and Wilson (see below) have discovered that test subjects were frequently in err in reporting their reasons for selecting product A over product B, humans can not be presumed to know their own minds (#2E, #73). (Too bad for Milton and Shakespeare, eh!) Therefore, although "bold and interesting" (#2A) and "plausible" (#122), the contributor's naturalistic account of feelings of worthlessness (Rational Negativism) is of no scientific value, since the evidence for such feelings is via the demonstrably unreliable technique of introspection (#2E, #73, #106) (i.e., noticing them). "Perhaps self-worth is just a myth of pop psychology" (#75). "What entitles you to assume you have access to Evel Knievel's psyche" (#103)? "Where are your crucial experiments" (#2A)?
Nor (by implication) does the SPP have any interest in a naturalistic reduction of self-endangering Greenpeacers, the setting of land speed records and the like, since these can already be explained by the theory of kin selection (#70).
In conclusion, the reviewee would do well to consider a beginner's course in psychology (#4C) or at least obtain a copy of Gleitman's (#3B) and "needs to be much (Rey's underline) better informed" (#4D) if (by implication) it is his intention to hold a future audience with the great and powerful Oz.
Note: For Rey's actual views on scientific method (unless he's schizoid), see Manicas and Secord (above) which Rey personally contributed to (ftn. 3), was the discussant for (SPP program), and publicly embraced at the seventh annual meeting I attended.
Synopsis: "Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes." Based on experiments in which, for example, subjects misidentified their reasons for selecting product A over product B, "the accuracy of subjective reports is so poor as to suggest that any introspective access that may exist is not sufficient to produce generally correct or reliable reports."
Remark: Significant individualization in the specifics of higher order cognitive processes is a prediction of Is a Science..., as would be a less dire state of affairs where introspective reports on perceptual processes are concerned (psychophysics, etc.). However, rather than attribute this disparity to a process's proximity to the physical edge (Diagram IIA), as retrenched behaviorists are wont to do (subconsciously, at least), I have attributed it to the more mechanical and isomorphic character of processes lower in the evolutionary scheme of things (Diagram IIB). As such, for me, Nisbett and Wilson's findings are not so much a vindication of behaviorists' long held suspicions about introspection, as a revelation of the shortcomings of the "atomistic" (Zener), "non-stratified", "constant conjunctional" (Bhaskar), "busy research" (Koch), "neo-positivist" (Manicas Secord), "high school science lab" (me) approach to the thought and behavior of a highly individualized species, and for which the real cure is just the opposite -- corresponding degrees of stratification, abstraction and generalization, as Manicas and Secord, myself, and a slew of others have recommended.
But since this [individualization] is an order problem rather than a privacy problem, the solution is, not to banish introspection, but to differentiate between the more evolved individualized features (specific reasoning, specific higher emotional behavior, etc.) and the more mechanical, isomorphic processes lower in the evolutionary scheme of things (perception, fear, anger, etc.). Once accomplished, the individualization can then be dealt with by applying corresponding amounts of abstraction and generalization to those features (both thought and behavior) where individualization can be presumed to be most rampant (Phil Roberts, Jr.).
Remark: 800 pages on everything from acquisition curves to zygotes, but I'll be damned if I could find a single reference to feelings of worthlessness or related subjects. Apparently, cognitive scientists are much too busy being oh so scientific to be bothered with such trifles.
Discussions of scientific method have tended to stress problems of testability, while neglecting...those aspects of the universe which in some sense are most central and significant for the area of reality with which the science deals. (Karl Zener)One of the characteristics of the majority of modern psychological theories, aside from the arbitrariness of so many of their claims, is their frequently ponderous _irrelevance_. The cause, both of the irrelevance and of the arbitrariness, is the evident belief of their exponents that one can have a science of human nature while consistently ignoring man's most significant and distinctive attributes. (Nathaniel Brandon)
From its earliest days, man's stipulation that psychology be adequate to science has outweighed his commitment that it be adequate to man. (Sigmund Koch)
Synopsis: Ditto to the Rey review. You are mistaken in your assumption that there are features of human nature (emotional disorder, neurosis, suicide and the like) incompatible with natural selection. The theory of kin selection can readily accommodate them (implied).
"The issues which concern you have traditionally been addressed from within a literary or artistic mode of expression" which (by implication) is where they should remain. Your concerns (e.g., with synthesizing natural science and the humanities) "do not address the professional interests of the Society" and I doubt that anyone else is going to find them of interest either. The SPP has been unbelievably generous with you, so please don't bother us anymore (implied).
Note: Considering the unlimited explanatory virtues ascribed to the theory of kin selection by both Rey and Mathews, I can only recommend that they contact The Behavioral and Brain Sciences. That's because this eminent journal has actually managed to dupe several dozen of the country's leading experts into commenting on these matters (e.g., Eysenck, 1979, deCatanzaro, 1980, etc.) and treating them as though they actually do pose something of a dilemma for natural science. Personally, I can't wait for the SPP's calculations on Evel Knievel. No doubt, the rest of us must have overlooked something, such as the probability he might have been able to rescue the DNA of a passing bird or what have you (tee! hee!).
Synopsis: You're the victim of "a conspiracy of misconceptions". "You count up comments and divide them into derogatory vs. laudatory, finding an enormous preponderance of the former, and from this you conclude that the comments were not objective. Bad conclusion. Referees normally write only critical comments to help authors revise rather than just feed their egos." (Mar 4, p.1, 3)
Another misconception -- you are just plain wrong in your assumption that there is an implied contract between the SPP and those who contribute papers, and therefore that reviewers can be held to the same standards as contributors. Since the SPP is just a small informal discussion group, it has no obligation to review papers either competently or objectively. (Mar 4, p. 2)
(earlier correspondence) "You're barking up the wrong Society. 'Society for Philosophy and Psychology' is a misleadingly general code phrase for a fairly identifiable group of people who do a rather specific sort of work and create a rather specific literature" and therefore is (by implication), first and foremost, a pseudo-scientific literary guild. (Jan 21, p. 1)
Synopsis: I have given the materials you sent the once over and, unfortunately, there is not much I can say that you would find encouraging.
Synopsis: On reviewing the material you sent, I was aghast (like its most definitely time for the smelling salts) to discover that you shared correspondence between yourself and Bill Lycan with other philosophers. The SPP was unbelievably generous (I mean, are we the good guys or what?) and you owe everyone an apology, particularly since it is all but inconceivable that you might actually have a case (implied).
Finally, and this I cannot overstress, ..full development of psychology as a science requires that a sufficient number of its scientific observers and experimenters must themselves be highly developed in those characteristics which are most essentially and significantly human (Karl Zener).
