Negative theory is primarily an attempt to account for ego-related emotion and emotional disorder (e.g., anxiety, depression, suicidal tendencies, etc.) in naturalistic terms. It may be considered as simply a series of deductions from and (hopefully) extensions to the basic ideas set forth by Darwin and Wallace (evolutionary theory). In order to accomplish this objective, it was necessary to accept certain conclusions which are decidedly negative (repugnant) in terms or their emotional appeal.

In addition to the foregoing, negative theory is further differentiated from most of its predecessors by its greater emphasis upon taxonomic considerations (the identification and classification of psychical functions) and its formation of a synthesis between natural science (evolutionary theory), psychology and philosophy to provide a single coherent accounting of emotionality. In this regard my article Is a Science of the Mind Possible? is intended as a precursor to the present article.

In studying a philosopher, the right attitude is neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind of hypothetical sympathy, until it is possible to know what it feels like to believe in his theories, and only then a revival of the critical attitude. which should resemble as far as possible, the state of mind of a person abandoning opinions which he has hitherto held.

Bertrand Russel

Negative theory is primarily an endeavor to resolve the contradiction between two primary assumptions which, somewhat analogous to the two postulates of special relativity, appear to be contradictory.

1. A primary and at times all-consuming need in Homo Sapiens is the need for an adequate sense of self-significance. The number of instances in which individuals have been observed to give up physical comfort, physical safety and, at times, their very lives to attain or maintain an adequate sense of self-significance (so-called spiritualistic ideals) are sufficient to establish this assumption as self-evident. A corollary of this assumption is that the need for an adequate sense of self-significance conatively accounts for the majority of human thought and behavior.

2. Darwin's accounting of the origin and evolution of life is correct, if not in specifics, at least in the general contention that adaptations serve useful survivalistic functions (i.e. the utilitarian doctrine, 1859, pp. 209-215).

Attempts to resolve this apparent contradiction have adopted one of two alternative approaches, 1. the need for a sense of self-significance (or emotion in general) serves a survivalistic function, or 2. the need for a sense of self-significance is a by-product of some other adaptation which itself serves a survivalistic function. The first approach has been adopted by the various theorists who have argued for the rationality of emotion (e.g. De Sousa, 1980). Not only do such approaches adopt survival itself as an unquestioned rational objective, but they stand in glaring contradiction to the numerous instances in which individuals have met with serious physical harm or death (mountain climbing, setting world speed records, etc.) for what would certainly appear to be frivolous reasons from a survivalistic standpoint.

The second approach can be found in Freud's endeavor to account for emotional disorder and other types of emotionally motivated thought and behavior as a by-product arising from the imposition of social restrictions on the natural sex drive. It can also be found in the behaviorists' endeavor to account for the needs for love, acceptance, etc. as nothing more than generalizations from more basic physical needs (conditioned behavior). That such a hypothesis should be given serious consideration offers indisputable proof for the absolute necessity of introspective reports for any serious understanding of the human organism.

The species on the planet in which reasoning, and one might presume consciousness, awareness, rationality, etc. is most fully developed, is also that species on the planet in which individuals have the greatest difficulty in maintaining an adequate sense of self-significance, often having to go to extraordinary means to do so (e.g., Evel Knievel).

Consciousness, awareness, rationality, etc. is antagonistic to psychocentric stability (i.e., the maintaining of an adequate sense of self-significance). In other words, the emotional instability in Homo Sapiens results from an antagonism which arises from a conflict between the tendency of a living organism to value itself absolutely and increasingly comprehensive conceptions of reality produced by the reasoning process which results in a danger that the organism will conceive of its significance in a manner which is too objective to satisfy nature's demand that the organism value itself absolutely. The organism is continually in danger of becoming overwhelmed by its own insignificance or a significance which is far closer to an objective assessment than nature requires for the organism to function as an effective survival system. In short, excessive rationality results in psychocentric disintegration.

Because negative theory deals with some highly abstract issues, the manner in which it proposes to resolve the contradiction between its two primary assumptions can perhaps be best understood in the form of a physical analogue. In this analogy, the human mind is viewed as analogous to a heavy atom, such as an atom of uranium; the notion of psychocentrism, that is, an absolute, inordinate self-value, is analogous to the strong force holding the nuclear particles together; the concept of consciousness, which determines the extent to which a processing point can hold together a large quantity of data as compresent regions of an amalgamated whole, is considered analogous to the number of particles in the nucleus, which determines the number or electrons which can be simultaneously held around the nucleus; the ongoing need for self-evaluating data is considered analogous to radioactivity, both of which constitute bizarre phenomena indicative of an ongoing instability in a class of systems; and emotional disorder, particularly schizophrenia etc. is considered analogous to nuclear fission.

In this analogy, it is crucial to the understanding of negative theory that one realize that the strong force is present in all nuclei, and is itself the stabilizing factor, while the excessive aggregation of nuclear particles is the destabilizing factor. This is a difficult issue, since I am proposing that, while a self-conscious psychocentrism may be a recent evolutionary innovation, psychocentrism is not. In other words, a preconscious psychocentrism formed the foundation for the emergence of self-consciousness. This preconscious psychocentrism might be viewed as nothing more than the cumulative effect of an organism responding to its survivalist programming. A self-conscious psychocentrism might be viewed as arising from the juncture between the input and output systems of the organism, but a juncture which has evolved the capacity to hold large quantities of data as compresent regions of an amalgamated whole (i.e., comprehensive conceptions).

While the psychotherapy proposed by negative theory may prove to radical for many individuals (see Negative Psychotherapy), its conceptual depiction of the human mind should prove useful in the research into artificial intelligence. This is because it depicts a system which produces an ongoing conation, not merely a system which responds to stimuli, and because it depicts this conation as arising from the manner in which the system processes information, that is, in an amalgamational as opposed to a temporal conjunctional mode. In this depiction, information incorporated into the system (depending on its negative and positive value, and the level of consciousness at which it is conceived --- see The Dynamics of Sanity) produces a destabilizing effect, which requires that the system engage in further thought and behavior to re-establish its stability. In other words, it proposes that the engine in a free-thinking computer will be a diesel, and will automatically arise from the amalgamational mode of data processing. Its appearance of free-thinking should be reinterpreted (as with Homo Sapiens) as simply an ongoing conation, but perhaps with a degree of autonomy (although I make no stand on this issue) as to how it can most efficiently attain self-value. It may well be that free-thinking will reduce to nothing more than this ongoing conation and the individualization I have identified and referred to as proposed "the principle of individualization" (see Is a Science.. ) (i.e., a determined individualization).

In addition to its depiction of a possible resolution of the conative side of the "free-thinking" problem in Al, an extension of the physical analogue can perhaps be utilized to provide some degree of insight into the cognitive side of the problem as well. To do so, requires the postulation of a psychical correspondent to the behavior of inorganic matter, and postulation that inorganic matter exhibits an elementary form of awareness (i.e., the awareness of the existence or non-existence of a stimulus for which it is capable of eliciting a response).

In the physical analogue, the causal points which comprise inorganic matter employed in present day computers would be analogous to an atom with a single nuclear particle. Logic would be analogous to the rules for the exchange of electrons which both computers and human minds can accommodate. Rationality would be analogous to the orderly relationships between compresent electrons around a nucleus, and is determined by coherence criterion. Cognition would be analogous to the capacity of a processing point to simultaneously hold a number of electrons around the nucleus, not in the capacity to exchange electrons. In Turing's now famous article reference was made to a theory which bears a striking resemblance to negative theory:

One could say that a man can "inject" an idea into a machine. and that it will respond to a certain extent and then drop into quiescence, like a piano string struck by a hammer. Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds, and is there one for machines?

The general hypothesis of negative theory is explored through a comparative analysis of the various classifications of psychical function presented in the phylogeny of psychical functions (see Is A Science...). The discussion of emotion begins with Lower Emotion precisely because it offers a high probability of intra-species identicality. As proposed in Is A Science.., this is determined by the functions' relative position in the phylogeny and inferences drawn from the principle of individualization. Of course, this procedure is dependent upon one accepting that there is indeed evidence of such a principle.

The strictures which I place on intersubjective observations I regard as something akin to a "psychical radical empiricism". In other words, descriptions of the private events of subjective experience are considered meaningless without some basis for inferring semantic congruity. Of course, the procedure is still dependent on descriptive terminology, but it no longer constitutes the sole basis for inferring identicality.

In truth, most theoretical psychologists have adopted a part of this procedure in that their theories did usually deal with common denominators. However, the failure to consciously examine the epistemological and taxonomic foundations of their constructs has resulted in some of the most significant blunders in psychology, including Freud's assumption that higher emotional disorder results from the suppression of lower emotional needs (a causal inference between categorically different functions), and the behaviorists' presupposition that the study of conditioned kinematics could lead to a definitive insight into the thought and behavior of reasoning organisms (a failure to recognize the distinction between categorically different kinematic functions). In a similar fashion, current research in Al is plagued with the failure on the part of theorists to recognize the categorical canyon between the temporal conjunctional and amalgamational modes of data processing, i.e., the psychical function of programming and the psychical function of reasoning.