Implications of the New Philosophy of Science
A Topology for Psychology
Peter T. Manicas, Queens College, CUNY
Paul F. Secord, University of Houston
FOOTNOTES
- Some of the persons named and others not identified specifically in
the foregoing contributed to both strands, e.g., Hanson, Toulmin,
W.V.O. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Wilfred Sellars and others. Some of the
issues, e.g., deductivism, are criticized by figures in both strands.
- The issue is too complex to pursue here, but the stratification of the
world makes reductionism false in one important sense. Thus, from
a knowledge of the states and principles of a lower-order science
(e.g., physics) we could not, even in principle, predict events whose
outcomes involve higher-order laws (e.g., biochemistry) as part of
their causal configuration. Of course, lower-order or microscopic
domains are the basis for higher-order properties and
configurations:
The neurophysiological organization of the CNS of persons is the basis
for psychological properties and phenomena, just as the atomic organization
of molecules is the basis for chemical properties. On this
see Bhaskar (1975, Chapter 2.5). Finally, the problem of reduction
of theory -- of explaining laws of a higher-order science in terms of
those of the lower order -- remains empirically open depending in part
on our ability in specific instances to offer a partial translation
between the theories. For a detailed discussion of the
problems in
reducing Mendelian genetic theory to molecular genetics -- an instance
where we have two genuine theories at different levels -- see David Hull)
Principles of Biological Science, Prentice - Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1974.
- The example is due to Georges Rey whose criticism of an earlier version
of this paper (presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology,
Chicago April 1981) helpfully motivated the preceding effort at
further clarification.
- Whether a science is autonomous in the present sense is a direct
function of the nature of stratification in the world. That is, as
per preceding note, if from a knowledge of the causal properties
and antecedent conditions of structures in one domain of science we
cannot predict events at the next level, then that level defines
another science with an irreducible subject-matter. As Bhaskar writes,
even if we could explain organic life in terms of physical and chemical
elements out of which organic things are formed, and perhaps even
reproduce this process in laboratories, biology would not be otiose.
Living things do not cease to be real; knowledge of biological
structures and processes would still be necessary to account for the
world as we know it.
- We do not pretend here, of course, to have addressed a number of
difficult methodological questions pertinent to experimental psychology.
These include questions regarding theory construction, problems about
the psychological reality of the mechanisms theorized, and issues
raised by various "functionalist" strategies (Fodor, 1968). Thus, as
was suggested earlier, while there can be no doubt that neurophysiological
infrastructures are involved in all psychological processes,
it is not clear how to proceed, whether, e.g., a neuropsychological
approach is to be preferred over artificial intelligence and computer
simulation models, whether or to what extent holistic versus more
specialized approaches are desirable, etc.
- On the present view, it is an important and empirical question whether
and how cultural factors relate to biological infrastructures. It
may or may not be the case that cultural differences have biological
effects. From this point of view, evolutionary biology, anthropology,
ethology, comparative psychology and related disciplines are surely
pertinent.
- While the standard view of science recognizes that one must distinguish
generalizations from laws, it was not able to identify in a reasonably
clear way their difference This is easily accomplished in the view
of science advanced here. (See Harre and Madden, 1976; Bhaskar,
1978a). Unclarity regarding this distinction has also encouraged
those instrumental views of science, most graphic in psychology in
the work of Skinner, in economics in the work of Milton Friedman, which
confuse explanation with prediction and control.