by Peter Szerlag July 20, 1998 zerg90@hotmail.com
On July 6, 1994, 14 firefighters died fighting the South Canyon/Storm King Mountain wildfire near Glenwood Springs, Colorado. The "Report of the South Canyon Fire Accident Investigation Team" was released on August 17, 1994. Ten people served on the investigation team - 6 US Forest Service employees, 3 Bureau of Land Management employees, and 1 National Weather Service employee.
On page 27 of the 216 page report, in the "Findings" section, you will find these words - "Radio and telephone Communications (did not contribute)". What these words signal is the belief of the investigating team that radio and telephone communications did not play a major role in this incident. I have gone through this report and come away with an entirely different impression in this matter. Please allow me to explain myself.
Major points to consider -
1. NICC would not release additional radios to assist initial attack forces during the days preceeding the Storm Mountain fire despite an apparent request from the Grand Junction BLM District office to do so. (District Fire Mgmt Officer Peter Blume's statement). NICC has ?3,000 portable radios and repeaters on hand in Boise Idaho to assist at wildfire operations throughout the USA.
2. There was hectic radio traffic on the "work" channel per the statement of Brad Hugh.
3. Per various statements, it is likely that 7 or more radio channels were in use on the fire.
4. Per Anthony C Petrilli's statement, it is fairly obvious that repeaters were not used to carry the fireline/fireground radio traffic. His exact words are - "I remembered when Wabaunsee was talking to Erickson I couldn't hear Erickson's transmissions".
5. At the most critical moment in the incident, when the fire was "blowing-up", (per Petrilli's statement again), radio messages had to be repeated twice. The exact quote is - "I called Mackey on the radio and told him that it had spotted across the main canyon and that we were coming back up the hill. I knew that I didn't want to be where I was. He asked me if it spotted across the MAIN canyon. I replied yes it was across the main canyon and its ROLLING."
In conclusion, please consider these ideas -
A. If NICC had given Grand Junction BLM additional radios when requested, then communications for initial attack commanders would have probably been much easier and much more relaxed.
B. Hectic radio communications probably slowed down reaction times to emergencies and reduced the amount of time that incident leaders could spend on strategizing and analyzing safety concerns. After all if you have to repeat radio messages two or three times, then you have much less time left to hear yourself think.
C. Per Steve Little's statement, there was apparently difficulty coordinating among all the various radio channels in use at the fire. Anytime that more than one radio channel is in use on a fire, then it is required that a well thought out radio coordination plan be in place.
D. Using repeaters to carry fireline/fireground communications reduces the number of messages which must be relayed by third parties and greatly decreases the number of broken-up/static-filled messgaes that everyone has to listen to.
E. There are three possible reasons that I can come up with to explain why Petrilli had to repeat his message to Mackey - a poor radio pathway between the two parties; interference from other users on the frequency; uncertainty on Mackey's part as to the true location of the spot fire. If repeaters were used to carry the fireline/fireground radio traffic on this fire then possibly this particular message would have gotten through quicker and to more of the parties who needed to know.
I have written this article in order to increase everyone's awareness of the critical role that radio communications play in public-safety operations.
Following the Oakland Hills Fire in 1991, there was a very strong suggestion made to the public-safety community that radio disaster drills be conducted on a regular basis. The purpose of these drills would be to maintain the proficiency of dispatchers in regards to little-used disaster communications and disaster operating procedures. I have never heard of a single, solitary agency in the USA which has implemented this suggestion. THOSE WHO DO NOT LEARN FROM THEIR MISTAKES ARE DESTINED TO REPEAT THEM!